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## File Notes

This is an argument central to the topic. The basic idea behind this argument is that the Affirmative is working to produce security for the United States by reducing its sale of arms to other countries. The articles that follow criticize the Affirmatives’ production of security on the basis that attempting to create security actually creates insecurity.

When using this file as the negative there are few things to keep in mind. First, there is a 1NC shell that has a generic link, impact, and alternative. If you wish to, which you should, be more specific in your criticism there are more specific links in the “Link” section of the file. There is also a “2NC/1NR Framework” section. You will want to use this section in the 2NC/1NR to frame the debate. Importantly, you will need to make the argument that fiat is illusory or not real.

When using this file as the affirmative, turn to the Section labeled “AFF.” There is also a brief introduction there.

## 1NC Security K Shell (1/3)

#### Link :The 1ac’s act of securitization threatens human existence

**Ahmed 11** [2011, Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development [IPRD], an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace %26 Security Volume 23, Issue 3, Taylor Francis]

This analysis thus **calls for a broader approach to** environmental security based on retrieving the **manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to** ecological, energy and economic **crises** [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism]. Instead, **both realist and liberal orthodox IR** approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each **lack**s **the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently** over-**exploiting the** biophysical **environment** in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. **They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and** the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they **neglect the** profound **irrationality of collective state behaviour, which** systematically erodes this relationship, **globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.**85 In Cox’s words, **because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence.** Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87

## 1NC Security K Shell (2/3)

#### Impact: Normalizing securitization produces invisible forms of violence.

**Einsenstein’07** (Zillah Eisenstein has been Professor of Politics at Ithaca College in New York for the last 35 years and is presently a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Sexual Decoys\_ Gender, Race and War in Imperial Democracy pg.19-20)

Cynthia Enloe writes of **militarization** as a process that **impacts** on **and pervades everyday life**, from the site of the military. The actual military is only a small, even if central, aspect of this disciplining and **regulating** of **social relations. Hierarchy, surveillance, authoritarianism, and deference** become part of the way people live both inside and outside military barracks.7 Homeland **Security** defines civilian psyches in militarist fashion. Codes orange and red demand a kind of unconscious consciousness of fear. They **authorize the need for a security state; a war of a different sort – the kind you might not see, or feel first-hand, but is there.** The 2004 presidential election was embedded in these militarist frames, calling forth particular memories of the Vietnam War to construct the new heroes and patriots of today. Enloe worries that **militarized culture mystifies its own significance by** focusing on the military as the location for militarized ways of thinking/ living. She argues that by **focusing on the military as the site of warlike life we normalize “the militarized civilian sites”.** She insightfully argues that the newest way that militarization is “camouflaged” is by presenting women’s service in the military as though it were connected to women’s liberation.8 Instead of liberation, women’s entry into the military is better understood as the newest stage of militarizing global capitalism. In this post-1989 era the constructions of racialized patriarchy are being reformed once again. New-old constructions of the dutiful wife, the black mammy, the welfare mother, the soccer mom, the professional woman, are being refashioned for and with militarization. More women are forced to join the military out of economic necessity; and more non-military women have been disciplined by the demands of a privatized public sphere that restructures gender with its intensified demands.

## 1NC Security K Shell (3/3)

#### Thus, the Alternative: interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prerequisite to successful policy.

**Ahmed 11** (Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace and Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis, CMR)

**This expansion of militarisation is** thus **coeval** **with the** subliminal normative **presumption that the social relations of** the perpetrators, in this case **Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost** - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet **conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats** enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### LINK: AFRICA

#### The Aff’s engagement with Africa is an attempt to once again use Africa s a pawn in the international power struggle between the US, China, and Russia.

**Unah’19** (Linus Unah, “Is the US making moves to counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa?” TRT World, January 10, 2019. Unah is a Nigerian journalist whom has written for Al Jezeera, The Christian Science Monitor and NPR.)

“While **the US is returning to Africa late in the game**, it must be noted that among the general populace, it still retains significant goodwill in major parts of Africa compared to its adversaries,” said Damimola Olawuyi of SBM Intelligence, a Lagos-based geopolitical consultancy firm. “**The continent** can be **seen as a staging base for global competition and great powers will want to disperse resources there before deploying them against adversaries**,” he added. The US strategy to win hearts and minds while advancing its foreign policy goals in Africa doesn’t end with the new agency. And as the Chinese government comes under scrutiny for a lack of transparency with project details and Chinese companies face accusations of labour and environmental violations, gaps to exploit remain. On December 13, at the Washington-based think tank Heritage Foundation, John R. Bolton, **Trump’s national security adviser, outlined the administration’s new strategy for Africa. Again, at the heart of the strategy is a ploy to counter Russian and Chinese influence,** which Bolton did not gloss over. The new **strategy** would, he told the audience, **focus on promoting trade and commercial ties, countering terrorism and violent conflict**, and providing foreign aid “efficiently and effectively.” A new initiative Prosper Africa, would be implemented to support US investment across Africa, increase the continent’s middle class and improve business environments in the region, he said. Bolton did not say how many dollars would be poured into the programme.

### LINK: ASIA

#### The affs reduction in US arms sales to Asia continues to fuel regional insecurity.

**Dominguez 16** (Gabriel Dominguez, “Asian security fears fueling global arms trade,” *DW*. February 21, 2016. https://www.dw.com/en/asian-security-fears-fueling-global-arms-trade/a-19054185.)

Moreover, explained analyst Fischer, **the United States' presence in the SCS and contradicting views on the freedom of the seas have created mounting tensions** between Washington and Beijing. "**To counter external threats and to protect its interests, China has made significant investments in the development of its anti-access/area denial capabilities** (A2/AD) over the past years," added Fischer. "The situation is further complicated by the US' long-standing security cooperation with other countries in the region, like the Philippines." The security dilemma **There are strong indications that tensions over the SCS could provoke a full-scale regional arms race.** This became evident in the latest defense spending statistics, which indicate that, of the ten countries globally whose defense budgets grew fastest in 2015, four border the SCS: the Philippines, Indonesia, China and Vietnam. In light of this development, **Moores argues that regional players with a vested interest in the SCS, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, will increasingly look to Europe and the US for more advanced naval equipment. At the same time, he says, South Korea and Japan will increasingly seek to strike bilateral development deals in the region to support their exports.** The driver of **this arms race is a classic security dilemma**. That is, the **attempt by one country to increase its own security** by increasing its military strength has the effect of **creating insecurity** in neighboring states," James D. J. Brown, an expert on international affairs at Temple University's campus in Tokyo, told DW. These neighbors then respond by increasing their own military capabilities, thereby neutralizing any advantage initially gained by the first country. Further increases in military strength then follow, creating a spiral of insecurity and a dangerous arms race. This so-called "circle of acquisitions" may lead to an arms race which, aside from being expensive, may also lead to alternative responses from countries that can't keep up.

### LINK: ASIA

#### The AFF’s reduction in arms to Asia is part of a US securitization model that destabilizes the region.

**Xinbo 00** (Wu Xinbo, U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China—U.S. Relations,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22 (3) (2000): 479-497.)

h turned out to be a highly political one. What **Beijing feels** most **aggrieved about are U.S.-Taiwan military ties**. Firstly, the frequent transfer of large quantities of advanced weapons to Taiwan violates the 1982 communique signed by Beijing and Washington in which the United States promised to reduce gradually its arms sales to Taiwan. In 1992, the Bush Administration announced the sale of 150 F-16 aircraft to Taiwan; and, in 1994, President Clinton signed a U.S. Congressional resolution into law which stated that the Taiwan Relations Act should take precedence over the three communiques between China and the United States with regard to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. **These actions have served to undermine U.S. credibility in its commitments on arms transfers to Taiwan.** Secondly, **Washington** **has** always claimed that the continuing arms supply to Taiwan would enhance **the** island's **sense** of security and **that the more secure Taiwan feels, the more** **likely** Taipei **would be willing to sit down to negotiate with Beijing. This is simply not true.** In fact, the more weapons Taiwan secures, the more reluctant it will be to talk to the mainland**.** In other words, **U.S. military assistance to Taiwan has given Taipei a false sense of security and, as a result, it has resisted any political solution to the entanglement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.** Thirdly, U.S. military assistance also encourages separatist elements in Taiwan who believe that, with advanced weapon systems procured from the United States and the promise under the Taiwan Relations Act of U.S. military protection in the event of a crisis, Taiwan can do whatever it wants. Finally, if the separatist forces in Taiwan push matters to the brink by seeking de jure independence for the island, Beijing will have to use force to preserve China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Should such a war break out across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. weapons will be used by the separatists against China. In sum, while Washington claims it prefers a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question, its military assistance to Taiwan ? particularly arms transfers ? has undermined the prospect of a peaceful settlement. **The U.S. challenges to China's security interests can be attributed to three factors. One is the desire to establish a hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific and, for that purpose, to install a U.S.-led regional system which Beijing regards as threatening.** Another is the overreaction to the rise of China. For ideological or strategic reasons, many people in the United States view the rise of China as a major challenge, and some even compare China to Germany before the two world wars. Therefore, while Washington has taken certain measures which it believes to be purely preventive, these are, in many cases, offensive and excessive, causing China to feel encircled and constricted. Third is the lack of understanding on the part of the United States with regard to China's legitimate national interests, especially on the Taiwan issue. Despite the fact that the United States fought a civil war to maintain its own national unity, it does not view China's aspiration for national unification sympathetically; because of domestic political and commercial factors, policy-makers in Washington are simply not willing to take a more reasonable and responsible stance on the Taiwan issue

### LINK: GENERIC

#### The 1ac’s act of securitization threatens human existence

**Ahmed 11** [2011, Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development [IPRD], an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace %26 Security Volume 23, Issue 3, Taylor Francis]

This analysis thus **calls for a broader approach to** environmental security based on retrieving the **manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to** ecological, energy and economic **crises** [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism]. Instead, **both realist and liberal orthodox IR** approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each **lack**s **the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently** over-**exploiting the** biophysical **environment** in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. **They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and** the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they **neglect the** profound **irrationality of collective state behaviour, which** systematically erodes this relationship, **globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.**85 In Cox’s words, **because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence.** Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87

### LINK: CLIMATE CHANGE

#### The securitization of climate change wrecks mitigation efforts, leads to military intervention, and retrenches security

**Lucke et al. 13** (Franziskus von Lucke – masters in political science @ the University of Hamburg, Zehra Wellmann – Ph.D candidate in political science @ the University of Tübingen, and Thomas Diez – Ph.D in political science @ the University of Mannheim, “What's at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach” 21st September 2013, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/vonLucke\_Wellmann\_Diez\_Whats%20at%20Stake%20in%20Securitizing%20Climate%20Change.pdf)

If we move to the different levels of securitisation, are some normatively preferably to others? On the territorial level, we agree with other scholars106 that **the securitisation of climate change in terms of conflicts between groups or states and national security conceptions is hugely problematic.** On the positive side, this discourse helps to raise attention and is conductive in forging coalitions between actors that would otherwise not have approached the topic seriously, as has happened for example in US debates107 or UN Security Council meetings.108 However, **such an argumentation** also **detracts the attention from the core issues – slowing down climate change through decisive mitigation efforts – to rather ad-hoc adaptation measures and interferences in risk countries that could in the end take the form of military intervention.**109 As a consequence, there is an increasing involvement of military and defence actors in climate politics as well as the adoption of concepts from the climate sector into military planning.110 **Actors prepare themselves to cope with climate change’s secondary effects instead of preventing global warming from happening in the first place.**111 Moreover, **using a territorial securitisation and national security conceptions reinforces Othering and friend-enemy conceptions** (in line with the original CS argument) **and shifts the attention to questions of security between states, thereby losing sight of the one most severely affected, that is poor populations within those states.**

### LINK:DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

#### Democratic peace theory justifies violent interventions to promote US interests.

**Barkawi 15**

(Tarak Barkawi, “Scientific Decay,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 59 (4) (2015): 8127-29. Barkawi was educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science)

The **Democratic Peace**, **as a** scientific **claim about the world**, retrospectively **justifies** US Cold War policies. **Interventions in the Third World** were really about promoting democracy, and not about supporting dictatorial regimes out of paranoid anti-communism. At the same time, those Cold War interventions—which we should, by rights, see as challenging the Democratic Peace—reappear as validating that claim. **Overthrowing elected leaders with the wrong ideology, or repressing popular movements abroad, is actually pro-democracy** and ultimately sustains the peace between democracies, objectively speaking. Here we catch a whiff of how Poz- nansky’s article, and the research **program** of which it is a part, **participates in US power and reproduces its logics of intervention in the present.** This sort of scholarship perpetuates the nearly complete failure of our discipline to confront its own implication in the US security state in and beyond the Cold War (cf. Asad 1973; Amadae 2003; Oren 2003).∂ The purpose of science should be to stand outside of ideology, to critique it, not to ratify it (Weber 1946 [1919]). Consider Poznansky’s closing lines about the present-day worldwide construct through which the US legitimates intervention, the War on Terror. He writes: “the prospects for a democratic peace in the Middle East will hinge in large part on whether moderate elements within these countries successfully keep anti-democratic Islamists out of power and forestall the belief that their countries have stepped out onto the slippery slope of democratic decay” (2015:10). Having reproduced Cold War ideology in stark simplicity—anti-communism equals pro-democracy—Poznansky does the same for the War on Terror. We have the whole panoply here: US friends (moderate Islamists), US enemies (anti-democratic Isla- mists), and the idea that any Islamist regime is inherently susceptible to authoritarianism. This think tank-level analysis wishes away the popular (that is, democratic) power of US opponents, whether or not they formally elect parties and governments. It disappears from inquiry their democratic projects and any relations those projects might have with peace, war, or the prospects for popular rule. It identifies the analyst with the US project in the world and with its enmities.∂ **That the chief findings of liberal and empiricist IR reflect the worldview of the US security state in no way confirms the hypotheses of democratic-peace theory. They indicate instead the co-constitutive character of power/knowledge relations and the need for a reckoning with the multifaceted ways in which US power has shaped, and continues to shape, the discipline** (Lowen 1997; Cumings 1999:173–204; Gilman 2003; Isaac 2007; Stampnitzky 2013).

### LINK:LATIN AMERICA

#### The AFFs reduction of arms sales to Latin America is an attempt at continuing to control Latin America.

**Muggah 19** (Robert Muggah, “Stop Enabling Latin America’s Gun Addiction,” Americas Quarterly 13 (2) (2019). https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/stop-enabling-latin-americas-gun-addiction.)

The sheer diversity and scale of arms and ammunition moving into **Latin America** from the U.S., both in **legal transfers and through smuggling, constitutes a major policy challenge** for your administration. **To be sure, the region’s governments can take many worthwhile steps, such as strengthening arms export and import regulations,** sharing intelligence and introducing additional border and custom controls, and establishing more oversight over local arms production — not to mention **developing stricter management and marking of military, police and private security arsenals.** However, without stronger U.S. control over the flow of arms south of the border, it will be difficult for Latin American authorities to adequately confront the region’s gun menace. Given the ready supply of firearms and ammunition the U.S. continues to provide as part of major security packages to Mexico, Central and South America, you have a special obligation to ensure the responsible export of arms and ammunition to the region. One way to accomplish this is by mandating greater accountability on the part of the brokers and end-users involved in the trade. This could be greatly aided if Congress, under your leadership, were to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, which the U.S. signed in 2013, as well as expand support for end-use monitoring programs such as Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry, which have spurred thousands of checks into license requests and suspicious transfers. **Ramping up bilateral support for military and police stockpile and inventory management and surplus destruction will help prevent lawful guns from being diverted into private — and eventually criminal — hands. You should also support regional confidence-building mechanisms to monitor legal and illegal arms transfers, trafficking and leakage. This will require some coaxing of Latin American governments to overcome the many political and economic factors that frustrate regional cooperation.** For example, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela are actively seeking to expand their market share in the defense sector — especially in rifles, handguns and ammunition. **What is more, several Central American governments mistrust one another and the U.S. One way to surmount some of these challenges** **is to encourage more Latin American countries to report to the UN Conventional Arms Register**, as well as the legally binding OAS Firearms Convention.

### LINK: MIDDLE EAST

#### The AFFs reduction of Arms sales to the Middle East is an attempt to produce a smarter, smaller forward posture.

**Dalton and Karlin’ 18**(Melissa Dalton, Mara Karlin, “Toward a smaller, smarter force posture in the Middle East,” *Brookings*. August 28, 2018.)

To be clear, the U.S. military will never leave the Middle East. We are not advocating that it do so. However, **if Defense Secretary** Mattis **wants to fulfill the NDS mandate to focus on China and Russia, the U.S. military’s posture in the Middle East must get smaller and smarter.** First, the United States must increase the emphasis of non-military tools, which will be vital to enabling regional partners to address long-term challenges of governance, fraying of social contracts, and consolidating counter terrorism and territorial gains into stabilization. Such initiatives will require sustained and accountable funding from both the Department of State and USAID, whose budgets have been slashed in the first two years of the Trump administration. In addition, the United States has yet to appoint as many as half of its ambassadors to the region. While career foreign, civil, and military service officers can carry forward initiatives quite capably, the absence of the president’s representatives in key partner countries limits the political effectiveness of the United States at a time when geopolitical competitors such as Russia and China are deepening their relationships in the region—and ability to broker the posture adjustments we recommend in this article. **To this point, the administration must look beyond one commonly used tool—U.S.arms sales—to compete with growing Russian influence in the Middle East; it must strengthen other U.S. diplomatic, economic, intelligence and strategic communication tools that will be critical to enabling a competitive strategy in the region.**

### LINK: TERRORISM

#### American attempts to securitize against terrorism create terrorism.

**Sinno 08** (Nadine Sinno is an Assistant Professor of Arabic in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at Virginia Tech, Deconstructing the myth of liberation @ riverbendblog.com, Feminism and War: Confronting US Imperalism pgs. 132-134)

In some of her posts, Riverbend quotes sections of US president George W. Bush’s speeches (which are fraught with references to terrorism) and shows how, **more often than not, the military ‘raids’ that are supposed to target terrorists end up killing innocent people instead.** For instance, she posts Bush’s following announcement: ‘Since the end of major combat, we have conducted raids seizing many caches of enemy weapons and massive amounts of ammunition, and we have captured or killed hundreds of Saddam loyalists and terrorists’ (2005: 58). In response to him, she writes: Yes, we know all about ‘raids’ … The ‘loyalists and terrorists’ must include Mohammed Al-Kubeisie of Jihad Quarter in Baghdad who was 11. He went outside the second floor balcony of his house to see what the commotion was all about in their garden … Mohammed was shot on the spot. I remember another little terrorist who was killed four days ago in Baquba … This terrorist was 10 … no one knows why or how he was shot by one of the troops while they were raiding his family’s house. They found no weapons, they found no Ba’athists, they found no WMD. (Ibid.: 58) In this example, Riverbend does not theorize about terrorism; rather, she simply relays to us actual incidents that have resulted from the same ‘raids’ that Bush presents as a means of combating ‘terrorism.’ Thus, ‘terrorist’ starts to signify and literally include ‘innocent’ or ‘victim.’Riverbend’s entries include a plethora of references to raids in which the army ended up killing civilians. **If such incidents were covered regularly by the media, the term ‘terrorism’ would start automatically to sound dubious to the average American, not just the Riverbend reader, the cynical academic or the peace activist.** Such dubiousness, however, would undermine the necessity of waging wars, because once a war is defined in vague, non-oppositional terms – once categories like ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ ‘civilian’ and ‘military,’ and even ‘war’ and ‘peace’ become blurred, apprehension about war becomes inevitable. As Miriam Cooke comments: There are risks attendant on the dismantling of the War Story. Why go to war if victory and defeat are not clear-cut, mutually exclusive concepts? Low-intensity conflict may spill into a non-militarized zone, but people still need to believe in the separation of space into dangerous front – men’s space – and danger-free home – women’s space. And then who would venture into battle if there is doubt about the goodness and loyalty of troops and allies and the total evil of the enemy? (Cooke 1996: 7) Not only does Riverbend speak of the ambiguity that characterizes the word ‘terrorist,’ she also describes the Iraqi domestic sphere’s current transformation into a militarized zone such that a whole household of innocent men and women could be branded as ‘terrorist’ (or a terrorist cell) for merely owning more than the permitted ‘single weapon’ – at a time when neither the police nor the troops have the resources to ensure the safety of Iraqi civilians. Every male in the house is usually armed and sometimes the women too. It’s not because we love turning our homes into arsenals, but because the situation was so dangerous (and in some areas still is) that no one wants to take any risks. Imagine this scene: a blue mini-van pulls up … 10 dirty, long-haired men clamber out with Kalashnikovs, pistols, and grenades and demand all the gold and the kids (for ransom). Now imagine trying to face them all with a single weapon … (Riverbend 2005: 145) Even more disturbing is Riverbend’s assertion that **children who witness the raids on their homes will probably grow up to become real terrorists, as a result of falling victims to the troops’ occasional abuse of power. ‘The troops were pushing women and children shivering with fear out the door in the middle of the night,’ she writes. ‘What do you think these children think to themselves? Who do you think is creating the “terrorists?!!”’** (ibid.: 145). **Riverbend complicates the term ‘terrorist’ and shows how the abuse of power will inevitably breed more terrorism, how the same forces of ‘good’ that are there to combat terrorism are planting the seeds of terrorism, as they ‘terrorize’ civilians.** Undeniably, Riverbend provides an insider’s war narrative that opposes the myth of war in its clear-cut categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’ and which emphasizes everybody’s involvement in the victimization, resistance, and survival process.

## Impact

#### Normalizing securitization produces invisible forms of violence.

**Einsenstein’07** (Zillah Eisenstein has been Professor of Politics at Ithaca College in New York for the last 35 years and is presently a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Sexual Decoys\_ Gender, Race and War in Imperial Democracy pg.19-20)

Cynthia Enloe writes of **militarization** as a process that **impacts** on **and pervades everyday life**, from the site of the military. The actual military is only a small, even if central, aspect of this disciplining and **regulating** of **social relations. Hierarchy, surveillance, authoritarianism, and deference** become part of the way people live both inside and outside military barracks.7 Homeland **Security** defines civilian psyches in militarist fashion. Codes orange and red demand a kind of unconscious consciousness of fear. They **authorize the need for a security state; a war of a different sort – the kind you might not see, or feel first-hand, but is there.** The 2004 presidential election was embedded in these militarist frames, calling forth particular memories of the Vietnam War to construct the new heroes and patriots of today. Enloe worries that **militarized culture mystifies its own significance by** focusing on the military as the location for militarized ways of thinking/ living. She argues that by **focusing on the military as the site of warlike life we normalize “the militarized civilian sites”.** She insightfully argues that the newest way that militarization is “camouflaged” is by presenting women’s service in the military as though it were connected to women’s liberation.8 Instead of liberation, women’s entry into the military is better understood as the newest stage of militarizing global capitalism. In this post-1989 era the constructions of racialized patriarchy are being reformed once again. New-old constructions of the dutiful wife, the black mammy, the welfare mother, the soccer mom, the professional woman, are being refashioned for and with militarization. More women are forced to join the military out of economic necessity; and more non-military women have been disciplined by the demands of a privatized public sphere that restructures gender with its intensified demands.

## Alternative

#### Thus, the Alternative: interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prerequisite to successful policy.

**Ahmed’11** (Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace and Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis, CMR)

**This expansion of militarisation is** thus **coeval** **with the** subliminal normative **presumption that the social relations of** the perpetrators, in this case **Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost** - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet **conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats** enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## A2: Permutation

#### No Permutation. The justification for international strategies determines their outcomes

**Goddard & Krebs 15** (Stacie E. Goddard – assistant professor of political science @ Wellesley College, Ph.D @ Columbia University, Ronald R. Krebs – professor of political science, Ph.D @ Columbia University, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” March 11, 2015)

After al Qaeda crashed three airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, the George W. Bush administration cast the United States as a blameless victim, represented the perpetrators as evildoers, and proclaimed a “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). It was not foreordained that this understanding of the day’s events, the protagonists, and the US response would become dominant. Many criticized the administration for having declared war on terrorism, rather than on a specific ideology or organization, and others for its having declared war, rather than adopting a law-enforcement paradigm. These critics saw the administration’s rhetorical choices as fateful: as a rhetorical device, the GWOT, they argued, imparted legitimacy to al Qaeda and lent itself to accusations of a war on Islam. Within a few years, even some in the Bush administration saw the GWOT as a liability.¶ Unlike many scholars of international relations, **participants in the pro- tracted controversy over the GWOT believed that it matters what actors say in global politics.** This **special issue of Security Studies** seeks to **demonstrate the value of making public talk central** to the study of international relations, and it focuses on a specific form of public talk, **legitimation**, in a single substantive arena, grand strategy. By legitimation, we mean how po- litical actors publicly **justify their policy stances before concrete audiences, seeking to secure these audiences’ assent that their positions are indeed le- gitimate and thus potentially to garner their approval and support.** Scholars of international relations often dismiss rhetorical contestation as meaningless posturing, unworthy of serious analysis, especially when it comes to the high politics of state security. The contributors to this special issue disagree. And they are not alone: politicians the world over devote substantial material resources and political capital to rhetorical battle, in implicit recognition that legitimation shapes the fate of political projects, from the welfare state to national security. This special issue sides with the politicians—not because the world of politics is a genteel debating society, whose participants politely puzzle over the central issues of the day, but because it is a political contest with very real consequences. To sustain this claim, this special issue takes on the “hard” case of grand strategy. The contributors analyze classic puzzles in the history of international security—among others, how the Concert of Europe produced peace, why Britain failed to balance against Nazi Germany, why the United States was slow to enter World War II—to show that, **even in these well-trod cases in which the stakes were high, leaders’ justifications of their actions and policies were crucial to explaining the outcome.**¶

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#### A2: FRAMEWORK

#### They say the focus on the macro matters - but the detached stance of the policy maker in debate divorces us from true advocacy and is one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education. Such as stance is linked to normative practices used to produce and maintain multiple networks of oppression.

**Reid-Brinkley, 2008** (Shanara,"THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE," pg. 118-120)

Mitchell observes that **the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture**.” In other words, its **participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates**. **Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking.** Debate **simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about**. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent.We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). The “objective” **stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona**. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, **such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression.** In other words, **the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony.** So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same. Jones and Green argue that debaters should ground their agency in what they are able to do as “individuals.” Note the following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emory’s Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the “sweet sixteen”): “And then, another main difference is that our advocacy is grounded in our agency as individuals. Their agency is grounded in what the US federal government, what the state should do.”117 Citing Mitchell, Green argues further: We talk about, dead prez, talks about how the system ain’t gone change, unless we make it change. We’re talkin’ about what we as individuals should do. That’s why Gordon Mitchell talked about how when we lose our argumentative agency. **When we give our agency to someone else, we begin speaking of what the United States Federal Government should do, rather than what we do, that cause us to be spectators. Its one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education.** As part of their commitment to the development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in recognition of their privilege, in an attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.

### A2: War is Natural

#### Thinking war or domination is inevitable is dangerous because it is a cover up for the political motivations for war.

**Einsenstein’08** (Zillah Eisenstein has been Professor of Politics at Ithaca College in New York for the last 35 years and is presently a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Resexing militarism for the globe, Feminism and War: Confronting US Impeeralism pg.34)

**Hobbes was not right** about most men or women. Yet **the naturalization and normalization of war are maintained by this notion of a mythic human nature, which is also constructed as male. It is dangerous to think that war is inevitable**, and intrinsic to human nature. I do not think genes are simply nature, nor do I think human nature is natural at all. **The concept of nature is** truly **political at the start**. **It** is a construct that **reifies the needs of those who need us to fight their wars.** In this techno-masculinist world that we inhabit we are shown war as the drama of manhood. Sometimes it is named the ‘Oedipal compulsion,’ and the ‘psychic quest for the father.’ Yet over 120,000 dutiful sons who fought the Vietnam War came home to commit suicide, twice the number killed in the war (Boose 1993: 504, 605)

## AFF File Notes

A security argument makes the case that the affirmative has produced some impact by attempting to secure the United States. As the affirmative, you should first remember to extend the benefits of the affirmative. Once you have explained why the affirmative is a good thing, the pieces of evidence that follow in this file will help you make the case that the affirmatives engagement with security is not a bad thing.

To answer this criticism you need to do a few things. First, you should make some “permutation” argument or an argument that explains how the affirmative and negative can happen at the same time. Second, you need to respond to the negative’s framework argument. Third, you need to create some disadvantage to the alternative. In this file, there is a 2AC frontline which provides a rubric for how to answer the criticism. There are also Link Defense, pieces of evidence that contest the link argument, pieces of evidence in the context of some of the most common Aff areas.

## 2AC Generic Answers: Security K

1. **Perm do both: The state is key to fixing its own hyper-securitization – it solves better because it sets a global model unique to policy action**

**Boyd ’16** (Dallas Boyd, national security analyst at Science Applications International Corporation, “Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (SPRING 2016), pp. 43-73, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271087>)

**In crises where states fundamentally misperceive each other’s tolerance for risk, the result of overconfidence may not be dominance but rather catastrophe. De-emphasis of Nuclear Weapons in US Security Policy Finally, adopting a countervalue strategy would enable a range of policies that circumscribe the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy, a goal that President Obama articulated in Prague.70 First, the United States could comfortably adopt a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. While US doctrine lists a range of potential first-use scenarios—for example, targeting deeply buried biological weapons facilities—these are mere garnishes to the primary mission of US strategic weapons: preemptively destroying enemy nuclear forces. If the limitations of this strategy were appreciated more widely and US doctrine modified accordingly, the chief impediment to adopting a no-first-use pledge would be greatly attenuated. Additionally, deployed warheads could be maintained at lower states of alert, which many senior leaders believe even now to be far out of proportion to the nation’s deterrence needs.71 Coupled with warhead reductions, changes to US targeting policy could influence foreign decision making by reassuring America’s rivals that they do not need formidable nuclear forces to deter the United States. While it is important not to overstate the responsiveness of foreign nuclear programs to American policies, it is not implausible that US doctrinal adjustments could have cascading effects. Consider the interlocking nature of the world’s nuclear deterrence relationships, where Russia and the United States must deter each other, China must deter them both as well as India, India must deter China and Pakistan, and Pakistan must deter India.72 A fundamental change to the targeting policy of the most powerful of these states could lead to a steep downward revision in the commonly accepted requirements of nuclear deterrence. Even if Russia’s targeting policy remained unchanged, countries that have not yet developed robust counterforce capabilities, such as China, India, and Pakistan, might be persuaded not to pursue them in the first place. Recognizing the difficulty of making such sweeping reforms to the US nuclear posture, as well as the enduring allure of the counterforce option in some scenarios, it may be necessary to consider more modest changes to reduce the danger of catastrophic misperceptions. Ideally, these reforms would address both sides of the underlying problem— the consequences of signaling the United States’ low damage tolerance and the intrinsic dangers of the counterforce model itself. Regarding the former, US leaders should consciously avoid rhetoric in other contexts that gives the impression of their extreme sensitivity to nuclear threats. Whether sincere or exaggerated, these statements may invite boldness on the part of adversaries in a crisis, undermining the US bargaining position. Although signaling that the United States is perfectly willing to gamble its cities may lack credibility, at the very least US leaders should refrain from messaging that reinforces the opposite position.**

## 2AC Generic Answers: Security K

1. **Framework:**
   1. **Interpretation:** The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of a topical plan and the negative must defend the status quo
   2. **Reasons to Prefer:**

#### Engagement is necessary to avoid reproducing the status quo

**Bryant 12 (**professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

However, **pointing** this **out and deriding** market based **solutions doesn’t get us very far.** In fact, **such a response** to proposed market-based solutions **is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that** 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), **above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be.** **We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here.** And here **it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.**¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.

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## 2AC Generic Answers: Security K

#### Role-Playing is different from simulation and produces empathy and interest in the topic.

**Lantis 08** (Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature\_sample.pdf) **Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe** 2002). Role-play **allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved** **and/or the challenges facing them** (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. **Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge.**

1. **Role of the Ballot:** endorse or reject the plan based on competing net benefits, voter for fairness and education. Mooting the PMC proves abuse, and the standards function as disadvantages to the alternative that only the permutation resolves.

## 2AC Generic Answers: Security K

#### Turn: Strategic political action is key – the alt causes insecurity that re-creates the most violent aspects of your impact claims

**Liotta ‘15** ( P. H. Liotta Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy) 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications

**Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization,** privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all **these concepts work in theory but fail in practice.** While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – **there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications.** With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: **National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security**. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. **Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement.**