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# Allied Prolif Turn

## 1NC

**Reducing military aid causes allied prolif and aggression.**

**Bromund, 18** (Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/obamas-ugly-legacy-the-mideast, 3-5)

The war in Syria was like a stone thrown into a lake. The initial splash has subsided, but the waves are spreading throughout the region. Where the waves meet the shores of the lake, they splash again into new wars. The wars of the Persian Gulf, the Kurds, and Israel are beginning. The modern Middle East has rarely been peaceful. But today, its wars have a new shape. A few years ago, they were in the heartland of Syria. Now, they are on the periphery — Yemen, Qatar, Turkey, and soon, Israel. These are the wars after the Syrian war — and they flowed naturally from it, and from U.S. policy. The Obama administration believed that the United States was too involved in the Middle East. That idea was not completely wrong: fundamentally, Asia and Europe are more important to the United States than the Persian Gulf. But **it was wrong to believe that less U.S. involvement would bring more peace**. The role of U.S. power — everywhere — **is to reassure our friends and deter our enemies**. We often focus too much on the deterrence role, but the reassuring role is often just as important. If we were not there to reassure, our friends would find it necessary to **act in ways contrary to our interests.** In Europe, the purpose of NATO was as much to reassure Western Europe as it was to deter the USSR. In Asia, our alliances with Japan and South Korea keep their nervousness about China and North Korea within tolerable limits. In the Persian Gulf, we backed up Saudi Arabia against Iran. The reason we do this is not because we are nice guys. It’s because we don’t want Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia to become **nuclear powers to protect themselves**. And we don’t want that because we believe that, on the whole, we’re safer if the spread of nuclear weapons is limited. When the United States withdraws, **we expect our allies to start taking out insurance policies on their own, and our adversaries to become more aggressive**. That is what we have seen in the Middle East. As the Obama administration withdrew, Saudi Arabia grew nervous, and Iran advanced. The result of that advance was the war in Syria. Of course, even before Iran was involved, the Arab Spring brought revolt to Syria. But it was Iran that made the struggle what it became — a war meant to spread Iranian power. Today, the Saudis are engaged in wars on several fronts. At its rear, it struggles to pacify Yemen. On its flank, it blockades Qatar. A blockage, classically, is an act of war. These are the acts of a new leadership seeking to control its neighbors out of fear for its region. The same is true, in a lesser way, of Turkey, which fears the Syrian war has brought new assertiveness to the Kurds. And so Ankara wages war on the Kurds, both inside Turkey and on its borders. And then there is Israel. If Iran controls Syria, as it now does, Lebanon cannot be free — and if Lebanon is dominated by Iran’s Hezbollah, Israel will face greater threat. That day is not far away. The recent Israel airstrikes in Syria, the Iranian military presence in Syria, and the growth of Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the Syrian war tell us that the next war on the edges of the Middle East will likely be waged against Israel. These wars are the result of antagonisms than began long before 2008. But old hatreds alone do not make wars, an **opportunity is also required**. And the withdrawal of the United States **created that opportunity**. So welcome the Middle East to the wars after the war — the wars of Barack Obama.

**Allied prolif turns the case- it causes *militarization* of new states with a legacy of colonial violence causing arms races and nuclear conflict-the affirmative must refute the specifics of each scenario to win.**

**Khalilzad, 95** (Zalmay, Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the cold war Tim WASHINGTON QtMciKkiv • SPRIX« 1995 )

Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well **increase the danger of major conflict,** require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. pros perity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the **institutions and solidarity** of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. At that time, the United States was but one of several major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany—especially since unification—would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically—to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. **This could result in arms races**, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, **it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly**, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks **of preventive or preemptive war**. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war—an unlikely prospect—Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests—economic and political—in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

# PMC Shift Turn 1NC

**Restricting military aid gets circumvented and causes a shift to PMCs. Gul, 6** (Saad Gul, 5-17-06, Law Clerk to The Hon. John C. Martin, Chief Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals. JD Wake Forest University School of Law, BA Davidson College., THE SECRETARY WILL DENY ALL KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR ACTIONS: THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, <https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9635-lcb102gulpdf>)

The use of innovative financial procedures to utilize PMC services in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy is particularly ominous, because Congress has often relied on its power of the purse to define the permissible parameters of the nation’s policy, e.g. in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda.116 Indeed, Congressional use of the appropriations power is one of the last meaningful constraints on virtually unbridled Presidential authority as Commander in Chief in the arena of military affairs—the utilization of financial smoke and mirrors to evade Congress effectively eviscerates this power. 117 The use of contractors to escape legal constraints is hardly a recent innovation. During the Vietnam era, a Pentagon official described one contractor, Vinnell, as “our own little army in Vietnam,” explaining that “we used them to do things we either didn’t have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems.” 118 Worse still, the ostensibly private status of PMCs means that they can be used to skirt Congressional mandates; the Pentagon used them in the Balkans to stage an end run around the Congressionally imposed cap on U.S. troop deployments in the region.119 Similarly, the United States has been able to evade statutory prohibitions on offering military assistance to certain nations by routing such aid through PMCs.120 Congressional oversight becomes an even more distant prospect when PMC contracts are routed through a variety of channels, including the Commerce, Interior, and State Departments.121 For instance, many of CACI’s contractors at Abu Ghraib were funded through a Department of the Interior Contract for Information Technology Services.122 With such bureaucratic sleights of hand, meaningful oversight is impossible. Even if technically legal, such actions serve to significantly dilute Congressional oversight of U.S. military activity around the globe.12

**Greater reliance on PMCs causes shadow wars.**

**Singer, 7** (Peter, Director @ 21st century defense initiative, interviewed by Scott Horton, columnist for Harper’s Magazine, “‘Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Six Questions for P.W. Singer”, 9/30, <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311>)

One of your first conclusions is that by using military contractors, policymakers “dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect the public interest.” Moving away from the operations in Iraq which are more immediately topical, security contractors have been pushed as surrogates for uniformed military as peacekeepers in Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and a variety of other circumstances. A Marine general recently told me that he was concerned that the heavy reliance on contractors might allow policymakers to ease into a foreign conflict in a way that avoided Congressional scrutiny and oversight. Do you agree that this is a realistic concern? Yes, and I wouldn’t use the word “might,” as if it were a future scenario. Contractors have already been used in all sorts of operations, in both an overt (Iraq, Balkans) and covert (Colombia, Sudan), manner to get around certain political consequences or congressional restrictions. When the U.S. military shifted to an all-volunteer, professional force in the wake of the Vietnam War, military leaders set up a series of organization “tripwires” to preserve the tie between the nation’s foreign policy decisions and local communities. Led by then-Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (1972-74), they wanted to ensure that the military would not go to war without the sufficient backing and involvement of the nation. Much like a call center moved to India, this “Abrams Doctrine” has been outsourced. Instead, contractors offer the means for choices to be dodged at the onset of deployment, and for scrutiny and public concern to be lessened after deployment. Your home-front does not get as involved when its contractors are being called up and deployed, nor do the people there ask key questions when contractors are lost. Over 1,000 have been killed in Iraq and 13,000 wounded, but they are not counted on official Department of Defense reports. In turn, if you want to go to a non-Iraq example, where is the concern over the three American contractors still held captive by the FARC in Colombia today? Imagine if we had three soldiers as POWs instead. In addition, your media also becomes less likely to cover the story when contractors are involved. One quarter of one percent of all news stories out of Iraq mention contractors. This new option is obviously greatly appealing to executive branch policymakers, but the underlying premise of the Abrams Doctrine was that, if a military operation could not garner public support of the level needed to involve the full nation, then maybe it shouldn’t happen in the first place.

**PMCs remove any counterweight on violence and prevents long term solution. Gladstone, 10** [(Masters from from University of St Andrews) (Elias, PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE SECURITIZATION OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, Dissertation in M.Litt from University of St Andrews, Proquest)]

In the contemporary global order, the “privatization” of security helps to remobilise the re-militarization of its understanding. This contributes to the increased legitimacy of technical, military, managerial security discourses. It depoliticises security, moving it out of the public realm and thereby disempowers not so much the state or public, but rather 'civil' component of state and civil society advocates of non-military security approaches. This has implications for where discourses about security are produced and by whom. Security debates are moving out of the public realm into a restricted sphere where executive, military, secret services and PSCs can decide how issues should be defined and handled. Correspondingly, it diminishes the presence of governmental (legislative assemblies, diplomats and foreign affairs/state departments) and civil society (media, NGOs, think tanks) voices that would be expected to contest the consequent militarization of security issues (Leander, 2005: 820). The increasing weight of the technical and managerial in discussions about security in the public sphere is the most tangible consequence of this trend. This shift reinforces the re-militarization of security as firms ground their claim to expertise in their capacity to offer technologically effective and economically interesting solutions to existing problems. However, when a problem is not a security problem or would be better responded too by way of diplomacy or economic aid or re-regulation of markets, the services of PSCs not needed. The growing weight of security experts and discourses in the production of legitimate knowledge risks overshadowing the kinds of “long term” solutions everyone sees the importance of. The dominance of private security discourses crowds out the prior question of whether or not a problem is really security problem, and if so, whether or not a military or law enforcement response is most appropriate (Leander, 2005: 824). As Ong- Webb (2007: 90) argues, piracy is non-traditional security threat that cannot be solved through military solutions, it requires better policing on land. Piracy should be rooted out by attacking pirates’ sources of strength on land, disrupting their organizational structures and isolating them from their sources of support. In particular, this means destroying their bases and hideouts, cutting off sources of capital, technology and recruitment; and crippling the middlemen and markets that allow them to dispose of their loot. A long-term solution would require governments to employ socioeconomic measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance in order deal with piracy effectively.

# Iranian Aggression Turn 1NC

**Saudi coalition is keeping Iranian funded Houthis at bay, but they will take over Yemen absent US support to the coalition – causes Iran prolif, regional aggression, and terrorism. Gordon, 19** [Evelyn Gordon 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist and commentator, former reporter for the Jerusalem Post, BA Princeton], "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," JNS.org, <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> (January 30, 2019)]

An expert report submitted to the U.N. Security Council this month concluded that Iran is illegally funding Yemen’s Houthi rebels by giving them oil, which they can sell for cash. From last year’s version of the same report, we learned that Iran is arming the Houthis with missiles and drones, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo. Thus whatever the Houthis were when the war started, they are now effectively an Iranian subsidiary, dependent on Tehran for both cash and arms. That is just one of many reasons to be appalled by the Senate’s renewed effort to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led fight against the Houthis. Not only is this strategically idiotic, but it contradicts the Senate’s own stated goal of protecting human rights. And the legislation reintroduced this week sends a terrible message, even if a presidential veto will presumably keep it from becoming law. On the strategic side, let’s start with the fact that an organization whose official slogan is “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam” isn’t one Americans should want ruling anything, much less a country whose location enables it to dominate a strategic waterway vital to the global oil industry. And without the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis would long since have taken over Yemen. In other countries, like Syria and Lebanon, Iranian military and financial aid has repeatedly enabled its proxies to overwhelm the opposition; that this hasn’t yet happened in Yemen is only because there, unlike in Syria and Lebanon, the Saudi coalition has provided its local allies with substantial assistance, including airstrikes. Second, empowering allies is always better than empowering enemies. Granted, Saudi Arabia a highly imperfect ally, but it is at least nominally in America’s camp. Iran, in contrast, has been America’s avowed enemy since 1979, and its proxies have been responsible for hundreds, if not thousands, of American deaths in Lebanon and Iraq. Thus for the Senate to weaken Riyadh and strengthen Tehran, which targeting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen does, would be foolish at any time. But it’s especially foolish at a time when America ostensibly seeks to exert maximum pressure on Iran to curb its multifarious bad behavior—its nuclear program, about which it has repeatedly lied; its ballistic-missile program, which defies a U.N. Security Council resolution; its regional aggression, which has already enabled it to dominate Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; and its terrorism, including recent attacks in the heart of Europe. Maximum pressure requires both financial and military components, as the case of the Soviet Union shows. It was America’s massive military buildup under Ronald Reagan, combined with its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which made Moscow’s military adventurism too expensive for its ailing economy to support. Iran, like the Soviet Union, has a weak economy, which has been further undermined by America’s reinstatement of stringent sanctions. Yet the economic pressure will be multiplied if Iran has to keep pouring resources into its numerous proxy wars rather than being able to win them cheaply. Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria obviously further this effort, since Iran must keep replacing what Israel destroys. But the Saudi coalition in Yemen is similarly forcing Iran is keep expending resources on a war it thought would be easily won. Thus if Washington is serious about countering Tehran and doesn’t want to risk American troops in the process, supporting regional allies who are bleeding Iran is the only alternative.

**That closes the Hormuz Strait, causes a global recession, and draws in China and North Korea – our evidence assumes US import independence and Iranian caution. Kopits, 17** [(Kopits, Steven, MA International Econ and MBA Finance @ Columbia, degree @ Haverford. “Oil could top $200 if Saudi-Iran war breaks out”. *CNBC News.* November 10, 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/10/saudi-iran-war-would-create-domino-effect-of-global-disaster-commentary.html>)]

Events appear to be spinning out of control in the Middle East, and the threat a Saudi-Iranian war is looking increasingly credible. Make no mistake, an out and out conflict between the two nations would be an unmitigated disaster for the region and the world. Last week, Houthi rebels in Yemen launched a missile targeting a Saudi airport near Riyadh. The missile was intercepted, but a Saudi-led military coalition battling the Yemeni rebels called the attack a "blatant military aggression by the Iranian regime which may amount to an act of war." The Saudis reserved the "right to respond", according to the official Saudi Press Agency. The major OPEC oil producers, all abutting the Persian Gulf, export almost 20 percent of the world's oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to global markets. The strait, a mere 34 miles wide at its narrowest, sits pinched between Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Were a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to erupt, this chokepoint could easily be closed. Indeed, shipping could stop even before a single ship is damaged. If insurers perceive an imminent risk of attack on a tanker in the region, they would either suspend insurance or charge exorbitant rates for coverage. Under the circumstances, vessel owners could opt to wait out the hostilities rather than risk their tankers. Of course, the strait could also be closed as a direct result of military hostilities, for example, by Iran. The impact of such a closure on the global economy would be severe and immediate. For example, the Suez Crisis of 1957 saw 10 percent of the world's oil production taken off the market. Within a month, the U.S. and Europe were facing a recession which would last the better part of a year. In 1973, the Arab-Israeli War and resulting Arab OPEC embargo would bring long lines to gas stations as the oil price quadrupled. On an annual basis, global oil production held steady, but Persian Gulf exports to the U.S. fell by 1.2 million barrels / day, or about 7 percent of total U.S. consumption. This oil shock would plunge the U.S. into a recession which lasted for two years. In the event of a Saudi-Iranian hostilities lead to a sustained outage of Persian Gulf exports, a severe and prompt global recession will follow similarly. Much as in 1973, U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf still amount to 8 percent of consumption, the loss of which was sufficient to knock 10 percent from GDP from 1973 to 1975. However, China and other importers would seek to outbid the U.S. on its imports from countries like Nigeria, Angola and even Brazil and Columbia. In all, U.S. imports could fall by 15 percent of total consumption--twice the drop from 1957 to 1973 and sufficient to plunge the U.S. into a deep recession lasting years. On the other hand, U.S. import dependence has fallen dramatically since the start of the shale revolution. Even as the U.S. coastal regions would suffer from high oil prices, boom times would return to Louisiana, Texas and on up to North Dakota and Canada's Alberta province. A loss of 20 percent of the world's oil supply would push oil prices into the $200 / barrel range. The shale sector would see its glory days. Those countries without material oil production would suffer the most, notably Europe and East Asia, in particular Japan and South Korea. China's situation would be dire. In the last few years, Chinese import dependence has become acute. Oil imports cover more than three-quarters of total Chinese consumption, and half of China's imports originate in the Persian Gulf. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not only put China into recession, but given the high degree of financialization of the economy, could create a wider societal and political crisis. The reaction of the Chinese government is difficult to anticipate, but China would certainly bring maximal pressure on the U.S. and Persian Gulf countries to end the conflict, by whatever means. The ultimate takeaway for China would be the necessity to build, at all speed, a global military and diplomatic presence capable of projecting force to influence events in the Middle East and, if necessary, to displace the U.S. in the region. Finally, given the history of cooperation between North Korea and Iran on missile programs, the threat of missile strikes from Iran could exacerbate tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon could become the absolute priority in the conflict and lead to a rapid escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

### Houthis are worse

**Turns the case – Houthis are a bajillion times worse than the Saudis. Gordon, 19** [Evelyn Gordon 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist and commentator, former reporter for the Jerusalem Post, BA Princeton], "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," JNS.org, <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> (January 30, 2019)]

Still, how can America possibly support a coalition that’s committing gross human-rights violations in Yemen? The answer is easy: **Horrible as Riyadh’s behavior is, the Houthis are worse**. Thus **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, American would empower an even greater evil**. **A perfect example is the issue of child soldiers**. The New York Times ran a front-page story last month accusing the Saudis of using Sudanese child soldiers in Yemen. Though it didn’t provide many hard numbers, it implied that there could well be several thousand such soldiers. This is incontrovertibly bad. But what the Times carefully concealed from its readers is that the Saudis’ use of child soldiers pales before that of the Houthis. According to an Associated Press report earlier that month, **the Houthis openly admit to employing a whopping 18,000 child soldiers**. Moreover, while the Saudis are taking boys aged 14 to 17, **the Houthis are using children as young as 10**. And while the Saudis are recruiting their impoverished volunteers by offering pay sufficient to make their families permanently self-supporting (assuming the returning veterans invest it, as most do, in profit-making ventures like cattle or shops), **the Houthis** use other tactics: They **kidnap children outright, coerce them to enlist in exchange for a relative’s freedom from jail, or force poor parents to choose between “volunteering” their child and making an unaffordable cash contribution to the war effort. Parents who resist are shot**. In short, **bad as the Saudis’ human-rights violations are, the Houthis’ violations are far worse**. And **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, the Senate would consign Yemen to the barbarous rule of those very same Houthis**.

**Case solvency proves the link – if Saudi is still strong, they don’t solve their case – our DA isn’t reliant on Iran becoming a regional hegemon but rather just increased aggression EVEN IF it fails – also they don’t need military might – the Houthis are on Iran’s side**

### Aff allows Iran to expand regionally

Aff plan would allow Iran to gain regional dominance and shut off major oil shipping lanes. Posey & Phillips, 18 [Madyson Hutchinson Posey is a former Research and Administrative Assistant.

James Phillips is a Senior Research Fellow @The Heritage Foundation, Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences,” 6 December 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous>]

Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it. The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

# Solvency: Only Pressure on Saudi Solves

Pressure on Sauid Arabia alone ends the war in 1 minute. Jones et. al, 19 [Jones, PhD LSE, et al. 19 (Bruce, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190107_new_geopolitics_of_mena_final.pdf>)]

BRUCE JONES: If I were an informed but not expert foreign policy watcher, I would read this interview and think to myself, when I listen to presidential candidates in 2020, I’m going to be very sympathetic to somebody saying, “Wash our hands, why on earth are we in this place, it’s like Game of Thrones, we don’t succeed, our allies are not always reliable.” What is the counter-argument to that? BRUCE RIEDEL: The reality is that you can’t get away from the tar baby once you’ve stuck yourself in it. MARTIN INDYK: What happens in the Middle East doesn’t stay in the Middle East. It comes after you. AMANDA SLOAT: We only have to look at the refugee crisis in Europe to see that American inaction in the Middle East, particularly in the Syrian case, also has consequences. Europe was flooded with refugees, which apart from the devastating humanitarian situation has contributed to heightened populist sentiments there and the corresponding rise of far-right political parties. MARTIN INDYK: And the United States has viable diplomatic options. U.S. diplomatic leadership can play a positive role in the conflicts between Israel and Iran in Syria, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In Syria, Israel has no choice but to deal with Moscow because we are absent from the game. And, as Kemal pointed out, Turkey, Iran, and Russia are trying to influence the political and diplomatic outcome there, and we’re not playing. Israel will quickly come to realize the limits to its ambitions in Syria because of the absence of the United States. In Yemen, the Saudis need an active American effort to get them the hell out of there. It’s the only way it’s going to work. And yet we’re not willing to do anything but supply weaponry. BRUCE RIEDEL: I want to underscore this point. If you think about smart American politics in this region, helping the Saudis get out of the morass that they’ve created in Yemen is probably the biggest thing we could do in the near term to help stabilize the Kingdom and stabilize the Arabian Peninsula. And it’s doable. We have the means. If we call the Saudis up tonight and say “Cease fire tomorrow at 6:00 or no arms deliveries starting at 6:01,” they’ll say, “Yeah, okay, we got it.” They would have no choice. NATAN SACHS: That would have a huge human benefit in Yemen. It’s not necessarily a geostrategic issue, but it is a dramatic tragedy

## UAE Thumps the Aff

**The UAE thumps the aff. Byman, 18** (Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also senior associate dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies Program. Previously, Byman served as a staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Prior to that, Byman was a policy analyst and the director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the U.S. government. His most recent book is "Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know" (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is the author of several other books on counterterrorism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and conflict and terrorism in the Middle East. "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/>)

Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates **(UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen.** Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and **Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders.** Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed.

The EU will continue to sell arms to Saudi and is ramping up, and if not they divert to Egypt – this is DOUBLE CIRCUMVENTION.

Cochrane, 18 (Paul Cochrane is “EU countries approve arms sales to Saudi, UAE worth 55 times aid to Yemen”; Middle Eastern Eye; November 12, 2018; <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-countries-approve-arms-sales-saudi-uae-worth-55-times-aid-yemen>)

European governments and the European Union publicly wring their hands about the "human tragedy" and need for "life-saving assistance" in war-torn Yemen. Yet while the Saudi-led coalition has bombed the region’s poorest country over the past three years, the EU and European countries approved the sale of more **than $86.7bn in arms to Saudi Arabia and the U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates, according to figures compiled by Middle East Eye. The value of the licences which the countries issued in 2015 and 2016 - the only years for which data is available - amount to more than 55 timeswhat the EU and European countries have donated to **the UN’s chronically underfunded Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan**. Meanwhile, independent researchers estimate that more than 56,000 Yemenis have been killed with the UN warning “a clear and present danger” of an imminent famine engulfing 14 million Yemenis – or half of the population. Many governments have promised during the course of the war to stop or restrict sales of the weapons that are being used to maim Yemenis, and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last month brought a new wave of public pressure to halt deals with the Saudi kingdom. But only Germany and Norway have suspended their sales – until Khashoggi’s murder is explained - while **the UK, France and Spain have all signalled that they will continue business as usual**. Experts say the continuation of the sales, which politicians often justify by pointing to job creation, security cooperation and trade relations, reveals a fundamental disconnect for Western governments between their actions and Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. The UK and many of its EU allies insist there is no military solution to the conflict, yet they themselves are supplying the weapons that are fuelling and prolonging the hostilities,” says Ben Donaldson, head of campaigns at the United Nations Association-UK, a grassroots policy group. “There has just been one UN Security Council resolution in three years of conflict, which is very surprising given its severity compared to other conflicts, and the UK is taking sides in the conflict, which flies against its position of ‘penholder’ and its responsibility. The UK’s position is to support Saudi Arabia.” Jeff Abramson, a non-resident senior fellow with the Washington, DC-based Arms Control Association told MEE: “**The reality is the provision of arms extends conflicts and leads to humanitarian disasters, so to an extent the arms trade fuels the need for aid assistance. It is a perverse cycle.**” **For decades, billions of dollars in arms sales flowed into the Gulf to be stockpiled and largely forgotten**, while the revenues have piled up into European bank accounts. Ministers did not have to do mental gymnastics to justify such deals, saying the sales were for "defensive purposes". Or as the French defence minister put it in February, they were “not supposed to be used”. Jobs were created at home, and the deals kept the doors open to closer economic and political ties with oil-rich Gulf kingdoms. The only potential crack in the narrative was if news surfaced of the greasing of palms to secure the deals. Take the Al-Yamamah oil-for-arms deal agreed by Saudi Arabia and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s which netted British arms giant BAE around $55bn in revenues. Made in Britain, tested on Yemenis: The reality of working for the bombmakers. An eventual investigation into the deal was shut down in 2006 by then prime minister Tony Blair after pressure from the Saudis. Otherwise, arms exports were an easy sell to the public. Shady deals there might be, but no one was getting killed, and nobody needed any humanitarian assistance, even if a blind eye was turned to domestic oppression and proxy wars. But with the war in Yemen, that position no longer holds. Since the war started in March 2015, more than 10,000 Yemenis have been killed – at least, that’s the figure that’s been reported, without change, over the past two years. In a report released in October, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, an independent conflict research group, has estimated that 56,000 have been killed since January 2016 which does not include those who have died from hunger and disease – and is likely, said the researchers, to be an underestimate. The growing number of civilians killed and maimed by coalition forces – at weddings, in marketplaces and on school buses - has led to increased pressure on governments to justify their arms sales to the kingdom and the UAE. In 2015 and 2016, the only years for which EU arms export reports are currently available, nearly every EU country has sold arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. MEE has found: In 2015, 21 EU countries approved licences for the export of arms, ranging from bullets to bombs to jet fighters and specialised military components, worth $25.3bn to Saudi Arabia and $11.4bn to the UAE, totalling $36.7bn. Of this total, $14.4bn was for aircraft, bombs and grenades, **the primary causes of civilian deaths**. In 2016, 17 EU countries licensed the sale of even more weapons worth $18.3bn to Saudi Arabia and $31.7bn to the UAE, totalling $50bn. While EU-wide figures are not available for 2017, those provided by individual countries indicate that arms sales have largely continued at the same rate. In 2017, the UK and Germany licensed $2.3bn in arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, according to figures provided by governments and the Campaign Against the Arms Trade. **As the sales have continued, the UN’s Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan campaigns have remain underfunded**: Overall since 2015, the EU and some European countries have given $1.56bn to the UN’s response plan, according to UN OCHA figures. That's equivalent to 1.8 percent of approved European arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2015 and 2016. The European Commission, towards which all EU states contribute, has provided $507.2m to Yemen, roughly half to the UN’s response plan, for the past three years. That’s equivalent to 0.58 percent of $86.7bn in approved European arms sales in 2015 and 2016. During the same period, the UK has provided $733.4m in humanitarian aid for Yemen, according to government figures provided to MEE. Of that, $636.9 million went to the UN response plan, equivalent to 13.1 percent of the UK's $4.85bn in approved licences for 2015 and 2016. France is the lowest overall donor compared to approved licenses, providing $12.3m in aid from 2015 to 2018, just 0.07 percent of $17.3bn in approved arms sales in 2015 and 2016. However, experts say France's licensing figures may be inflated because the country includes ongoing negotiations in their totals. The fourth and fifth largest European arms suppliers, Spain and Italy, are tight-fisted when it comes to humanitarian aid, giving equivalent to 0.26 percent and 0.76 percent of their approved arms sales in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Germany has been relatively generous with aid of $358m from 2015-2018, equivalent to 29 percent of $1.2bn in licenses approved in 2015 and 2016. Sweden, which had $1.33bn in sales in 2015 and 2016, has given $105m in aid for 2015 to 2018, or 7.93 percent of the value of approved licences. Only Ireland has exceeded humanitarian aid contributions compared to approved arms sales, at 123 percent in 2015 (there were no exports in 2016). As the conflict continues in Yemen, the UN’s 2018 humanitarian response plan is currently **35 percent underfunded**. **The $1.04bn shortfall is just 1.1 percent of approved European arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2015 and 2016 alone.** While approved licenses are clearly different from actual exports, in Europe, they nearly always become actual sales, says Andrew Smith, spokesman for the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT). "If a licence is signed which isn't hugely skewed by change in legislation, you have given permission for the sale to go ahead. That means the government won't block it and, if they do block or suspend it for some reason, that gets calculated later on anyway," Smith says. The one exception is France which has included licences still under negotiation since 2014. Overall, given the choice between “maximising arms sales or human rights, it’s always arms sales that wins,” he says. And **the aid**, says Andrew Feinstein, executive director of Corruption Watch, and author of The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, **is “part of a PR veneer created around justifying the arms industry”.** As the world’s largest humanitarian disaster has unfolded, there has been pressure from activists and civil society groups over the past three years which has led Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden to announce that they were freezing or restricting of arms exports to the Gulf. The EU also made overtures at restricting arms exports, with the Council of Ministers – the executive government of the EU - passing a non-binding motion in December 2016 to ban all arms sales to Saudi Arabia. However, despite “a majority voting for the motion, the request was put aside and it has not happened,” said Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher, arms and military expenditure programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Neither have the country-level embargo announcements come to fruition. “There’s often a gulf between what is said and done in practice,” says Smith from CAAT. Furthermore, the EU’s attempt at an embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia did not include embargoes on other coalition members, including **the UAE and Egypt**. France, for instance, sold naval vessels to Egypt that could have been used to enforce the maritime blockade of Yemen, notes Wezeman. “The Dutch were supportive of the call for an embargo and not providing material for the aerial campaign, but they were still selling naval equipment; those components could be used in the blockade. **They try to look progressive but it’s still business as usual**,” says Anna Stavrianakis, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex and author of Taking Aim at the Arms Trade. So why do the sales continue? Jobs and political influence on the countries that arms are sold to are often used to justify the continued policy. But one primary reason for the EU’s inability to rein in arms exports to the Gulf is an unwillingness to regulate the military industrial complex due to its powerful influence over governments and pervasive corruption in the sector, say observers. Feinstein of Corruption Watch says there is, in fact, no meaningful regulation of the arms industry in Europe. “The UK and Germany point out national legislation and rigorous exporting licences, and being signatories to treaties they champion, but by exporting to Saudi Arabia and the UAE they are violating their own national laws, the EU Common Position on arms exports, and the Arms Trade Treaty,” he says. “There is nothing that compels them to do anything differently. National parliaments are completely powerless when it comes to the arms industry.” The industry has a strong lobby through government contracts, interlinkages with the military establishment, and a revolving door of politicians who are rewarded with positions on the boards of arms’ companies once out of office, according to Feinstein. Another problem, say observers, is corruption inherent within the industry. The arms trade is unregulated because the largest manufacturers (the USA, UK, Russia, France) all sit on the UN Security Council, so why would they go against their own business? Lacking the influence of the US, European companies have to frequently sweeten arms deals, which range from investments in buyer countries to gifts of personal jets, to payments to politicians through offshore bank accounts. “The US is slightly less corrupt as they have enormous political clout, but all European countries are more corrupt than the Americans, they’re far dirtier,” says Feinstein. None of the five largest West European suppliers - France, Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy, which together accounted for 23 percent of global arms transfers in 2013–17, according to SIPRI figures - appear to have any appetite to better regulate the arms trade, he added. Loretta Napoleoni, an Italian economist and expert on terrorist financing, told MEE: “The arms trade is unregulated because the largest manufacturers (the USA, UK, Russia, France) all sit on the UN Security Council, so why would they go against their own business?” In fact, there are more requirements imposed by financial regulators on NGOs globally, focused on where their donations come from and how their money is spent, than on global arms, she said. “There’s a lot of fuss about charities but almost nothing about arms,” says Napoleoni. The Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an influential global body which develops policies for countries to adopt on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards, has a specific recommendation for NGOs but not for the arms industry. “The amount of due diligence and compliance that humanitarian and development organisations working in conflict zones have to do is incredible. It is no exaggeration to say it is crippling some organisations from operating,” says Ben Hayes, an independent consultant who advises charities and foundations on AML and CFT rules. “To the founding members of FATF, which is the EU and the USA, corruption is viewed as something that happens exclusively in developing countries.” The restrictions on NGOs operating in Yemen has had a significant impact on the ground, says Sherine El Tarboulsi-McCarthy, a research fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). A packet of rice for a family of nine: Why Yemenis are starving “International humanitarian organisations face a lot of challenges to send and receive funds for Yemen. Getting bread and getting cash are the two main challenges for Yemenis,” she says. And critically, there is also the historical picture to consider: **jets sold to Saudi Arabia under the Yamamah deal and British-made cluster bombs exported before the UK passed legislation banning the weapons in 2010 are in use in Yemen today**. “Almost 30 years later, the cluster bombs were still operational, and used in air strikes,” says Smith of the Campaign Against the Arms Trade. **“Weapons sold today could be used for atrocities for years and years to come.”**

## UK Alt Cause

**The UK is a massive alt cause—they fuel just as many human rights abuses in Yemen and there are NO checks. Sharman, 18** (Jon Sharman is a news reporter, 7-18-18, UK almost doubles arms sales to countries on governments list of human rights abusers, figures reveal, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-arms-sales-double-human-rights-abusers-china-saudi-arabia-israel-yemen-a8452101.html>)

The UK nearly doubled the value of arms sales to countries on the government’s list of human rights abusers in the past year, figures reveal. Licences for arms deals worth some £1.5bn were approved in Whitehall in 2017, up from £820m a year earlier, according to figures compiled by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) pressure group. Sales were granted to 18 countries on the list, including China, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Israel, Egypt and Pakistan, compared to 20 different states in 2016. The value of sales to Saudi Arabia, currently embroiled in a bloody conflict in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels where thousands of civilians have been killed and millions left in need of aid, alone totalled £1.13bn, the group said. Theresa May’s government is “actively arming and supporting many of the regimes that even it believes are responsible for terrible human rights abuses”, CAAT’s Andrew Smith told The Independent. He added: “There is little oversight in the system, and no controls over how these arms will be used once they have left the UK. The arms sales being agreed today could be used to fuel atrocities for years to come. Right now UK-made fighter jets and bombs are playing a central role in the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen, and the government and arms companies have totally failed to monitor or evaluate how this deadly equipment is being used. “We are always being told how rigorous and robust the system supposedly is, but nothing could be further from the truth. These arms sales don’t just provide dictatorships and human rights abusers with the means to kill, they also give them a huge degree of political support.”

## Saudi Fear of Abandonment

**Fear of US abandonment drives reckless Saudi behavior- cutting off sales will magnify it. Bromund, 18** (Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage, https://www.newsday.com/opinion/commentary/what-not-to-do-about-khashoggi-1.22136012)

The death of Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of Saudi Arabia offers a terrible temptation to the United States: We can indulge our outrage at the expense of our interests. We have few good options, but giving in to that temptation would be the worst thing to do. Everyone involved in this scandal has performed poorly, if not disgracefully. Saudi Arabia has been caught lying about Khashoggi’s death. President Donald Trump has sided both with and against the Saudis, thereby earning brickbats from all sides. Turkey pretends to care about Khashoggi but imprisons more journalists than any other nation. And then there is Khashoggi himself. It’s awkward to speak ill of the dead, but Khashoggi’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was not a mere youthful flirtation. Just a year ago, he called on the Saudi leadership to cooperate with them, and to lead a unified Arab world to support the Palestinians in their fight against Israel. That doesn’t justify killing him. Of the region’s four major Muslim powers, Turkey has slid away from the West, Egypt just signed a strategic partnership with Russia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has hated the United States since 1979. That leaves only Saudi Arabia as a possible U.S. ally. Which is why Khashoggi’s death has caused such a stir. Revealingly, at about the same time as the writer disappeared, France disrupted an Iranian bomb plot that would have killed tens, if not hundreds, of people in Paris. And yet it’s Khashoggi’s killing that has grabbed the headlines. That’s because Khashoggi isn’t just a victim; he’s a proxy for a debate about U.S. policy. Obama-era veterans from Ben Rhodes to Michael McFaul have argued that Khashoggi’s death proves that President Barack Obama’s desire to sidle up to Iran at the expense of the Saudis was correct. This is nonsense. Obama’s policy isn’t the answer, it’s a significant part of the problem. As I have written in this column before, most U.S. alliances are as much about restraining our allies as they are about deterring our enemies. When Obama tilted toward Tehran, he gave Saudi Arabia a reason to start writing its own insurance policy against Iran, its regional enemy. Predictably, the Saudis have made a mess of it. They wanted to secure their flanks, but their war in Yemen is endless and profitless, and their blockade of Qatar, though driven by understandable concern over Iranian influence, has achieved little. At home, the regime’s so-called drive against corruption — like the parallel ones in Russia and China — is about centralizing power by eliminating opponents. The killing of Khashoggi, whether it was deliberate or a panicked bungle, is part of that drive — and it has backfired spectacularly. The problem for the United States is that Saudi behavior is destructive. But leaving the Saudis to go it alone would merely be more of the same policy that got us where we are today. Since 2011, when most U.S. forces left Iraq, declining U.S. influence has paralleled rising regional violence — and Iranian power. That violence isn’t our fault — but given how rotten the regimes in the region are, we shouldn’t have expected them to behave any better. Kicking Saudi Arabia to the curb now is tempting, but it will only quicken the descent by making it clear to the Saudis that they’re on their own against the Iranians. Breaking this spiral won’t be easy. It may not be possible. Yet we have to try to convince the Saudis that their actions, far from enhancing their security, are undermining it. Ironically, Khashoggi was right about that; the reaction to his death is proof of it. Our response to it should be guided not by self-righteous outrage, but by our interest in talking the Saudis down from their ledge.

**Ending aid won’t end the war; it will exacerbate it, encourage Iranian aggression and weaken key allies. Phillips & Posey, 18** (James, Phillips holds a master of arts (MA) as well as a master of arts in law and diplomacy (MALD) in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @Heritage Madyson Hutchinson Posey is research and administrative assistant for the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy. <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous>)

The Trump administration has banned 21 Saudi suspects in that murder from entering the U.S., imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials, and expressed its willingness to take further action if warranted by ongoing investigations. Many senators seek to do more to punish the Saudis, even if it means sacrificing the interests of the Yemeni government and making a negotiated settlement of the conflict more difficult. The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it.

### Block Extension

**US influence is key to reduce violence and promote settlement- withdrawal greenlights aggression by Russia and terrorists. Carafano, 18** (James J, vice president of Heritage's Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow. https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/chaos-will-erupt-the-middle-east-if-us-leaves-yemen)

Three years ago this month, a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf nations waded into Yemen's civil war. The U.S. is aiding the coalition, supplying special forces and sharing intelligence with our Saudi and UAE allies. For some Americans, that's too much. On Feb. 28, Sens. Mike Lee, R-Utah; Bernie Sanders, I-Vt.; and Chris Murphy, D-Conn., introduced a joint resolution invoking the War Powers Act. The goal: to yank all U.S. military support from the conflict. Legal scholars debate the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. Still, even if the Hill could tell the president to pull out of Yemen, it should not. If America walks away, it will only bring more war, not peace. America is there for a reason: to keep the region from falling apart. The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us. The greatest threats to Middle East stability and security are Iran and transnational Islamist terrorists groups, principally ISIS and al-Qaida. And it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war. If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, Tehran, ISIS, and al-Qaida would feel emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war. Meanwhile, Washington would lose its ability to influence how Saudi Arabia and the UAE conduct coalition operations. Without our mitigating presence, the carnage of this vicious war would only increase. And Russia would be tempted to further complicate the situation. Moscow has already vetoed a draft U.N. Security Council resolution to hold Iran accountable for providing Yemen's rebels with the long-range missiles recently fired at the Saudi capital. Putin would interpret an American withdrawal as a green light for additional Russian meddling – the type that Moscow has brought to the Syrian civil war. Instead of turning our back on Yemen, the U.S. should focus on ending the war. The longer the conflict persists, the more the chaos benefits terrorist groups in the region and the more the main rebel group, the Houthis, becomes dependent on Iran. There are no easy answers. Just ask American Enterprise Institute analyst Katherine Zimmerman, who follows the issue as closely as anyone. Her assessment: "The (Saudi-led) coalition's efforts to end the war militarily have been unsuccessful and will likely continue to fail...." There is no clear military solution. There is no clear political resolution either. Yemen's political landscape remains hopelessly fractured. Any settlement talks that exclude key stakeholders are likely to go nowhere. A new U.N. envoy, Martin Griffiths, is expected to try to launch another round of negotiations. But for now, at least, too many key actors seem unwilling to engage in serious peace talks. Rather than pull out, the U.S. should continue to use its presence and influence to establish the conditions that will allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the start of real peace negotiations that put the people of Yemen first. U.S. military activities contribute to both those goals, particularly by supporting counterterrorism operations against ISIS and a-Qaida. In addition to continuing that support, the U.S. should work to diminish Iranian meddling – not just by disrupting its aid to the Houthis, but by broadly attacking Tehran's foreign escapades throughout the region. Pressing the regime overall will strain its capacity to support the rebels in Yemen – and that may lead to all sides in the conflict coming to the peace table sooner rather than later. If Congress wants to see an end to the humanitarian suffering in Yemen, then writing off the current U.S. role there ought to be the last thing lawmakers think about. The U.S. cannot be a bystander. In fact, it may be the only actor with sufficient influence to drive the other players toward a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.

## Aff prevents the end of Yemeni War

**Saudi strength key to peace- plan weakening them means zero chance of success. Almarzoqi, 16** (Mansour , researcher on Saudi politics at Sciences Po de Lyon, France <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-saudi-efforts-yemen-advance-us-interests-17901> 10-2)

No fight against Al Qaeda has any chance of success in Yemen without two elements: a strong central government and a functioning state structure. Without that, any achievement is a mere flash in the pan. These two elements on the one hand, and the predominance of the alliance between the Iran-backed Houthi militia and Saleh forces on the other, are mutually exclusive. Thus, fighting Al Qaeda starts with the Houthi militia becoming a political party and Saleh’s acceptance of an inclusive political process. That is why the Arab coalition labored so hard for a solution based on these elements, as evident in the Gulf Initiative, UNSC Resolution 2216, the Kuwait negotiations, and several failed ceasefire attempts. If Saudi military capabilities are weakened, the chances that another state actor can rally the region behind a viable stabilization plan are next to none. Riyadh is the only major Arab world power that is stable and prosperous. And the fact that the Arab and Islamic World are rallying behind Riyadh’s leadership is not only motivated by Saudi Arabia’s reliability and stability, but also by its diplomatic, economic and military power, as well as its symbolic power as the birthplace of Arab and Islamic civilization. The Arab nation was born in Souk Okaz, grew up in Dar Annadwah, and emerged from the Suspended Poems. The Islamic nation was born in Mecca, grew up in Medina, and emerged from Saqifat Bani Sa’idah. From the Rashideen era, Umayyad era and Abbasid era, to Arab royal families and until today, political and religious elites of the Arab and Islamic worlds trace back their origins to this land. And it is towards this land that more than one billion believers around the world turn their faces five times a day. Blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia will put the territorial integrity of the Arab world, its security, and the stability of the region in jeopardy. The current balance maintained by Riyadh and its allies will be in a grave danger, and with it American security and interests.

## Aff leads to a flip to Russia

**Reducing arm sales to Saudi Arabia would cause a flip towards Russia. Bradley, 18** [John R. Bradley ( University College London, Dartmouth College and Exeter College, Oxford), 1 December 2018, Coffee House, 12-1-2018, "Has Saudi Arabia just pivoted towards Russia?," <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/12/has-saudi-arabia-just-pivoted-towards-russia/>]

First, a hot mic picked up parts of a tense conversation between the French President and Saudi Crown Prince. While hardly a slanging match, it was the most undiplomatic spat between a Western and Saudi leader ever made public. That was followed by the equally unprecedented spectacle of a bro-five between the latter and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. In the space of an hour, we may have witnessed what future history books will say was the moment Saudi Arabia’s relations pivoted from the West towards Russia. The relationship between the democratic West and theocratic Saudi Arabia has often been described as a marriage of convenience. The exchange between President Emmanuel Macron and Crown Prince Mohammed will certainly sound familiar to anyone who has been through a messy but not especially bitter divorce: MbS: Don’t worry. M: I do worry. I am worried, because I am very exp… MbS: He told me. Thank you. M: I don’t want… MbS: No. M: You never listen to me. MbS: I will listen, of course. M: … MbS: It’s OK. I can deal with it. The official word from the Elysee Palace is that the President was giving the Crown Prince a ‘very firm’ warning over the murder in Istanbul of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi and the continuing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. In the Western media, the two issues have become inextricably linked. For having failed in their effort to oust the Crown Prince, there is now as a push – led by the Washington Post, which has tripled its coverage of Yemen during the past six weeks – to bring an end to the Yemen conflict as retribution for Khashoggi’s slaughter. And this is especially embarassing for Macron. As recently as April, he pledged France’s ‘full support’ for the Saudi position on Yemen, while slamming the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels the Saudis and their allies are battling against. Predictably, this came on the back of arms agreements worth $18bn. But Macron’s exasperated ‘You never listen to me’ may have been in reference to the Saudi ruler’s decision last year to kidnap Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri during a visit to Riyadh, when he was beaten up and forced to read a resignation letter on Saudi TV. It was only after Macron stepped in that Hariri was finally released, and was subsequently able to resume his role as prime minister. In this way, Macron has been strutting around the world lecturing other countries and leaders how to behave as, his critics argue, a way of diverting attention from his own abysmal failures at home. Now he is in the unenviable position of being not only the least popular French president in modern history but also aligned most closely abroad with a Saudi ruler who is perhaps the most despised in the world. Putin, of course, is watching all this with relish. He is experienced in the art of bumping off political opponents, and having eradicated almost all traces of meaningful democracy and freedom of expression at home is able to offer the Crown Prince the hand of friendship without fear of reprecussions. He laid the groundwork last year during an official state visit to Moscow by King Salman — the first ever by a reigning monarch. They signed a $3bn arms deal and pledged tens of billions more in bilateral trade. At the time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the event as ‘an historical moment’. Now Saudi Arabia is even negotiating the purchase of Russia’s formiddable S-400 defense missile system, while threatening to cancel arms deals with the Western countires and instead purchase weaponary from Russia and China if sanctions are imposed over the Khashoggi affair. As with Syria and Iran, the Kremlin is demonstrating how, in contrast to the fickle West, it can relied on to remain a steadfast ally to countries in the Middle East it considers friendly, come hell or high water. The partnership between Saudi Arabia and Russia is not going to flourish overnight. But the crucial difference between our political leaders and theirs is that the latter think not in terms of election cycles while feeding at the trough, but rather how to forge deep strategic partnerships that will bear fruit decades, even centuries, in the future.

## Circumvention

**The plan guarantees circumvention- this card ends the debate. Miller, 12** (Nathanael Tenorio Miller intends to receive a J.D. from Cornell Law School in 2013., The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences, Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 45, 2012, <https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Miller-final.pdf>)

What happened to Najib and Ahmad was not an isolated incident, perpetrated by individual soldiers or commanders.14 Instead, it is a symptom of the wider failure of the Afghan government to address human rights abuses within their armed forces. Three months after Najib and Ahmad’s arrest, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by irregular armed groups and the Afghan Local Police (ALP).15 This incident also demonstrates the consequences of the United States’ circumventing its own laws to permit the distribution of military aid and equipment to countries that violate their citizens’ human rights. In many instances, units receiving aid from the United States are responsible for extra-judicial killings, torture, extortion, and rape.16 The failure of legislation to prevent military aid from flowing to foreign military units responsible for atrocities stems in part from a long-standing pattern in which increasingly broad Executive power pushes back against legislative attempts to limit Presidential authority in foreign policy decision-making.17 Often, Congress legislates a foreign policy position and the Executive works around the intent, if not always the letter, of the law. Because of subsequent congressional inaction, and a series of Supreme Court decisions effectively depriving any potential party of means to sue for enforcement of human rights legislation, the Executive remains in firm control.18 Without any independent check on its authority, the Executive’s internal controls are insufficient to prevent funding units that have committed human rights abuses.

# Case Impact Answers: Middle East War

**Middle East war won’t escalate—regional militaries are too weak. Rovner, 14** [\*John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair of International Politics and National Security, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies @ Southern Methodist University, \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University (\*Joshua, \*\*Caitlin Talmadge, Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, The George Washington University, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/less-more-future-us-military-persian-gulf>)]

Happily, however, the situation for the United States today is more like the 1950s than the 1970s. The major regional powers all suffer from serious shortcomings in conventional military power, meaning that none of them will be able to seriously threaten the balance for the foreseeable future. Iran’s military has suffered greatly from decades of war and sanctions. Iraq’s fledgling security services are almost exclusively focused on internal problems. And Saudi Arabia, the richest country in the region, seems content to rely on a dense network of defenses and proxies rather than pursue any real power projection capabilities. While there are reasons to worry about internal stability, especially given the ongoing fight against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), **there is very little chance of a major interstate war**. Moreover, threats to oil shipping in the Gulf are real but not overwhelming. All of this points to a simple and optimistic conclusion: the United States can protect its core interest in the free flow of oil without having to commit to a large and enduring naval or ground presence to the Gulf.

**Middle East war won’t escalate – balanced alliances, Chinese non-intervention, and cooperation prevent great power draw-in. Mead, 14** [Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine and a non-resident Scholar at the Hudson Institute, 2014 (“Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?” *Huffington Post*, July 7th, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html>)]

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago. GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms. Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending. But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible. AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close. While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.

## Saudi Arabia War

**No chance of instability. Obaid, 11** (Nawaf, Senior Fellow – King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and Ph.D. Candidate in War Studies – King’s College (London), “Why Saudi Arabia is Stable Amid the Mideast Unrest”, Washington Post, 3-10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030904372.html)

Saudi Arabia shares some characteristics that have been causes for unrest - such as high unemployment among its youth and public-sector corruption - but the kingdom has **strengths** its neighbors lack. Its strong economy and weak opposition are clear. Less understood in the West is another critical element: a nationalism that has been fostered by and is strongly linked to the monarchy. These qualities make it **highly unlikely** that the unrest in other Arab countries will spread to the kingdom. Economically, Saudi Arabia is able to fund projects that satisfy the needs of its growing population. Record revenue from energy exports has been invested in infrastructure and social services. It has spent tens of billions the past several years on universities and other schools, hospitals, rail lines and housing developments. An additional [$29.5 billion in financial benefits](http://arabia.msn.com/Business/Economy/AF/2011/March/4136498.aspx) to poorer Saudis - including help for the unemployed - was recently announced, as were raises for public servants and efforts to mitigate inflationary pressures. Last year, the salaries of all soldiers and military officers were increased. Although Saudi Arabia has amassed more than [$500 billion in foreign reserves](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/733c7df2-4e11-11de-a0a1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1G8hVWCk8) during the reign of King Abdullah - a measure widely seen as representative of the government's fiscal responsibility - the kingdom still faces economic challenges. By world standards, Saudi Arabia is wealthy; the global poverty line is $1.25 per day. All Saudis receive housing assistance and free health care and education; per capita income is about $18,500. Yet many Saudis feel that this standard of living is not commensurate with a country so rich in resources. To address embarrassment and unhappiness, the government launched a national strategy a few years ago to combat poverty, aiming to reduce the number of those living below the poverty level ($1,015 per month) from 13.3 percent in 2010 to 2.2 percent in 2020. Another initiative is on track to help the 1.63 percent of Saudis living in "extreme poverty" (less than $450 per month) by the end of this year. The culturally conservative Saudi society is also resistant to revolution. This reticence toward unpredictable change helps explain why the grass-roots "liberal" movement in the kingdom is just a few scattered groups that carry little support among the general population. Islamist reform movements are also small and fragmented. Five recent petitions by these groups gathered fewer than 4,500 signatures. Historically, Saudi Arabia has been dominated by allegiance to tribe and region. The most serious threat to Saudi leadership in the past decade may have been posed by al-Qaeda, but that group lost whatever public support it had after a series of bombings in Riyadh in 2003. A concerted counterterrorism effort, supported by the population, wiped out the group's network in the kingdom by 2006. Meanwhile, over the past two decades, a growing nationalist sentiment has been binding together Saudi society. External threats, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the rise of Iran and its anti-Arab policies, coupled with internal crises such as the al-Qaeda bombings have bolstered this patriotism. Saudi leaders have pursued domestic policies to unify the population, including the 1.5 million minority Shiites, who have long harbored grievances over discrimination and lack of opportunity. Loan programs have been expanded to bring students from outlying tribal areas to urban schools, shifting their allegiance from local to national leaders. The military has been recruiting from across the social spectrum. Restrictions against free expression have been loosened. Vibrant debates and government criticism are common in the press, as coverage of the disastrous [Jeddah floods](http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article283638.ece) recently and the government's initial inept response showed. Huge celebrations were held during the last Saudi National Day, whereas in the past, conservative religious authorities had opposed any expressions of fidelity to the state. The country's soccer league and national team have also formed important catalysts for fostering a strong sense of pride in being Saudi. Another simple but critical factor is that King Abdullah is a deeply popular leader of a monarchy that the vast majority of Saudis view as legitimate. The "Allegiance Commission" - which chooses the next leader from the sons and grandsons of King Abdulaziz, who united the kingdom in 1932- ensures that transitions are smooth and popularly supported. Satisfaction with the leadership, economic strength and nascent nationalism mark a unity in Saudi Arabia that is of a different fabric than those that are tearing across the Arab world. While other regimes reap the bitter harvest of irresponsible fiscal policies, social disunion and unpopular leadership, the Saudi monarchy is l**ikely to remain** a bulwark of regional stability and security.

# Base DA 1NC Link

**Trump’s base loves Saudi Arabia: cutting aid kills support. Ahmed, 18** (Ahmed, Akbar Shahid. “Trump And His Supporters Seem Primed To Accept Saudi Denials Over Jamal Khashoggi” *The Huffington Post*. 15 Oct. 2018, <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-and-his-supporters-are-primed-to-accept-saudi-denials-over-jamal-khashoggi_us_5bc4ab44e4b01a01d68cffaf>)

President Donald Trump on Monday jumped on the bandwagon of **conservatives** who have **spent more than a week arguing that he should not risk a serious rupture with Saudi Arabia over the alleged murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi**. By giving credence to the Saudi government’s denial of involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance, Trump moved toward putting his stamp of approval on a narrative that suits his ally, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman. **That narrative has focused on criticizing Khashoggi, downplaying Saudi human rights abuses and, above all, avoiding pressure or embarrassment for Trump over a major international scandal**. Trump, in comments to reporters outside the White House, raised the prospect that “rogue killers” are responsible for whatever happened to Khashoggi, who has not been seen since he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in early October. Trump’s remarks, which came after he spoke by phone with Saudi King Salman, directly challenges the intelligence gathered by the U.S., Britain and Turkey that indicates Khashoggi was murdered by a Saudi hit squad. Trump also stressed that King Salman “firmly denied” any knowledge of what’s become of Khashoggi, a point he also made in a tweet. rump’s approach lets him simultaneously say he is seeking answers about Khashoggi while signaling support for a historic U.S. partner to whom he has become especially close. And **it’s a Saudi-friendly turn that pro-Trump figures have quietly laid the groundwork for while lawmakers and rights groups have been loudly demanding accountability from the Saudis and threatening major changes** in American support for the kingdom. Some right-wing commentators cast the Khashoggi mystery in tribal terms. **In their telling, shadowy enemies of the president are responsible for the global outrage over Khashoggi’s disappearance and for blaming the Saudis before all the facts are known**. **The goal, they say, is to undermine the close relationship Trump has established with the Saudi leadership. Those fueling this effort point to bogeymen familiar to Trump fans.** These include the Muslim Brotherhood ― a largely non-violent Mideast political movement that the Islamophobia network in the U.S. describes as terrorists in a bid to cast doubt on all Muslims ― as well as the establishment media, officials who served under former President Barack Obama and Iran. Occasionally, some of this commentary gets pretty close to justifying murder by raising doubts about Khashoggi himself. But the larger goal is to make it harder for the public to accept that Trump’s Saudi friends are to blame or should be punished for the journalist’s disappearance. The pro-Trump outlet The Federalist published a classic of the genre Monday morning. In “10 Key Questions About The Khashoggi Affair To Answer Before Buying The Press Narrative,” Lee Smith argues that Turkey ― whose president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is close to the Muslim Brotherhood ― is deliberately misleading the world with its investigations and comments. Smith also suggests media coverage of the matter is being influenced by Qatar, another supporter of the Brotherhood and a regional rival of the Saudis. He casts doubt about how Khashoggi got permission to live in the U.S. ― hinting at the favorite Trump trope of undesirable people, particularly extremists, exploiting the immigration system. And he rounds it all off with aspersions about Obama aides. Former CIA director John Brennan, a Trump critic, should be asked about Khashoggi’s immigration process, Smith wrote, and other influential members of the Obama team should be seen as partisan critics of the Saudis as part of their continued advocacy for the Iran nuclear deal. “How much is U.S. reporting and opinion regarding the Khashoggi affair shaped by the pro-Iran echo chamber? Nearly all of it,” Smith wrote. “Having acquired over the last several years the customs and manners of Arab media outlets, it’s only fitting the U.S press has taken sides against certain Arab regimes, just as it has taken sides against the current White House. **Since Trump looks with favor on Saudi and the (United Arab Emirates), the media considers them enemies, too**.” Jacob **Wohl, a pro-Trump commentator, on Monday amplified the effort to smear Khashoggi, posting on Twitter that the journalist “was a spook**.” Donald Trump Jr. on Friday had helped boost this type of assault by retweeting an exchange that linked Khashoggi to “jihadists.” Over the weekend, **Conservative Review** reporter Jordan Schachtel **scoffed at the push for sanctions targeting the Saudis, posting that “I’m told we need to change U.S. policy because an Islamist noncitizen disappeared overseas under unknown circumstances.”** He added that it was time “to tune out demands & fake news coming from Erdogan, Iranian regime, & Qatari state-media organs, & continue to support Middle East reformers.” Other Trump supporters insist on a need for skepticism over Saudi involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance, recycling the “presumption of innocence” watchword touted by Trump supporters when sexual assault allegations surfaced against Brett Kavanaugh during his confirmation process for the Supreme Court. But **the trend is clear**. And it suggests how **advocates of Trump and the Saudis will behave as debate over Khashoggi continues in the U.S. and the rest of West. Conspiratorial Trump fans will get their red meat while institutions threatening repercussions for the Saudis over Khashoggi’s disappearance ― from Capitol Hill to the private sector ― will be targeted by the more sophisticated network of Saudi influence in Washington that will argue against a dramatic rupture with the kingdom.** It’s a double whammy that might just work ― versus one journalist whose voice has likely been silenced forever.

# Impact Framing Nuke War Outweighs

**Nuke war outweighs structural violence – prioritizing structural violence makes preventing war impossible. Boulding, 78** [Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354]

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, **a danger to human survival far greater than poverty**, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

## War turns the aff

**War turns structural violence – exacerbates gendered violence. Pain, 15** Rachel, Department of Geography, and Centre for Social Justice and Community Action, Political Geography, 'Intimate war,' 44 . pp. 64-73.

More directly, there are increases in domestic and sexual violence in times and zones of war. In Jones’ (2013) account of American soldiers’ return from Afghanistan and Iraq, she documents rising rates of homicide committed by service members and new veterans, and rape, sexual assault and domestic violence resulting from the effect of military culture, all of which are consistent with earlier wars across history (see also Leatherman, 2011). Through these continuities, Jones (2010) argues, war keeps going. Militarization, conflict, post-conflict and displacement exacerbate domestic violence, and it becomes more lethal where weapons are easily available (Adelman, 2003; Cockburn, 2004). War also presents new forms of violence against women (WHO, 2013); Sela-Shayovitz (2010) draws direct links between terrorism and increasing femicide in Israel, while Mojab (2004) documents a rise in the ‘nationalist tradition’ of honour killings in Iraqi Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War. There are especially high rates of violence in the transition from war to peace, as gender-based violence shifts from the public back to the private sphere (Hans, 2004).

**War turns structural violence not vice versa. Goldstein, 1** – IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

## Magnitude Outweighs

**Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing extinction outweighs structural violence – future generations. Bostrom, 12** (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

**High risk, low probability impacts come first – necessary for human survival. Vlek, 10** (Charles, professor emeritus, behavioral and social sciences @ Groningen university, 2010, "Judicious management of uncertain risks: I. Developments and criticisms of risk analysis and precautionary reasoning," Routledge, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669871003629887) //)

Serious uncertain risks in modern society Clearly, **risk-taking is needed for human survival and development**: ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’. Many real-life risks can be reasonably well assessed or even calculated beforehand; both the nature of a negative outcome and its probability may be relatively clear a priori. Thus, at least in principle, it is possible to contemplate such risks as either high, medium or low, as either acceptable or not, and/or as more or less controllable by the risk-taker. However, the enormous technological development and economic expansion in the industrial countries since World War II have gradually caused new risks to arise (see the examples in Table 2). These risks may be called ‘environmental’, but in most cases, public health seems equally at stake, either directly (as in avian influenza) or indirectly (as in GMOs). Page (1978) has described the new environmental risks using nine characteristics: (1) ignorance of mechanism, (2) modest benefits, (3) catastrophic costs, (4) low probability of disaster, (5) internal benefits, (6) external costs, (7) collective risk, (8) latency of effects, and (9) irreversibility of effects. Clearly, such risks Journal of Risk Research 521 are serious, complex, uncertain and socio-politically ambiguous, four ‘challenges of contemporary risks’ as identified by Klinke et al. (2006; see also Klinke and Renn 2002). Such uncertain, ill-quantifiable risks cannot be clearly delineated, structured, assessed and evaluated. This makes them (gradually) distinct from ‘certain’, reasonably quantifiable risks.

**Extinction first – we must prioritize the wiping out of humanity over impacts that we can recover from. Sandberg et al, 8** (Anders Sandberg - James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, Jason G. Matheny - senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, Milan M. ĆIrković - senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade; 9-9-2008, "How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction) //)

In the early morning of September 10, the Large Hadron Collider will be tested for the first time amid concern that the device could create a blackhole that will destroy the Earth. If you're reading this afterwards, the Earth survived. Still, the event provides an opportunity to reflect on the possibility of human extinction. Since 1947, the Bulletin has maintained the Doomsday Clock, which "conveys how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction--the figurative midnight--and monitors the means humankind could use to obliterate itself." The Clock may have been the first effort to educate the general public about the real possibility of human extinction. Less publicly, there had been earlier speculations about humanity's undoing. During the Manhattan Project, Robert Oppenheimer ordered a study to calculate whether a nuclear detonation would cause a self-propagating chain of nuclear reactions in the Earth's atmosphere. The resulting report, "LA-602: Ignition of the atmosphere with nuclear bombs," may represent the first quantitative risk assessment of human extinction. LA-602 concluded that ignition was physically impossible, and nuclear development proceeded. In 1950, physicist Leo Szilard renewed worries about human extinction after estimating that a sufficiently large number of nuclear weapons wrapped in cobalt would, when detonated, render the Earth's surface uninhabitable for five years (the half-life of cobalt 60). Szilard's fear that such a "doomsday device" might be developed inspired much of Herman Kahn's 1960 treatise, On Thermonuclear War, as well as the premise of Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film Dr. Strangelove. While such a device remains possible in principle, it would require vast amounts of cobalt, and there is no indication that such a weapon was ever built. In 1983, discussion of human extinction re-emerged when Carl Sagan and others calculated that a global thermonuclear war could generate enough atmospheric debris to kill much of the planet's plant life and, with it, humanity. While the "nuclear winter" theory fell out of favor in the 1990s, recent climate models suggest that the original calculations actually **underestimated the catastrophic effects of thermonuclear war**. Moreover, the original model of Sagan and his collaborators supported research showing that supervolcanic eruptions and asteroid or comet impacts could pose comparable extinction risks. Despite these notable instances, in the 61 years since the Doomsday Clock's creation, the risk of human extinction has received relatively scant scientific attention, with a bibliography filling perhaps one page. Maybe this is because human extinction seems to most of us impossible, inevitable, or, in either case, beyond our control. Still, it's surprising that a topic of primary significance to humanity has provoked so little serious research. One of the missions of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University is to expand scholarly analysis of extinction risks by studying extinction-level hazards, their relative probabilities, and strategies for mitigation. In July 2008, the institute organized a meeting on these subjects, drawing experts from physics, biology, philosophy, economics, law, and public policy. The facts are sobering. More than 99.9 percent of species that have ever existed on Earth have gone extinct. Over the long run, it seems likely that humanity will meet the same fate. In less than a billion years, the increased intensity of the Sun will initiate a wet greenhouse effect, even without any human interference, making Earth inhospitable to life. A couple of billion years later Earth will be destroyed, when it's engulfed by our Sun as it expands into a red-giant star. If we colonize space, we could survive longer than our planet, but as mammalian species survive, on average, only two million years, we should consider ourselves very lucky if we make it to one billion. Humanity could be extinguished as early as this century by succumbing to natural hazards, such as an extinction-level asteroid or comet impact, supervolcanic eruption, global methane-hydrate release, or nearby supernova or gamma-ray burst. (Perhaps the most probable of these hazards, supervolcanism, was discovered only in the last 25 years, suggesting that other natural hazards may remain unrecognized.) Fortunately the probability of any one of these events killing off our species is very low--less than one in 100 million per year, given what we know about their past frequency. But as improbable as these events are, measures to reduce their probability can still be worthwhile. For instance, investments in asteroid detection and deflection technologies cost less, per life saved, than most investments in medicine. While an extinction-level asteroid impact is very unlikely, its improbability is outweighed by its potential death toll. The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, **humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter**. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent**. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover.** If we value future human generations, **then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations**. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction. These measures include: Removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert and further reducing their numbers; Placing safeguards on gene synthesis equipment to prevent synthesis of select pathogens; Improving our ability to respond to infectious diseases, including rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis, and control, as well as accelerated drug development; Funding research on asteroid detection and deflection, "hot spot" eruptions, methane hydrate deposits, and other catastrophic natural hazards; Monitoring developments in key disruptive technologies, such as nanotechnology and computational neuroscience, and developing international policies to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents. Other measures to reduce extinction risks may have less in common with strategies to improve global security, generally. Since a species' survivability is closely related to the extent of its range, perhaps the most effective means of reducing the risk of human extinction is to colonize space sooner, rather than later. Citing, in particular, the threat of new biological weapons, Stephen Hawking has said, "I don't think the human race will survive the next thousand years, unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet." Similarly, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has noted, "The history of life on Earth is the history of extinction events, and human expansion into the Solar System is, in the end, fundamentally about the survival of the species." Probably cheaper than building refuges in space would be building them on Earth. Elaborate bunkers already exist for government leaders to survive nuclear war, and the Svalbard Global Seed Vault in Norway protects crop seeds from nuclear war, asteroid strikes, and climate change. Although Biosphere 2 may inspire giggles, functioning refuges that are self-sufficient, remote, and permanently occupied would help to safeguard against a range of hazards, both foreseeable and unforeseeable. Perhaps least controversial, we should invest more in efforts to enumerate the risks to human survival and the means to mitigate them. We need more interdisciplinary research in quantitative risk assessment, probability theory, and technology forecasting. And we need to build a worldwide community of experts from various fields concerned about global catastrophic risks. Human extinction may, in the long run, be inevitable. But just as we work to secure a long life for individuals, even when our eventual death is assured, we should work to secure a long life for our species.