### 1NC Policy Debate Good Framework

#### Interpretation: The aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option in the debate. The neg should win if the plan is proven worse than the status quo or a policy option competitive with the plan.

#### Reasons to Prefer:

#### “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C. – not individuals

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

**“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC**

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, **each topic contains certain key elements,** although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. **An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action**. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example**, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. **Propositions of policy deal with future action**. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Only our interpretation allows for education about the inner workings of the military ---- this prevents the misappropriation of security policy. Learning about the intricacies of warfare is crucial to prevent conflict and have a deep seated understanding of policies that plague the country. This form of education outweighs --- this is a unique opportunity for us to learn about military policy which their discussion skirts.

#### Education about military issues is necessary to prevent war extinction

Hanson, 07 [Victor Davis Hanson, Professor of Classics at CSU Fullerton, “Why Study War” City Journal, Summer]

**It’s no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict’s outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus**. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject. This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever. I came to the study of warfare in an odd way, at the age of 24. Without ever taking a class in military history, I naively began writing about war for a Stanford classics dissertation that explored the effects of agricultural devastation in ancient Greece, especially the Spartan ravaging of the Athenian countryside during the Peloponnesian War. The topic fascinated me. Was the strategy effective? Why assume that ancient armies with primitive tools could easily burn or cut trees, vines, and grain on thousands of acres of enemy farms, when on my family farm in Selma, California, it took me almost an hour to fell a mature fruit tree with a sharp modern ax? Yet even if the invaders couldn’t starve civilian populations, was the destruction still harmful psychologically? Did it goad proud agrarians to come out and fight? And what did the practice tell us about the values of the Greeks—and of the generals who persisted in an operation that seemingly brought no tangible results? I posed these questions to my prospective thesis advisor, adding all sorts of further justifications. The topic was central to understanding the Peloponnesian War, I noted. The research would be interdisciplinary—a big plus in the modern university—drawing not just on ancient military histories but also on archaeology, classical drama, epigraphy, and poetry. I could bring a personal dimension to the research, too, having grown up around veterans of both world wars who talked constantly about battle. And from my experience on the farm, I wanted to add practical details about growing trees and vines in a Mediterranean climate. Yet my advisor was skeptical. Agrarian wars, indeed wars of any kind, weren’t popular in classics Ph.D. programs, even though farming and fighting were the ancient Greeks’ two most common pursuits, the sources of anecdote, allusion, and metaphor in almost every Greek philosophical, historical, and literary text. Few classicists seemed to care any more that most notable Greek writers, thinkers, and statesmen—from Aeschylus to Pericles to Xenophon—had served in the phalanx or on a trireme at sea. Dozens of nineteenth-century dissertations and monographs on ancient warfare—on the organization of the Spartan army, the birth of Greek tactics, the strategic thinking of Greek generals, and much more—went largely unread. **Nor was the discipline of military history, once central to a liberal education, in vogue on campuses in the seventies. It was as if the university had forgotten that history itself had begun with Herodotus and Thucydides as the story of armed conflicts. What lay behind this academic lack of interest? The most obvious explanation: this was the immediate post-Vietnam era. The public perception in the Carter years was that America had lost a war that for moral and practical reasons it should never have fought—a catastrophe, for many in the universities, that it must never repeat. The necessary corrective wasn’t to learn how such wars started, went forward, and were lost. Better to ignore anything that had to do with such odious business in the first place. The nuclear pessimism of the cold war, which followed the horror of two world wars, also dampened academic interest**. The postwar obscenity of Mutually Assured Destruction had lent an apocalyptic veneer to contemporary war: as President Kennedy warned, “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” Conflict had become something so destructive, in this view, that it no longer had any relation to the battles of the past. It seemed absurd to worry about a new tank or a novel doctrine of counterinsurgency when the press of a button, unleashing nuclear Armageddon, would render all military thinking superfluous. Further, the sixties had ushered in a utopian view of society antithetical to serious thinking about war. Government, the military, business, religion, and the family had conspired, the new Rousseauians believed, to warp the naturally peace-loving individual. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. To assert that wars broke out because bad men, in fear or in pride, sought material advantage or status, or because good men had done too little to stop them, was now seen as antithetical to an enlightened understanding of human nature. “What difference does it make,” in the words of the much-quoted Mahatma Gandhi, “to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?” **The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward Coffman, a retired military history professor who taught at the University of Wisconsin, reviewed the faculties of the top 25 history departments, as ranked by U.S. News and World Report. He found that of over 1,000 professors, only 21 identified war as a specialty. When war does show up on university syllabi, it’s often about the race, class, and gender of combatants and wartime civilians. So a class on the Civil War will focus on the Underground Railroad and Reconstruction, not on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.** One on World War II might emphasize Japanese internment, Rosie the Riveter, and the horror of Hiroshima, not Guadalcanal and Midway. A survey of the Vietnam War will devote lots of time to the inequities of the draft, media coverage, and the antiwar movement at home, and scant the air and artillery barrages at Khe Sanh. Those who want to study war in the traditional way face intense academic suspicion, as Margaret Atwood’s poem “The Loneliness of the Military Historian” suggests: Confess: it’s my profession that alarms you. This is why few people ask me to dinner, though Lord knows I don’t go out of my way to be scary. Historians of war must derive perverse pleasure, their critics suspect, from reading about carnage and suffering. Why not figure out instead how to outlaw war forever, as if it were not a tragic, nearly inevitable aspect of human existence? Hence the recent surge of “peace studies” (see “The Peace Racket”). **The university’s aversion to the study of war certainly doesn’t reflect public lack of interest in the subject. Students love old-fashioned war classes on those rare occasions when they’re offered, usually as courses that professors sneak in when the choice of what to teach is left up to them.** I taught a number of such classes at California State University, Stanford, and elsewhere. They’d invariably wind up overenrolled, with hordes of students lingering after office hours to offer opinions on the battles of Marathon and Lepanto. Popular culture, too, displays extraordinary enthusiasm for all things military. There’s a new Military History Channel, and Hollywood churns out a steady supply of blockbuster war movies, from Saving Private Ryan to 300. The post–Ken Burns explosion of interest in the Civil War continues. Historical reenactment societies stage history’s great battles, from the Roman legions’ to the Wehrmacht’s. Barnes and Noble and Borders bookstores boast well-stocked military history sections, with scores of new titles every month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles. The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank’s 88mm cannon, for instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. **The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they end? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? How best to avoid wars or contain their worst effects? A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments. Neither our politicians nor most of our citizens seem to recall the incompetence and terrible decisions that, in December 1777, December 1941, and November 1950, led to massive American casualties and, for a time, public despair. So it’s no surprise that today so many seem to think that the violence in Iraq is unprecedented in our history**. Roughly 3,000 combat dead in Iraq in some four years of fighting is, of course, a terrible thing. And it has provoked national outrage to the point of considering withdrawal and defeat, as we still bicker over up-armored Humvees and proper troop levels. But a previous generation considered Okinawa a stunning American victory, and prepared to follow it with an invasion of the Japanese mainland itself—despite losing, in a little over two months, four times as many Americans as we have lost in Iraq, casualties of faulty intelligence, poor generalship, and suicidal head-on assaults against fortified positions. It’s not that military history offers cookie-cutter comparisons with the past. Germany’s World War I victory over Russia in under three years and her failure to take France in four apparently misled Hitler into thinking that he could overrun the Soviets in three or four weeks—after all, he had brought down historically tougher France in just six. Similarly, the conquest of the Taliban in eight weeks in 2001, followed by the establishment of constitutional government within a year in Kabul, did not mean that the similarly easy removal of Saddam Hussein in three weeks in 2003 would ensure a working Iraqi democracy within six months. The differences between the countries—cultural, political, geographical, and economic—were too great**. Instead, knowledge of past wars establishes wide parameters of what to expect from new ones. Themes, emotions, and rhetoric remain constant over the centuries, and thus generally predictable. Athens’s disastrous expedition in 415 BC against Sicily, the largest democracy in the Greek world, may not prefigure our war in Iraq. But the story of the Sicilian calamity does instruct us on how consensual societies can clamor for war—yet soon become disheartened and predicate their support on the perceived pulse of the battlefield. Military history teaches us, contrary to popular belief these days, that wars aren’t necessarily the most costly of human calamities. The first Gulf War took few lives in getting Saddam out of Kuwait; doing nothing in Rwanda allowed savage gangs and militias to murder hundreds of thousands with impunity. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin killed far more off the battlefield than on it. The 1918 Spanish flu epidemic brought down more people than World War I did. And more Americans—over 3.2 million—lost their lives driving over the last 90 years than died in combat in this nation’s 231-year history.** **Perhaps what bothers us about wars, though, isn’t just their horrific lethality but also that people choose to wage them—which makes them seem avoidable, unlike a flu virus or a car wreck, and their tolls unduly grievous. Yet military history also reminds us that war sometimes has an eerie utility: as British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart put it, “War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it.” Wars—or threats of wars—put an end to chattel slavery, Nazism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet Communism.** Military history is as often the story of appeasement as of warmongering. The destructive military careers of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler would all have ended early had any of their numerous enemies united when the odds favored them. Western air power stopped Slobodan Milošević’s reign of terror at little cost to NATO forces—but only after a near-decade of inaction and dialogue had made possible the slaughter of tens of thousands. Affluent Western societies have often proved reluctant to use force to prevent greater future violence. “War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things,” observed the British philosopher John Stuart Mill. “The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.” Indeed, **by ignoring history, the modern age is free to interpret war as a failure of communication, of diplomacy, of talking—as if aggressors don’t know exactly what they’re doing.** Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, frustrated by the Bush administration’s intransigence in the War on Terror, flew to Syria, hoping to persuade President Assad to stop funding terror in the Middle East. She assumed that Assad’s belligerence resulted from our aloofness and arrogance rather than from his dictatorship’s interest in destroying democracy in Lebanon and Iraq, before such contagious freedom might in fact destroy him. For a therapeutically inclined generation raised on Oprah and Dr. Phil—and not on the letters of William Tecumseh Sherman and William Shirer’s Berlin Diary—problems between states, like those in our personal lives, should be argued about by equally civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence. Yet it’s hard to find many wars that result from miscommunication. Far more often they break out because of malevolent intent and the absence of deterrence. Margaret Atwood also wrote in her poem: “Wars happen because the ones who start them / think they can win.” Hitler did; so did Mussolini and Tojo—and their assumptions were logical, given the relative disarmament of the Western democracies at the time. Bin Laden attacked on September 11 not because there was a dearth of American diplomats willing to dialogue with him in the Hindu Kush. Instead, he recognized that a series of Islamic terrorist assaults against U.S. interests over two decades had met with no meaningful reprisals, and concluded that decadent Westerners would never fight, whatever the provocation—or that, if we did, we would withdraw as we had from Mogadishu. In the twenty-first century, it’s easier than ever to succumb to technological determinism, the idea that science, new weaponry, and globalization have altered the very rules of war. **But military history teaches us that our ability to strike a single individual from 30,000 feet up with a GPS bomb or a jihadist’s efforts to have his propaganda beamed to millions in real time do not necessarily transform the conditions that determine who wins and who loses wars. True, instant communications may compress decision making, and generals must be skilled at news conferences that can now influence the views of millions worldwide. Yet these are really just new wrinkles on the old face of war.** The improvised explosive device versus the up-armored Humvee is simply an updated take on the catapult versus the stone wall or the harquebus versus the mailed knight. The long history of war suggests no static primacy of the defensive or the offensive, or of one sort of weapon over the other, but just temporary advantages gained by particular strategies and technologies that go unanswered for a time by less adept adversaries. So it’s highly doubtful, the study of war tells us, that a new weapon will emerge from the Pentagon or anywhere else that will change the very nature of armed conflict—unless some sort of genetic engineering so alters man’s brain chemistry that he begins to act in unprecedented ways. We fought the 1991 Gulf War with dazzling, computer-enhanced weaponry. But lost in the technological pizzazz was the basic wisdom that we need to fight wars with political objectives in mind and that, to conclude them decisively, we must defeat and even humiliate our enemies, so that they agree to abandon their prewar behavior. For some reason, no American general or diplomat seemed to understand that crucial point 16 years ago, with the result that, on the cessation of hostilities, Saddam Hussein’s supposedly defeated generals used their gunships to butcher Kurds and Shiites while Americans looked on. And because we never achieved the war’s proper aim—ensuring that Iraq would not use its petro-wealth to destroy the peace of the region—we have had to fight a second war of no-fly zones, and then a third war to remove Saddam, and now a fourth war, of counterinsurgency, to protect the fledgling Iraqi democracy. Military history reminds us of important anomalies and paradoxes. When Sparta invaded Attica in the first spring of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides recounts, it expected the Athenians to surrender after a few short seasons of ravaging. They didn’t—but a plague that broke out unexpectedly did more damage than thousands of Spartan ravagers did. Twenty-seven years later, a maritime Athens lost the war at sea to Sparta, an insular land power that started the conflict with scarcely a navy. The 2003 removal of Saddam refuted doom-and-gloom critics who predicted thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, just as the subsequent messy four-year reconstruction hasn’t evolved as anticipated into a quiet, stable democracy—to say the least. The size of armies doesn’t guarantee battlefield success: the victors at Salamis, Issos, Mexico City, and Lepanto were all outnumbered. War’s most savage moments—the Allied summer offensive of 1918, the Russian siege of Berlin in the spring of 1945, the Battle of the Bulge, Hiroshima—often unfold right before hostilities cease. And democratic leaders during war—think of Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Richard Nixon—often leave office either disgraced or unpopular. It would be reassuring to think that the righteousness of a cause, or the bravery of an army, or the nobility of a sacrifice ensures public support for war. But military history shows that far more often the perception of winning is what matters. Citizens turn abruptly on any leaders deemed culpable for losing. “Public sentiment is everything,” wrote Abraham Lincoln. “With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he who enacts laws.” Lincoln knew that lesson well. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were brilliant Union victories that by summer 1863 had restored Lincoln’s previously shaky credibility. But a year later, after the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, and Cold Harbor battles—Cold Harbor claimed 7,000 Union lives in 20 minutes—the public reviled him. Neither Lincoln nor his policies had changed, but the Confederate ability to kill large numbers of Union soldiers had. Ultimately, public opinion follows the ups and downs—including the perception of the ups and downs—of the battlefield, since victory excites the most ardent pacifist and defeat silences the most zealous zealot. After the defeat of France, the losses to Bomber Command, the U-boat rampage, and the fall of Greece, Singapore, and Dunkirk, Churchill took the blame for a war as seemingly lost as, a little later, it seemed won by the brilliant prime minister after victories in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. When the successful military action against Saddam Hussein ended in April 2003, over 70 percent of the American people backed it, with politicians and pundits alike elbowing each other aside to take credit for their prescient support. Four years of insurgency later, Americans oppose a now-orphaned war by the same margin. General George S. Patton may have been uncouth, but he wasn’t wrong when he bellowed, “Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser.” The American public turned on the Iraq War not because of Cindy Sheehan or Michael Moore but because it felt that the battlefield news had turned uniformly bad and that the price in American lives and treasure for ensuring Iraqi reform was too dear. **Finally, military history has the moral purpose of educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security**. If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosun, the crosses in our military cemeteries are just pleasant white stones on lush green lawns. They no longer serve as reminders that thousands endured pain and hardship for our right to listen to what we wish on our iPods and to shop at Wal-Mart in safety—or that they expected future generations, links in this great chain of obligation, to do the same for those not yet born**. The United States was born through war, reunited by war, and saved from destruction by war. No future generation, however comfortable and affluent, should escape that terrible knowledge. What, then, can we do to restore the study of war to its proper place in the life of the American mind? The challenge isn’t just to reform the graduate schools or the professoriate, though that would help. On a deeper level, we need to reexamine the larger forces that have devalued the very idea of military history—of war itself. We must abandon the naive faith that with enough money, education, or good intentions we can change the nature of mankind so that conflict, as if by fiat, becomes a thing of the past. In the end, the study of war reminds us that we will never be gods. We will always just be men, it tells us. Some men will always prefer war to peace; and other men, we who have learned from the past, have a moral obligation to stop them.**

#### Topic focused debate increases education about key social issues

Bellon, 2k – Department of Communication at Georgia State (Joe, Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 36 Issue 3, p161, “A Research-Based Justification for Debate Across the Curriculum.” Winter 2000, EBSCO)

**While it seems intuitive that an activity involving competitive speaking would improve communication skills, debate also facilitates education in other, more subtle ways. Debate experience induces student involvement in important social issues. Every year, debaters study one prominent social issue, researching policy options from multiple perspectives. The knowledge thus gained often far surpasses the typical educational experience of non-debaters. Robinson (1956) describes debate experience as "an introduction to the social sciences" (62). The sheer breadth of topics a debater is likely to encounter, along with the competitive incentive to understand how the political world operates, virtually ensures that students who debate will be well versed in current events and public decision-making dynamics.**

#### Fiat-oriented debate is better than the activist model

Mitchell 02 (Gordon Mitchell, debate coach at Pittsburgh, Nov 09 2002, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html)

Politically I have moved quite a bit since 1998, when I wrote that debate institutions should pay more attention to argumentative agency, i.e. cultivation of skills that facilitate translation of critical thinking, public speaking, and research acumen into concrete exemplars of democratic empowerment. Back then I was highly skeptical of the "laboratory model" of "preparatory pedagogy," where students were kept, by fiat, in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen. Now I respect much more **the value of a protected space where young people can experiment politically by taking imaginary positions, driving the heuristic process by arguing against their convictions. In fact, the integrity of this space could be compromised by "activist turn" initiatives designed to bridge contest round advocacy with political activism.** These days **I have much more confidence in the importance and necessity of switch-side debating, and the heuristic value for debaters of arguing against their convictions. I think fashioning competitive debate contest rounds as isolated and politically protected safe spaces for communicative experimentation makes sense**. However, I worry that a narrow diet of competitive contest round debating could starve students of opportunities to experience the rich political valence of their debating activities.

#### Voters:

#### They are non-topical because they don’t defend the enactment of a policy by the United States federal government. Topicality is an a-priori voting issue – as judge you are only allowed to affirm those policies within your jurisdiction dictated by the resolution.

#### Fairness – it is impossible to be negative in their world. If the affirmative is not constrained by the topic, they get to just speak in general about the horrors of militarism, talk about their personal experiences or interpret the resolution any way they see fit. These claims are nearly unlimited in scope, non-falsifiable, impossible to predict, and unfair for the team that is forced to debate against it.

#### Defending a topical affirmative is the only way to ensure that teams must research and debate both sides of an argument and learn from multiple perspectives about the topic. Forcing a rigid adherence to the topic facilitates switch-side debating – the advocacy of things you sometimes don’t necessarily believe in. Topic based education and ground should be prioritized because it encourages students to learn in-depth about new and important public policy issues each year.

### 2NC/1NR Framework Extensions

#### Problem-oriented policy analysis is critical to develop portable skills, maximize knowledge of the literature, raise public awareness of social issues, and create better political solutions – only our framework allows for effective consideration of alternatives.

Hird 17 [John Hird, Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice. University of California Press. 44-76.]

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop. In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009). In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research. Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.

#### Policymakers must be attentive to the role that weapons play in securing conflict, debates around the plan inform us as to the real causes of regional instability. Only the plan solves the critiques call for increased understandings of regional differences and values.

Sevilla 11 [Henelito Sevilla, West Asian Studies, Asian CenterUniversity of the Philippines Diliman, “Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf Security,” International Journal of West Asian Studies]

It can be said that one of themost important components of foreign policy is the ability of decision makers to project their country‟s interests in the highestand most effective form of strategy. Such condition requires experts to a multi-level approaches inpolicy formulation. One must consider how actors think and response to certain events while at the same time, he must understand the ability of the actor to utilize all necessary local and national potentials to create and implement rational policy. In short, policy makers must be smart and prompt to take advantage of the events that take place both at national, regional and international levels. Apart from the history, culture, institutional efficiency, and geography, other human elements such “decisions, behaviour and outcomes” (Marrijke Breuning 2007: 1630)are also very important elements in policy formulation. All efforts to come up with an effective policy are aimed in the name of national interests.This condition may also be applicable at regional and international levelswhere collective regional and international interests are defined. This part examines how regional actors-the Arablittoralstates, Iran and the United States see Persian Gulf security.The importance of Persian Gulfstabilityto regional and international economic survival echoesR.K. Ramazini‟s simple but criticalquestion , “who should maintain the future security of the Persian Gulf?”(Foreign Affairs). The importance lies ona simple consideration that **maintaining the security of the Gulf requires not only cooperation among regional actors but also firm political commitmentsby outsiders who share common interests on the region’s security**. Up to this time, **Arab leaders in the Gulf are incapable of securing their own countriesand the region without alliance from the United States**. This sense of dependency suggests that the security of Arab littoral states should be maintained within the security umbrella provided by the United States. The Arabs are so worried that Iraq and Iran, with strong demographic base and army,could disturbthepeaceand securityof the region. Whereas, the United States views Iran as a threat to the security of the Middle East, Iran also views US interference in regional affairsas thehindrance to greater regional security cooperation. This situation captures Amir Sajedi‟sargument that, “what jeopardises stability of the region are the different perceptions that Iran and U.S. have regarding the Persian Gulf security”(Amir Sajedi 2009:77-89), whileat the same time “the Arab countries in the Gulf do not have common understanding of the Persian Gulf security”(Amir Sajedi 2009:77-89).Lack of common understanding of the Gulf security dynamics and threats have thereforebrought them to adopt different strategies to the extent of sacrificing the possibility of creating what Michael Ryan Kraig refers to as a“stable security system”(Middle East Policy Council Journal 2006)in the region. What is embodied in the regionalactors‟ strategy is a naive and self-serving interest without looking at the possibility of “compromise” such as entering into a mutually constructive agreement in which both parties may benefit(Middle East Policy Council Journal 2006). Each has wanted to get the most possible gain of what they desires, so that the immediate result is to seek military and security alliances with a hegemonic power to protect the well being of their very existence. This strategy is misleadingbecause the greatest threat that a Gulf member state is now facing comesnot from outside the region butfrom within. Iran is an “undisputed regional superpower”(Judith Yaphe 2008).Due to its strategic location, Iran has adopted a careful calculation on how it can continue to project as a strong country despite American encirclement through series of alliances with the countries in the Persian Gulf,Central Asiaand South Asia. In order to pre-empt threats from the United States and maintain its status as regional power, several factors were included in its strategic and military considerations: 1) tore-assert Iranian traditional role as regional hegemon. The clerical establishment believes the country‟s‘natural and historical destiny to dominate the region as well as to lead the world‟s Muslim‟; 2) to enhancemilitary capability to defend itself from military aggression(Judith Yaphe 2008); 3) to diversifyits foreign policy not only towards the western worldbut most importantly towards the developing countries in Asia,Central Asia,Africa, and Latin America; and 4) to be self-sufficient in producing important goods necessaryfor its survivalto pre-emptthe impacts of international sanctionson its economy.Iran perceived regional security as the “sole responsibilityof the countries in the region.”In its recent military exercises in the Persian Gulf, PresidentMahmoud Ahmadnejad has called fora “new security order” in Gulf-an order that does not need the participation of the American forces(Mansharof, Y. & Savyon A. 2010).This declarationhas not convincedhowever many of theArab countries as it could meanasre-assertingIran’s hegemony in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia as an influential country in the region shares the desire and aspiration of other Arab littoral countries in the Gulf in countering Iranian influence(JessicaDrum 2008).**The differencesof perceptions, interpretationsof the nature and origin of security threats prevented these countries from constructing an agreed security mechanism.A multilateral approachto security is necessary to keep the region away from the damaging security perceptions of the actors involved**.This could mean the involvement of all regional actors including the United States and perhaps China, European countries and Japan. Just like their European and American counterparts, China and Japan have regarded the stability of region as vital to theireconomicsurvival. Since 1993, China became a net exporter of oil mainly from the Persian Gulf(Mahmoud Ghafouri 2011). China has also been allegedly involved in arms dealing with Iran‟s Islamic government in exchange to oil supply(Asia Times 2006). It becomes more active in its bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and it ventures to African continent in search for energy supply (CindyHurst 2006: 4). In the other hand,Japan is hugely dependent in the Middle East oil supply(US Energy Information Administration 2011) whereas,Europe still considers the region as the main source of oil despite new energy prospects in Central Asia.

#### Absent material reality of arms sales logistics, subjects are primed to advocate interventionist solutions—turns the K

Sevilla 11 [Henelito Sevilla, West Asian Studies, Asian CenterUniversity of the Philippines Diliman, “Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf Security,” International Journal of West Asian Studies]

**The American government together with its European friends have been the contributors in the massive military acquisitions in the Persian Gulf since the Cold War. This massive military build up of conventional weapons have been identified as the main source of regional insecurity.** From Iran and Iraq to Saudi Arabia and other small Gulf littoral states,conventional arms build up becomesan integral part of their security apparatus. Small arms can be easily acquired and carried by lawless elements. They can easily be smuggled out of thecountry to carry rebellion against the existing government. Washington Post reported, “the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are leading a region with military build up that has resulted in more than $25 billion in arms purchases in the past two yearsalone”(Washington Post2010). This purchase is probably aimed at counter-balancing Iran‟s growing conventional arsenal(Washington Post 2010).Military build up in the Gulf created a spiral security problem by which other neighbouring countries are forced to arm. Although the concern about the eradication nuclear proliferation in the region has been debated much, some regional countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel, acquired nuclear weapons without a staunch criticism from the US government. One thing for sure is that the United States finds these countries “responsible‟ and “cooperative” to the US government. Unlike Iran, these three countries have all supported and cooperated with the US government‟s campaign on combating international terrorism. Iran has been repeatedly denying the military use of its nuclear program. Iran argues that its nuclear program is intended for civilian purposes and it feels “its rightful position as a leading power in the Gulf has been denied,” (RAND Issue Paper 2003)yet, the United States and other member of the international community, counter-argued that Iran‟s intention is to transform this nuclear program into a military bomb,hence, Iran is a threat to the security of the Persian Gulf and Middle East in general. The US accusationson Iran can be understood from a fact that since the establishment of the Islamic government, it has strained diplomatic relations with the United States and it categorically rejected American imperialism in the region. Iran‟s Islamic government does not recognize the US role in the regional peace negotiation between Israel and Palestinian as genuine nor does it acknowledge US presence in the Persian Gulf as constructive to regional security. There are worries that Iranian nuclear programs may result tonuclear competitionsamong regional powers in the Middle East region. Thus, there is a probability then that other countries in the Persian Gulf will go nuclear to balance the imaginary threatsfrom Iran and other nuclear regional countries. Contrary to what are reported in mass media, Iran believesthat its nuclear program will serve as an “ultimate insurance policy”from any future attacksof the United States or Israel(Kenneth R. Timmerman 2006:4). However, whatareclear and worrisomearenot the Iraniannuclear projects,rather the proliferation of conventional weapons which,when use against other country,can possible trigger regional nuclear build up. As Paul Wolfowitz argues,“the key to preventing nuclear wars was to stop 60Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf SecurityMengkonstruksi Semula Perangga Minda Politik Keselamatan Teluk ParsiHenelito A. Sevilla, Jr.conventional wars (James Mann 2004: 79) and to make sure that all regional countries adhere to international peaceful resolutions in resolving conflicts. The reality of theplummeting conventional weapons must be addressed seriously by the suppliers and the buyers themselves if they want a genuine peace in the region. Peace cannot be guaranteed by military build up. Since military business is a very lucrative activity, it will be difficult tosay that suppliers would stop selling arms to the region for the sake of peace. The United States alone was a leading supplier of arms to the region. It “gave or sold arms to the Middle East than all other arms exports combined totalling more than $90 billion since the Gulf War”(Anthony H. Cordesman 1999: 85).There are at least three reasons why arms transferto the region has continued until today: 1) arms sales are an important component of building political alliances, particularly with the military leaderships of recipient country; 2) there is a strategic benefit coming from interoperability of having U.S. manufactured systems on the ground in the event of a direct U.S. military intervention; and 3) arms sales aremeans of supporting military industries faced with declining demand in western countries”(Joe Stork 2002: 42).It is clear that the series of warsin the Persian Gulf including the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the US-led campaign to combat international terrorism is undeniably a big profitable business by which some corporate Americans could benefit. In anywhere in the globe, the Persian Gulf states can manage to purchase military equipments which they believe necessary for their protection from attack. To sustain this profitable business, it is important to maintain an environment of mistrust and insecurity; it is important that a perceived enemy like Iran in the context of the Gulf securityexists. It is important tocreate an imaginary threat such as terrorism to convince the Gulf States to continue to buy military hardware. And finally, it is necessary to intervene in the name of peace, justice, and development for the region and the international community. This misguided presentation of oneself by an extra-regional power in the Gulf has misledArab leaders to the extent of sacrificing regional security cooperation. The United States has tried to maintain alliances with friendly countries in the Persian Gulf. Thisalliance system between the United States and the six Arab monarchies of the GCCpromotes a perceptive insecurity in Iran and thus as a reaction to this, the Iranian regime depicts this ties as a symbol of “American imperialism” by which GCC countries areconsidered as “puppets of American imperialism.” In this way, Iran has no option but to “continue ... (its) own quest for further militarization”(Stephen Zunes 2003:45).Under the pretext of moral responsibility, former President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003. The invasion was too timing in such a way thattheAmerican public was still mourning thedeath of thousand Americans who were killed on September 11 terrorist attack in New York. An award-winning journalist and author argues that,“the invasion of Iraq was sold on the basis of fear of weapons of mass destruction” (Naomi Klein 2007: 414). Saddam Hussein was brutal and that it possessed weapons of mass destruction andit harboured terrorists‟ figures inside Iraq. In addition, Saddam‟s “willingness” and “capability to use these weapons against US citizens on US soils”(EricAlterman and Mark Green 2004:254)was unquestionable.President Bush in his speech said that that, “The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq's 11-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith (Pres. Bush Speech 2002). This public presentation of an imaginary threat’had brought the American tax payer to believe that there was indeed a weapon of mass destruction in Iraq. Other members of the international community also supported the “coalition of the willing” to combat international terrorism. And so, as Noime Klaine noted, the “invasion was a successbut the occupation was a failure” (Noime Klaine 2007: 419). The invasion to Iraq was not only designed to topple Saddam Hussein and to control Iraqi oil but also to transform Iraq into a new country by which western style democracy and economic liberalism can be introduced in this vast region of many autocratic regimes. As Michael Ledeen, an adviser to the Bush administration lamented,the aim of the war was “to remake the world”(Noime Klein 2007:415). This means that the US invasion will not only create “the first Arab democracy” in the region but also and most importantly, to bring other countries in the Arab world to embrace Western values. In addition, it also believed by the President Bush team that the Iraqi invasion “represented the advance for the world civilization” (Stephen Pelletiere 2004:131).The invasion however, displayed the modern American military technology and an attempt to show that America was still an undisputed superpower and that it has still the capability to police the world and that it has a “divine” responsibility to maintain and establish peace and security in the world. This display of military might against the Iraqi Army “subscribed to theprinciple of might makes right” (Stephen Pelletire 2004:131).Consequently, after many years in Iraq since 2003, the world community has seen little progress in the country. What becomes apparent is the daily bombing of the Iraqi insurgents and militias who are trying to sabotage the American installed government. President Obama himself recognizes that the “war has fuelled terrorism and helped galvanize terrorist organizations. And it has made the world less safe”(Deborah White 2007).This realization is true as many countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia have experienced the challenging threats to security. In various countries in the Persian Gulf region, threats from the localized terrorism are becoming felt by people. Even American forces completely withdraw from Iraq, newly Iraqi government cannot sustain its political stability for as long as the problem about power sharing between the major ethnic groups is not settled. What the Americans have done to the Iraqis was not to make the Iraqi nation free from brutal and ambitious leaders but rather to make this nation more dependent from theAmericans.

#### Education about military strategy is good – it’s key to military effectiveness and humanitarian missions that outweigh.

Toronto 15 [Dr. Nathan W. Toronto is an associate professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the United Arab Emirates National Defense College. 5/26. "Does Military Education Matter?" https://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/26/does-military-education-matter/]

Military education is valuable because it provides an intellectual architecture for battlefield success. It contributes to stable civil-military relations, a culture of reflection, and a capacity for critical analysis. This article specifies these conceptual links between military education and battlefield success, and then suggests statistical correlations linking military education and battlefield success. The main point of this exercise is that questioning the purpose of military education is like questioning the purpose of education, period. National education systems are chock full of students who think they are taking useless general education classes, just as there will always be officers who question why they have to go to military schools. The reason is that, regardless of what people do, education helps them do it better. Military education matters because it cultivates an aspiration to excellence. This is especially true for military education, because the military usually only has to fix things when they are truly broken, like combating Ebola in West Africa, battling Islamic State, or conducting humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. We do not give the military the easy problems. We give them the hardest possible problems we can find. What is more, we cannot even predict what those problems will be, much less devise solutions to them ahead of time. For military organizations, which often thrive on predictability and routine, this is the most challenging aspect of the job (Dempsey, 2012; Bruscino, 2013). This nettlesome environment requires a daunting command of everything from book-learned knowledge of history and social science to hard-won experience from the world’s remotest battlefields and military headquarters. Military officers get this through their education, not only by being exposed to new ideas in the classroom, but also by reflecting on their experience in new ways. Military education becomes a ‘force multiplier,’ meaning that it magnifies the positives in what the military is already doing (Lamb and Porro, 2014). However, war is complex. It will always be the province of reason and passion and chance (Clausewitz, 1989[1832]), so it is unreasonable to expect that more military education will always lead to more military success. This article proposes reasons why military education is related to military success, but the claim is probabilistic. Military education is not an insurance policy against failure, but it is likely to establish the conditions for military success.

### 1NC Case Answers

#### China is an independently militaristic actor that only the US can regulate, South China Sea proves

Clark 19 (Colin Clark , Thu 7/11/2019, Breaking Defense, “China Seeks ‘Hegemony’ in Asia: Adm. Harris, PACOM” , Colin is an Editor for the breakingmedia in the article he is directly quoting Admiral Harry Harris, [https://thedisorderofthings.com/2015/10/02/thinking-internationally-about-the-arms-trade/](about:blank))

WASHINGTON: The gloves came off during today’s Senate Armed Services committee hearing on China and North Korea with Pacific Command’s Adm. Harry Harris saying that China seeks “hegemony in East Asia” and is unequivocally militarizing the South China Sea. “In my opinion, China is clearly militarizing its position in the South China Sea. You’d have to believe in a flat earth to believe otherwise,” Harris told the committee this morning. But Chinese president Xi Jinping continues to claim that China is not militarizing the South China Sea, even though his regime is violating international law by building these islands in the first place, are building military-length runways on them and are stationing missiles and advanced radar sets on them. Until very recently, US military officials were at pains to characterize China as a sometimes challenging partner in international affairs, one they characterized as a rising peer competitor but never as an opponent or an enemy. Saying China wants to be a hegemon — which is what China denounced the United States as for much of the last 50 years — comes perilously close to characterizing China as an opponent. Harris’ comments are not there yet, but we are edging closer to a Cold War in the Pacific. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued this detailed assessment of the situation yesterday: “This month’s deployment of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels, while notable, does not alter the military balance in the South China Sea. New radar facilities being developed in the Spratlys, on the other hand, could significantly change the operational landscape in the South China Sea. And along with the development of new runways and air defense capabilities, they speak to a long-term anti-access strategy by China—one that would see it establish effective control over the sea and airspace throughout the South China Sea.” China, of course, blames the United States for militarizing the South China Sea because we are executing legal Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) such as flying over the fake Chinese islands and sailing near them. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters Saturday that those US actions, combined with exercises involving regional partners, were the reasons the sea is being militarized. China is really only trying to help the world by building these islands, putting up lighthouses, building military-length runways, stationing missiles and advanced radar sets on them and claiming they are sovereign China territory — although international law says otherwise. “The above actions have escalated tensions in the South China Sea, and that’s the real militarization of the South China Sea,” Hong said. Since China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi is in town today, and Adm. Harris doubtless knows this, you can take his comments as a direct shot at the Chinese claims to only safeguarding their rightful territorial claims. Harris also restated the US intention to “routinely” execute Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. One other very interesting tidbit surfaced during today’s hearing when Sen. Kelly Ayotte pressed Harris about a gap in US attack submarine capabilities. Harris confirmed that the US can only meet 62 percent of the requests for attack submarines from commanders and that this particularly affects the Pacific theater. “My requirements are not being met,” Harris told Sen. Richard Blumenthal from Connecticut, who followed up on Ayotte’s question. “That’s a function of global demands.” Ayotte, who hails from New Hampshire where the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard sits, was particularly interested in shortfalls in attack submarines. They are, of course, maintained and overhauled at Portsmouth. Blumenthal’s state, Connecticut, is home to the Electric Board yard where both new Virginia-class attack subs and — in the near future — new ICBM submarines, known as boomers, are built.

#### China is the main aggressor in the SCS conflict if they aren’t regulated Nuclear war is inevitable

Rando 15 Frank G. Rando, 8/29/15, NCT magazine, Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, Frank G. Rando possesses over 30 years of real world experience as a public safety professional,clinician, educator ,emergency and crisis manager ,author and consultant in the areas of tactical ,disaster and operational medicine, weapons and tactics, law enforcement /criminal investigations ,counterterrorism, hazardous materials management and emergency response ,toxicology, environmental safety and health,and health care and public health emergency management, <http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation>,

Robert Kaplan, one of the world’s foremost experts on China, has stated “The South China Sea will be the 21st Century’s defining battleground.” The obsession with supremacy in the South China Sea is certainly not a new phenomenon in the realms of international security and maritime strategy. In opinionated discussions related to naval warfare, prominent political scientists and military strategists have been addressing the geopolitical and military significance of the region for decades. For example, the enlightening 1997 article “The Chinese Way”, written in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California-San Diego, noted significantly increased defense budgets and expenditures in the region. In addition, the article eludes to the fact that China had claimed the entire South China Sea and would use its naval forces to counter any encroachment. The argument for an increased U.S. naval presence in East Asia is certainly not without precedent. This contested aquatic region has tremendous geopolitical, strategic and economic significance. While, the Persian Gulf has immense importance and global recognition due to its strategic location in the Middle East, as well its significance to global commerce, industry and sought after oil, the South China Sea is crucially important to nations seeking to obtain their economic riches and geopolitical advantages. The South China Sea is geographically located near the Pacific Ocean and encompasses an area of 1.4 million square miles (3.5 million square kilometers). As a semi-closed area, the South China Sea extends from the Singapore Strait to the Taiwan Strait, with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan surrounding it. In terms of economic value, fishery stocks and potential fossil fuel reserves are two major commodities that may spark an armed conflict, even to the point of nuclear confrontation. As a rich source of the region’s staple diet, fish, the sea guarantees a steady flow of food to the countries of the region. Control and supremacy of the sea would also assure claiming the much touted hydrocarbon reserves in the seabed, possibly exceeding those of the OPEC nations such as Iraq and Kuwait. The conquest of this vast resource would virtually assure energy independence and high monetary returns for those that would gain supremacy over the South China Sea. Thus, seizing the opportunity to gain dominance will lead to control and manipulation of vital food and energy resources, economic wealth and geopolitical power in the region. A scenario of regional and maritime domination and control could lead to the partial or total exclusion of adjacent nation-states to access any food or natural resources derived from a sea ruled with an iron hand; leading to a massive complex humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions from malnutrition and starvation, limitations in energy production, and economic collapse. These factors make the South China Sea a national security priority for nations in the region, including one of the world’s superpowers, China. The dependence of China and other regional nations surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one -third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere. Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war, and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster. China continues to assert sovereignty by constructing man made islands using sand dredged from the sea bottom and these artificial islands could be militarized. China has even affirmed its desire to have a military presence on these islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also professes the use of these land masses to facilitate commerce via shipping lanes and to protect Chinese fishing and other vessels from piracy. China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived “ownership” of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the “Chinese Dream”. The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived “right” to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the “submarine factor”, it is evident that China’s submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India’s nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China’s submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances, such as the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters claimed by both countries in the region and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets. A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. China’s Global Times published an unprecedented report that revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S. with JL-2 missiles could generate up to 12 million American fatalities. The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to China’s claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat, which included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation. The possibilities of China’s anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including conventional and, potentially, nuclear scenarios. China’s South Sea naval facilities have seen significant upgrading and expansion, such as the facilities on Hainan, and the nuclear submarine base at Longpo serves as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The base also includes a submarine tunnel that is part of an underwater complex of nuclear facilities on Hainan. Also, Chinese-Russian wargames are worrisome, which adds to the concerns of nuclear confrontation and consequences globally. The Chinese have asserted their right to defend its territories, which in their view, includes the South China Sea, and they have stated verbally, and by their aggressive actions, that they will continue to pursue their strategic goals despite the threat of confrontation and conflict. Many of the issues in contention in the South China Sea will remain unresolved for, probably, several years to come. We must remain balanced, and not overzealous in our approaches to assisting with conflict resolution in the area. We must apply reasonable diplomacy, without stirring up a hornet’s nest that would serve to be counterproductive and enhance animosities. However, the US, its allies, and other concerned nation-states must not refrain from being ever so vigilant and proactive in achieving peaceful resolution, while at the same time maintaining our national defense and security postures.

#### US heg is good for the economy, democracy, and human rights

**Brands ’16** (Hal Brands is an Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. His most recent book is What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, just released by Cornell University Press., The National Interest, "The Era of American Primacy Is Far from Over", August 24th, 2016, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-era-american-primacy-far-over-17465?nopaging=1//GHS-AK](about:blank))  
First, **the possession of international primacy has benefitted the United States greatly**over the years, **allowing it to fashion a generally advantageous world order.** Second, and contrary to what is often argued today, this era of American primacy is not yet over, nor will it end anytime soon—the United States still has a commanding lead in the most important dimensions of global power. Third, however, if American primacy still remains intact, that primacy is nonetheless growing more contested today than at any previous time during the post-Cold War era. And fourth, although it would be **unwise for the United States to retrench dramatically from its globe-straddling posture, America will need to make greater investments, and greater efforts, to sustain its eminently favorable global position**in the years to come.Let’s start with the first point—that primacy has been very good for the United States. America has enjoyed some degree of international primacy since World War II, and an essentially unrivaled sort of primacy since the end of the Cold War. And over the course of several decades, Washington has used that primacy to shape an international system that, by any meaningful comparison, has been highly conducive to American interests and ideals. **Washington has employed its power to uphold stability in key regions, to foster the spread of democracy and human rights, to anchor a prosperous and liberal global economy, and to contain or roll back the influence of aggressive authoritarian powers or other malign actors that might fundamentally disrupt this more or less happy state of affairs**.To be sure, the temptations of power have occasionally gotten the better of Americans, leading to military interventions or other exertions that have proven counterproductive in the end—Vietnam and Iraq being the two foremost examples. But on the whole, the United States has profited handsomely from its primacy, using it to shape a fairly congenial global order. Moreover—and this is the second key point—reports of American primacy’s demise are much exaggerated, just as they have been in previous instance of premature “declinism” over the past seventy years. For by the most important metrics, the United States still boasts sizable leads over its closest geopolitical competitors. Consider the economic balance. In 2014, America had a $17.5 trillion GDP that was more than $7 trillion larger than China’s. It’s per capita GDP—which is a key measure of how much wealth a country can actually extract from its citizenry to pursue ambitious international objectives—was around four times as large as China’s. If one considers more holistic measures like “inclusive wealth,” which takes into account factors such as China’s catastrophic degradation of its environment, then the U.S. lead becomes even larger. Add in all of the long-term economic problems that a country like China faces, and confident predictions of impending Chinese economic supremacy seem increasingly tenuous. In the military realm, U.S. global primacy is even more pronounced. U.S. defense spending remained around three times as high as China’s as of 2014, meaning that the absolute American lead in overall military investment and capabilities is actually getting substantially larger each year. The U.S. military also has global power-projection capabilities that won’t be matched for decades, if even then; it has vast amounts of recent experience in complex operations; it possesses extraordinarily high levels of human capital, married to the flexible command-and-control structures needed to make the most of that capital. And, of course, the United States has literally dozens of allies that add significantly to the aggregate power of the community that Washington leads; challengers like Russia and China have a very small number of allies that are often more liabilities than assets. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have therefore concluded in a recent study of global power dynamics, “Everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.” Yet this leads to a third key point about American power—that although it is highly premature to say that the era of U.S. primacy has passed, it is not premature to observe that this primacy is being tested and stressed more strenuously than at any time since the Cold War.The challenges that the United States faces to its primacy today are arguably more serious than they have been at any time in a quarter-century; they are certainly more numerous than at any previous point during this period. Undoubtedly sitting atop the list of those challenges is the return of great-power competition. **Major regional powers like Russia and China**—which never really accepted a post-Cold War order dominated by the United States—are now **using their power and capabilities to push back against that order**.They are seeking to dominate their “near abroads”; they are testing American alliances along the periphery of U.S. power. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that U.S. global military primacy remains intact, these countries are developing and deploying capabilities that **increasingly menace America’s ability to project that power into East Asia and Eastern Europe.Regional military balances are therefore shifting in adverse ways, confronting the United States with military and geopolitical challenges unlike any it has faced since the end of the Cold War**.American primacy is being tested in other ways, as well. The “end of history” has now ended—the world ideological climate is becoming more contested as the spread of democracy has stalled, and authoritarianism seems to be making a modest comeback. The exploits of the Islamic State, which has utterly destabilized a key region, and North Korea, which is reportedly working toward an ICBM capability to complement its growing nuclear arsenal, demonstrate that the challenge posed by “rogue” actors is probably greater than at any time since Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. U.S. allies have become relatively weaker in terms of their shares of global GDP and defense spending over the past fifteen years; the European allies have systematically divested themselves of many key military capabilities. And within the United States, partisan gridlock and polarization have played havoc with the Pentagon’s force structure, modernization programs, and readiness over the past half-decade, amid broader questions about whether Americans care to sustain an ambitious global project any longer. It is still not time to panic about the state of American primacy, then, but there is real cause for concern. So what is America to do? Advocates of restraint often argue that Washington should roll back many of the alliance commitments and forward deployments that have long characterized U.S. strategy, and fall back to a far more austere international posture. Yet as discussed previously, this position overstates the degree of American relative decline, for America’s primacy has not yet eroded to the point where it lacks options other than dramatic retrenchment. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere at greater length, proposals for “offshore balancing” or other retrenchment-minded strategies rest on highly precarious assumptions about whether the world would remain stable and congenial following a major geopolitical retreat. In other words, if you think that the world seems dangerous and unstable now, just wait and see what it looks like without U.S. engagement and presence as we have known it for the past seventy years. What is true enough, however, is that Washington will undoubtedly have to work harder—and invest more—to maintain an acceptable degree of primacy, and the benefits it has long provided. During the post–Cold War era, America has essentially been able to enjoy primacy on the cheap. It has spent as little as 3 percent of GDP on defense during this period, while also deferring hard choices about deficits, ballooning domestic spending, and other critical long-term fiscal issues. There will be no such luxury in the coming years.

#### Hegemony allows the creation of a peaceful world order, also solves war

**Brands ’16** (Hal Brands is an Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. His most recent book is What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, just released by Cornell University Press., The National Interest, "The Era of American Primacy Is Far from Over", August 24th, 2016, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-era-american-primacy-far-over-17465?nopaging=1//GHS-AK](about:blank))  
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And over the course of several decades, Washington has used that primacy to shape an international system that, by any meaningful comparison, has been highly conducive to American interests and ideals. **Washington has employed its power to uphold stability in key regions, to foster the spread of democracy and human rights, to anchor a prosperous and liberal global economy, and to contain or roll back the influence of aggressive authoritarian powers or other malign actors that might fundamentally disrupt this more or less happy state of affairs**.To be sure, the temptations of power have occasionally gotten the better of Americans, leading to military interventions or other exertions that have proven counterproductive in the end—Vietnam and Iraq being the two foremost examples. But on the whole, the United States has profited handsomely from its primacy, using it to shape a fairly congenial global order. Moreover—and this is the second key point—reports of American primacy’s demise are much exaggerated, just as they have been in previous instance of premature “declinism” over the past seventy years. For by the most important metrics, the United States still boasts sizable leads over its closest geopolitical competitors. Consider the economic balance. In 2014, America had a $17.5 trillion GDP that was more than $7 trillion larger than China’s. It’s per capita GDP—which is a key measure of how much wealth a country can actually extract from its citizenry to pursue ambitious international objectives—was around four times as large as China’s. If one considers more holistic measures like “inclusive wealth,” which takes into account factors such as China’s catastrophic degradation of its environment, then the U.S. lead becomes even larger. Add in all of the long-term economic problems that a country like China faces, and confident predictions of impending Chinese economic supremacy seem increasingly tenuous. In the military realm, U.S. global primacy is even more pronounced. U.S. defense spending remained around three times as high as China’s as of 2014, meaning that the absolute American lead in overall military investment and capabilities is actually getting substantially larger each year. The U.S. military also has global power-projection capabilities that won’t be matched for decades, if even then; it has vast amounts of recent experience in complex operations; it possesses extraordinarily high levels of human capital, married to the flexible command-and-control structures needed to make the most of that capital. And, of course, the United States has literally dozens of allies that add significantly to the aggregate power of the community that Washington leads; challengers like Russia and China have a very small number of allies that are often more liabilities than assets. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have therefore concluded in a recent study of global power dynamics, “Everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.” Yet this leads to a third key point about American power—that although it is highly premature to say that the era of U.S. primacy has passed, it is not premature to observe that this primacy is being tested and stressed more strenuously than at any time since the Cold War.The challenges that the United States faces to its primacy today are arguably more serious than they have been at any time in a quarter-century; they are certainly more numerous than at any previous point during this period. Undoubtedly sitting atop the list of those challenges is the return of great-power competition. **Major regional powers like Russia and China**—which never really accepted a post-Cold War order dominated by the United States—are now **using their power and capabilities to push back against that order**.They are seeking to dominate their “near abroads”; they are testing American alliances along the periphery of U.S. power. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that U.S. global military primacy remains intact, these countries are developing and deploying capabilities that **increasingly menace America’s ability to project that power into East Asia and Eastern Europe.Regional military balances are therefore shifting in adverse ways, confronting the United States with military and geopolitical challenges unlike any it has faced since the end of the Cold War**.American primacy is being tested in other ways, as well. The “end of history” has now ended—the world ideological climate is becoming more contested as the spread of democracy has stalled, and authoritarianism seems to be making a modest comeback. The exploits of the Islamic State, which has utterly destabilized a key region, and North Korea, which is reportedly working toward an ICBM capability to complement its growing nuclear arsenal, demonstrate that the challenge posed by “rogue” actors is probably greater than at any time since Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. U.S. allies have become relatively weaker in terms of their shares of global GDP and defense spending over the past fifteen years; the European allies have systematically divested themselves of many key military capabilities. And within the United States, partisan gridlock and polarization have played havoc with the Pentagon’s force structure, modernization programs, and readiness over the past half-decade, amid broader questions about whether Americans care to sustain an ambitious global project any longer. It is still not time to panic about the state of American primacy, then, but there is real cause for concern. So what is America to do? Advocates of restraint often argue that Washington should roll back many of the alliance commitments and forward deployments that have long characterized U.S. strategy, and fall back to a far more austere international posture. Yet as discussed previously, this position overstates the degree of American relative decline, for America’s primacy has not yet eroded to the point where it lacks options other than dramatic retrenchment. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere at greater length, proposals for “offshore balancing” or other retrenchment-minded strategies rest on highly precarious assumptions about whether the world would remain stable and congenial following a major geopolitical retreat. In other words, if you think that the world seems dangerous and unstable now, just wait and see what it looks like without U.S. engagement and presence as we have known it for the past seventy years. What is true enough, however, is that Washington will undoubtedly have to work harder—and invest more—to maintain an acceptable degree of primacy, and the benefits it has long provided. During the post–Cold War era, America has essentially been able to enjoy primacy on the cheap. It has spent as little as 3 percent of GDP on defense during this period, while also deferring hard choices about deficits, ballooning domestic spending, and other critical long-term fiscal issues. There will be no such luxury in the coming years.

**US heg key to stability-without it nations lock themselves into arms races which leads to war**

**Fay ’17** (Matthew Fay is Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Niskanen Center, "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy", November 16th, 2017, <https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf)>

While libertarians often disagree with one another, there is broad agreement among them about the need to change American foreign policy. They believe the United States should pursue a political military retrenchment by forswearing intervention in the affairs of other states and exiting the alliances it has formed since 1945. By doing so, libertarians believe the United States will be at war less and a free society will flourish as a result. The size of its military would shrink, they argue, which would in turn reduce the financial burden it places on American taxpayers and the threat the national security state poses to individual liberty. However, using retrenchment as the basis for a libertarian foreign policy is unlikely to serve libertarian ends. Retrenchment ignores the relationship between the international political environment and domestic political order. At the same time, libertarian advocates for retrenchment have overestimated the benefits it will provide for a free society, while overlooking the risks it presents. Instead, libertarians should **embrace a grand strategy of engagement that maintains America’s core military alliances while pursuing reforms that will constrain American leaders’ tendency to use military force recklessly**. One of the many remarkable features of the 2016 presidential campaign was the number of libertarians who found hope in Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy. To be sure, the overwhelming majority of libertarians found Trump’s candidacy, and subsequent election, grotesque. However, a number of libertarians saw in America First—with its supposed repudiation of nation building and overt hostility to America’s allies—a foreign policy they could rally behind. Some of these individuals operate at the fringes of the libertarian movement, but even some mainstream libertarian voices had positive things to say about Trump as he belatedly criticized the invasion of Iraq and hinted that he might pull out of NATO.1 Several libertarian supporters of Trump’s foreign policy have expressed “buyer’s remorse” as he launched cruise missiles against Assad regime forces in Syria, escalated the bombing campaign against the Islamic State, ramped up counterterrorism operations in Yemen and elsewhere, promised to rain “fire and fury” on North Korea, increased the number of American troops in Afghanistan, and refused to certify that Iran was in compliance with the deal to curb its nuclear program.2 But as a candidate, Trump never really hid what he was selling. On the campaign trail, Trump not only rejected core libertarian principles such as the free movement of goods and people, but also said, “I really love war, in a certain way,” promised to torture terrorism suspects and go after their families, and repeatedly stated his desire to “take” Iraqi oil.3 That any supporter of a free society would back a candidate expressing such sentiments is puzzling. A partial explanation for the initial sympathy among some libertarians for Trump’s foreign policy can be found with his opponent. Hillary Clinton, throughout her career, has been a consistently hawkish interventionist.4 That explanation is incomplete, though. While libertarian support for America First was limited, it represented a broader problem in libertarian foreign policy thinking. Libertarianism is perhaps most famous for the internal disagreements of its adherents. However, one broad area of agreement among American libertarians is that the United States needs to be less involved in the world. While libertarians want diplomatic and commercial relations with the world, they believe the American government should have little political or military attachment to other countries and should avoid meddling in their internal affairs. George Washington’s warning against “foreign entanglements,” Thomas Jefferson’s call for “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none,” and John Quincy Adams’ axiom that America “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy” combine to form the lodestar of libertarian foreign policy.5 As a matter of policy, libertarians generally believe the United States should undertake a political and military retrenchment.6 Libertarians think that by pulling back from overseas commitments and forgoing intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the United States would become involved in fewer wars.7 War is inherently destructive to human life and property, and disruptive to peaceful exchange and cooperation. It infringes on the rights of individuals abroad. At home, war poses a threat to a free society. The size of the state increases during wartime, as does its propensity to act oppressively. Yet despite Trump’s professed militarism, some libertarians saw the type of disengagement they had long sought in his America First platform. Even if Trump had been the type of non-interventionist some mistakenly believed he was, **retrenchment may not produce** the **free society** at home that libertarians desire. **Remaining aloof from international politics risks the return of a more competitive and war-prone international system. On close examination, the benefits of retrenchment do not outweigh the risks of a more conflict-ridden world.** If peace is a prerequisite of a free society, then a **free society is more likely if the United States remains engaged in the world.** This paper argues that a grand strategy of engagement serves libertarian foreign policy ends better than retrenchment.8 At the same time, libertarians should continue pursuing reforms that inhibit American leaders’ tendency to use military force recklessly. The paper proceeds in four parts. The first part discusses the relationship between international order and a free society before explaining how a grand strategy of engagement helps enable an international environment conducive to the latter. The second part discusses the strongest argument libertarian foreign policy analysts have made for retrenchment: a grand strategy derived from realist international relations known as “restraint.” The third part explains why the benefits of retrenchment are marginal while the risks are high by exploring alternative scenarios that could occur if the United States retrenches. The fourth part explores the policy implications of a grand strategy of engagement for libertarians. Engagement and a Free Society Foreign policy presents a dilemma for libertarians. In modern history, **the state has been the primary actor in international politics**. Libertarians are suspicious of an overweening state because it poses a threat to a free society. Libertarians therefore adopt an a priori non-interventionist position according to which the use of military force should be prohibited except in cases of national self-defense. This section explains why this **focus on narrow self-defense is misguided.** First, it explores the relationship between the international order and a state’s political order. Second, it discusses the concept of grand strategy and how a grand strategy of engagement through a system of alliances facilitates an international order conducive to a free society. International Politics and a Free Society If the United States adopted a narrow focus on its self-defense, it likely would remain physically secure. Given its geographic isolation, America is largely immune to major military threats. Therefore, if the United States focuses narrowly on its own security, it will have few reasons to go to war. Retrenchment might therefore allow the United States to remain aloof from international politics and forgo alliances, obviating the need to maintain a large military and thereby avoiding the taxation, bureaucracy, and state growth that accompany large military establishments. However, a libertarian foreign policy narrowly focused on territorial defense is misguided for at least two reasons. First, “security” is an ambiguous, and often subjective, basis for determining America’s national interest. Second, a narrow focus on physical security ignores the way an increasingly competitive international system might affect the internal character of the American state. The physical security of a state is obviously necessary, but it is an insufficient basis for identifying the national interest because security is an inherently ambiguous concept. References to national security, as political scientist Arnold Wolfers argued in 1952, are rhetorically powerful but have little intrinsic meaning.9 The invocation of national security is just as symbolic when it’s used to sell retrenchment as it is when inflating threats for the purpose of hawkish policies. A state defines its security based on its interests, and its interests are a product of its values. Historian Melvyn Leffler, in the course of developing an explanatory framework for studying the history of American foreign relations, has argued that America’s national interest must be viewed through its “core values.” Instead of focusing on narrow self-defense, Leffler argues, “Core values usually fuse material self-interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of a state’s organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity.”10 Leffler later warned that throughout American history, imbalances between ideology and a rational understanding of America’s national interest have led to foreign policy disasters. Too much of the latter leads to heightened threat perceptions, which have in turn resulted in the misuse of American power abroad.11 However, he rightly notes that narrow physical security, the internal political character, and ideological concerns are inextricably tied together when considering America’s interests. If America’s values include, for libertarians, the maintenance of a free society, then it is important to consider how the external environment of a state affects its internal character. International pressures help shape the internal character of states.12 The two are, in fact, intertwined. International order and domestic political order both serve the purpose of providing security against organized violence.13 How that order is achieved on both the international and domestic levels has important implications for both the likelihood of war and the internal character of a state. Liberal polities in particular have been interested in the connection between international order and domestic political order. Political scientist Daniel Deudney argues that liberal states attempt to shape their international environment to mitigate anarchy at the international level. To do so, liberal states practice what Deudney refers to as “security co-binding.” **Security co-binding is an effort to lock states into mutually constraining institutions to mitigate the threat they pose to one another in an anarchic international system**.14 In t**he absence of these institutions, states are likely to balance against the potential threats they pose to one another by building up their military capabilities. The result of these military buildups would be rampant security dilemmas. Security dilemmas occur when defensive measures in one state create a sense of insecurity in another, producing a response that reduces the security of the first state, leading to further defensive measures, and so on.15 Security dilemmas tend to produce arms races and** occasionally **spiral into war**.16 In modern Europe, wars that resulted from these security dilemmas led to recurring cycles of state building.17

#### US heg prevents extinction

**Barnett 11** (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,”) <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately**,** we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### American growth and leadership solve war – the alternative is power vacuum conflicts

**Haass 13** Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department The World Without America https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass

NEW YORK – Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and **slow economic growth** – in short, the domestic foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would **come at a steep price**. Indeed**, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself.** Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase, thereby **boosting growth around the world**. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive **global economic recovery**. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract **oil and natural gas** from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their **energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions**. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the **spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts**. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out. While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of **leadership** to formulate and realize global **responses to global challenges**. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now **there is only one candidate for this role: the US**. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that **the US must put its house in order** – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather **a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict**. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants.

#### Militarism is key to survival

**Hanjian ’14** (Clark Hanjian, He offers support during transitions, crises, and other difficult times. Clark specializes in working with conflict, and is available to consult with individuals, organizations, and communities, “Reconsidering Militarism”, <https://dmzlab.org/reconsidering-militarism>, AA)

Militarism could not exist without support from politics, commerce, religion, academics, science, media, and entertainment. Third, militarism is a system dependent on tools of coercion and harm. Remove these tools, and militarism no longer exists. (For example, when military forces conduct disaster relief, with no thought of coercion or harm, such work falls outside the scope of militarism.) Although militarism has many tools at its disposal, the tools of coercion and harm are prerequisites. In short, we can say that militarism is institutionalized self-interest, dependent on tools of coercion and harm. Because we invest heavily in militarism, it is in our interest to be very clear about what we get in return. Our reasons for supporting militarism boil down to these: We believe **that militarism is critical to our survival.** We all need food, water, shelter, and the conditions for general health, safety, and freedom. **Militarism is our premier plan to ensure that we get these essentials**. We believe that the more resources we control, the more likely it is that we will be satisfied. **Militarism is our ultimate tool to achieve satisfaction**. We believe that militarism is a relatively quick means of resolving conflicts. Our interests are typically tied to short-term calendars (the next business opportunity, the next election, etc.), so we are not inclined to invest in solutions that we know will span many years. We believe that the mere threat of coercion and harm is a useful tool for building respectful, stable, and sustainable relations. When others get in the way of our interests, we believe that an act of coercion has the potential to resolve the conflict. We believe that forcing others to act against their will can be a useful tool for setting things right. When others get in the way of our interests, we believe that an act of harm has the potential to resolve the conflict. We believe that retaliation, punishment, and elimination can be useful tools for setting things right. Nonmilitary approaches to conflict resolution involve substantial uncertainty. We cannot design a cooperative resolution unless we give genuine attention to the interests of the adversary. This openness leads down an unpredictable path. We believe that militarism offers better certainty. We believe that **militarism serves our financial interests by providing employment and education to some and wealth to a few**. We believe that **militarism is good** for building our sense of community. We feel that by wielding tools of coercion and harm, we strengthen our identity and self-esteem. We believe that military activity is inherently honorable, and that warriors are, by definition, heroes. We believe that military attacks deserve military responses. An eye for an eye is how we teach others a lesson. A tooth for a tooth is how we maintain our self-respect. Militarism is our tradition. While there are a multitude of ways to respond to conflict and acts of malice, we believe that our warrior tradition deserves high regard due to its extensive history. We believe that militarism incorporates the highest callings of our various religious and ethical traditions.

#### It would be foolish to pretend militarism can be stopped

**Blatchford 1900** (Robert Blatchford was a English [socialist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist) campaigner, journalist, and author in the United Kingdom. He was also noted as a prominent [atheist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atheist), opponent of [eugenics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugenics), and English nationalist, “Militarism”, 3/31/1900, <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/clarion/1900/03/militarism.htm>, AA)

For my own part, I am not much concerned upon that head. As an old soldier and an old volunteer. I may, I hope, be pardoned for declaring that military training is not all evil. Perhaps some of you will quarrel with me if I go as far (as I must) as to say that a moderate amount of the best military training would be a good and not a bad thing for our young men. I doubt whether even a universal military training would be a bad thing – since universal peace cannot be yet established. But against compulsory military service and against any army system based upon French or German lines, I have a feeling of the bitterest and the most implacable hostility. Against conscription in any form, and against a military establishment of a Continental pattern, all who love freedom, all democrats and all reformers, should declare war – war to the knife. But to make war against all forms of Militarism at **a time when some form of Militarism has become inevitable, is bad policy**, and will **tend fatally to strengthen the hands of the advocates of conscription. Let us speak and write against war; let us work to bring about universal brotherhood and peace; but let us recognize the fact that some form of Militarism will be established** in this country very soon, whether we Socialists are willing or no.

#### Hardline militarism is good-their strategy will guarantee more suffering and death

HANSON 2004 (Victor Davis, Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, City Journal, Spring, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html)

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.” So too did Western excuses for the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente. As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty—and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these **historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance**, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest. Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement—perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval—was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista

#### Militarism is the only way to deal with global terrorism.

Epstein, 2002 (Alex, fellow at Ayn Rand Institute, “Peacenik Warmongers,” online, 12/16/2002)

If dropping bombs won't work, what should the United States do to obtain a peaceful relationship with the numerous hostile regimes, including Iraq, that seek to harm us with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? The "peace advocates" offer no answer. The most one can coax out of them are vague platitudes (we should "make common cause with the people of the world," says the prominent "anti-war" group Not in Our Name) and agonized soul-searching ("Why do they hate us?"). The absence of a peacenik peace plan is no accident. Pacifism is inherently a negative doctrine--it merely says that military action is always bad. As one San Francisco protestor put the point: "I don't think it's right for our government to kill people." In practice, this leaves the government only two means of dealing with our enemies: to ignore their acts of aggression, or to **appease them** by capitulating to the aggressor's demands. We do not need to predict or deduce the consequences of pacifism with regard to terrorism and the nations that sponsor it, because we experienced those consequences on September 11. Pacifism practically dictated the American response to terrorism for more than 23 years, beginning with our government's response to the first major act of Islamic terrorism against this country: when Iranian mobs held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days at the American embassy in Tehran. In response to that and later terrorist atrocities, American Presidents sought to avoid military action at all costs--by treating terrorists as isolated criminals and thereby ignoring the role of the governments that support them, or by offering diplomatic handouts to terrorist states in hopes that they would want to be our friends. With each pacifist response it became clearer that the most powerful nation on Earth was a paper tiger--and our enemies **made the most of it**. After years of American politicians acting like peaceniks, Islamic terrorism had proliferated from a few gangs of thugs to a worldwide scourge--making possible the attacks of September 11. It is an obvious evasion of history and logic for the advocates of pacifism to label themselves "anti-war," **since the policies they advocate necessarily invite escalating acts of war against anyone who practices them. Military inaction sends the message to an aggressor--and to other, potential aggressors--that it will benefit by attacking the United** States. To whatever extent "anti-war" protesters influence policy, they are not helping to prevent war; they are acting to make war more frequent and deadly, by making our enemies more aggressive, more plentiful, and more powerful. **The only way to deal with militant enemies is to show them unequivocally that aggression against the United States will lead to their destruction**. The only means of imparting this lesson is overwhelming military force--enough to defeat and incapacitate the enemy. Had we annihilated the Iranian regime 23 years ago, we could have thwarted Islamic terrorism at the beginning, with far less cost than will be required to defeat terrorism today. And if we fail to use our military against state sponsors of terrorism today, imagine the challenge we will face five years from now when Iraq and Iran possess nuclear weapons and are ready to disseminate them to their terrorist minions. Yet such a world is the goal of the "anti-war" movement. The **suicidal** stance of peaceniks is no innocent error or mere overflow of youthful idealism. It is the product of a fundamentally immoral commitment: the commitment to ignore reality--from the historical evidence of the consequences of pacifism to the very existence of the violent threats that confront us today--in favor of the wish that laying down our arms will achieve peace somehow.

### Economy DA Link

#### Defense industry critical to the US economy

Aaron Bowman is Senior Vice President for Business Development, JAXUSA Partnership, “The Military and Defense Industry: An Economic Force in the U.S.”, Site Selection Magazine, Sept 2012, https://siteselection.com/issues/2012/sep/sas-military-economy.cfm

The military and defense industry is a significant driver of economic development in communities throughout the country. The positive benefits from military installations impact every citizen. Often overlooked, the companies that support the military are major employers and tax generators. A report prepared by Deloitte and sponsored by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) earlier this year assessed the contribution and financial impact of the U.S. aerospace and defense industry. The indirect and induced employment associated with the U.S. aerospace and defense industry is a minimum of 3.5 million jobs. The companies providing these jobs generated $324 billion in sales revenue in 2010, with $15.6 billion in net income after tax at an average pre-tax reported operating profit margin of 10.5 percent. These companies paid $5.5 billion in corporate income taxes on their earnings, as well as $1.7 billion in state income and similar business taxes. With individual direct employee taxes, the total industry generated an estimated $37.8 billion in wage and income-based taxes to state and federal government treasuries, not including the taxes paid by indirect and induced industry employment.

### U.S. Leadership DA Link

#### International actors perceive US arms transfer policy through the lens of political leverage – decreasing it would signal retreat.

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Keep China Down, Russia Out, and Friendly States In A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction. America should accept that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a lot of U.S. weapons, but avoid coddling the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia (and its Gulf State allies) will remain an important customer largely because the country is desperate to keep the United States involved in the region. The Saudi military is almost entirely American equipped and trained and most of its military capability requires continued American support to function for more than a couple of days. A few additional jobs may result from selling more arms to the Kingdom, but this may not justify giving up the leverage over Saudi and its allies’ policies towards Yemen, Syria, and Qatar that do not necessarily advance American interests. The United States should encourage, but steer, Europe. Since the Cold War the United States has used its economic and political clout to systematically inhibit an independent European defense production capability. This has certainly increased U.S. market share, but continued efforts come at the expense of more important political goals. It would be much easier to ask NATO allies to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense if more of this money would go into indigenous industries. The United States should recognize that European global competitiveness in the arms trade can serve American interests (and perhaps provide competition for its own sheltered defense industry). This will relieve pressure on Europe to export to countries embargoed by the United States, which undermines the influence of U.S. arms transfer policy. When the United States placed real restrictions on arms transfers to Egypt’s al-Sisi regime, other states quickly attempted to fill this gap. As one French policymaker cynically noted, “Obama was the [French fighter jet] Rafale’s best salesperson.” Overall, from 2012-2015 the export agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-fold over the previous four-year period. That said, Europe has by and large cooperated with successful arms embargoes against Russia and China (although Europe does sell nearly $400 million of dual use equipment to China each year). Maintaining and even tightening these key sanctions must be the highest priority of any defense cooperation policy with Europe. More broadly, fixation on “buying American” misses tremendous opportunities for leading coordinated action with like-minded states in Europe and elsewhere. This is feasible given that the United States, NATO members, South Korea, Israel, and a few other allies account for a whopping 62 percent of total global arms exports (SIPRI). To this end, the United States should liberalize its own market. Much as when “foreign” automotive firms build their cars in the United States, acquiring products from abroad may create more jobs than selling weapons internationally. The U.S. Air Force’s current $16 billion fighter-trainer contract has been largely narrowed down to three candidates with foreign connections: a Lockheed Martin-Korea Aerospace Industries version of Korea’s T-50; a new design from a Boeing-Saab team; and an entirely foreign offering from Leonardo. Winning such a contract will give one of three like-minded states (South Korea, Sweden, or Italy, respectively) a boost in other international competitions against less scrupulous dealers. And the United States can still shape these exports for its political interests, such as when it recently vetoed the T-50’s export to Uzbekistan. America is Like No Other Arms Exporter and Should Act Like It The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S. wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S. domination of the global arms trade is based on the world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain. Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage American influence abroad.