Novice Negative Evident Packet

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# Introduction:

Welcome to the WUDL Novice Negative Evidence Set. In here, you’ll find all the research you need to construct winning negative arguments in the Novice Division and beyond on this year’s topic, Immigration. Remember, the goal of the negative is to show why the affirmative’s plan is a bad idea.

We’ve organized this evidence into a few different types of arguments:

* **“On Case” Arguments:** Direct responses to something the affirmative team has said. There are separate sections to respond to the two affirmative cases, economics and refugees, so make sure you have the right answers.
* **Disadvantages:** Disadvantages are reasons why the affirmative is a bad idea that aren’t direct responses to something that they said (The affirmative team isn’t going to bring up the problems with their plan on their own). These should be used against both affirmative cases.

**How to use this file:**

The file is organized by argument type, and which speech evidence should be used.

1. Read the summaries of each argument available in the packet.
2. Check out the glossary to make sure you understand all of the words and terms.
3. Read and highlight the evidence, making sure you understand the argument being made and pulling out the key parts of each piece of evidence.

When you are ready to debate:

1. Assemble a first negative constructive (1NC) from the 1NC options.
2. Expand on those initial arguments in the second negative constructive (2NC) and the first negative rebuttal (1NR).
3. Make a closing statement in the second negative rebuttal (2NR), explaining why the negative team’s arguments are more important than those made by the affirmative team.

# Being Negative:

The goal of the negative is simple: Prove that the plan presented by the affirmative team is a bad idea. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you’ll win debates.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Speech** | **Time (Minutes)** |
| **1st Affirmative Constructive (1AC)** | **8** |
| **2nd Negative Speaker Questions 1st Affirmative Speaker** | **3** |
| **1st Negative Constructive (1NC)** | **8** |
| **1st Affirmative Speaker Questions 1st Negative Speaker** | **3** |
| **2nd Affirmative Constructive (2AC)** | **8**  |
| **1st Negative Speaker Questions 2nd Affirmative Speaker** | **3**  |
| **2nd Negative Constructive (2NC)** | **8**  |
| **2nd Affirmative Speaker Questions 2nd Negative Speaker** | **3**  |
| **1st Negative Rebuttal (1NR)** | **5**  |
| **1st Affirmative Rebuttal (1AR)** | **5** |
| **2nd Negative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2NR)** | **5**  |
| **2nd Affirmative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2AR)** | **5**  |

**Speaking Roles on the Negative:**

* **1st Negative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce a range of negative arguments in the 1NC, and to definitively win at least one of those arguments in the 1NR.
* **2nd Negative Speaker:** Your job is to expand upon one or two arguments made in the 1NC, then to choose the best argument made by the negative team and show why the negative should win the debate in the 2NR. You are in charge of choosing negative strategy, since you’ll have to explain it in the 2NR

**Phases of a Debate:**

1. **1NC:** Outline a few different reasons why the affirmative is a bad idea, without going into too much detail on any one of them.
2. **2NC/1NR:** Think of these as a single speech, given by different people. Each debater should choose one or two (different) arguments from the 1NC and go into greater detail, explaining and adding evidence when needed.
3. **2NR:** The second negative speaker should give a closing argument all about the strongest negative position (after hearing the affirmative speak in the 1AR). Tell the judge why the negative team should win.

# Argument Overview:

The first section of this file will help you assemble the 1st Negative Constructive, or the 1NC. Remember, these are outlines of different arguments you can make—you don’t have to include every little detail until later in the debate.

Use these outlines to construct an 8 minute speech that responds to the affirmative case that you are debating (economic or refugees).

* **Global Leadership Disadvantage:** The plan will cause the United States to lose international influence and power, which prevents bad things from happening.
* **Economy Disadvantage:** The plan will hurt U.S. businesses and jobs in the United States, destroying the defense industrial base.
* **On Case Responses:** Saudi Arabia Affirmative: The arguments made by the affirmative on the human rights and middle east stability as benefits of the case are wrong
* **On Case Responses:** End Small Arms Sales Affirmative: The arguments made by the affirmative about the benefits of ending the sale of small arms are wrong.

For the 2NC and 1NR, treat these are one speech given by two different people. Each speech should cover different arguments, “dividing the block.” For example, if the 2NC talks about the Economy Disadvantage, the 1NR should talk about the on case arguments, or the Leadership Disadvantage.

# Background: US Leadership Disadvantage

Throughout global history, some countries have been bigger and stronger than others, and generally were able to exert influence over other nations. These global (or regional) leaders were often referred to as “hegemons,” the greek word for leader. Here are some historical examples:

* Sparta, Athens, and Thebes all exerted “hegemony” over the surrounding Greek world from the (8th - 1st Century BCE)
* Ancient Chinese dynasties required tribute and made gifts as the economic and political center of the Pacific world. (770 - 480 BCE)
* The Roman Empire had a host of client states that, while nominally independent, did the bidding of the Emperor. (1st and 2nd Century AD)
* Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates ruled lands from India to Spain (7th - 12th Century AD)
* European Powers in the Age of Exploration:
	+ Spain: 1516 - 1659
	+ British Empire: 1688 - 1914
* United States: 1990 - ???

Countries can acquire “hegemony,” or global leadership, by a combination of different factors, often referred to as “hard” and “soft” power.

**Hard Power:** The ability to exercise power over other nations via the use of the military, or by threatening the use of military power. For example, when Russia invaded the Ukraine, they are exercising their “hard power” to achieve their political and economic objectives (gain a port in the Black Sea).

**Soft Power:** The ability of a nation to use non-military tools to get their way in international affairs. This can include wielding economic power to create incentives (or disincentives) for cooperation, persuasion and diplomacy, appeals to morality, etc. Soft power also includes the power of a nation’s culture (movies, music, celebrity, literature, etc.) to influence people and change their values and minds.

Arms Sales impact both Hard and Soft Power. Increasing the military capacity of allies, or threatening to cut off arms shipments are forms of Hard Power, while the leverage and influence provided by the sales are forms of Soft Power.

**Some useful terms:**

 The greek word for city, or state (which were usually the same in ancient greece) was “polis.’ We still use this word as the root for many of the terms used to describe different states of international affairs. When the world has many regional powers, and no truly global powers. This is called “multi-polarity.” When there are only two global powers, this is called “bi-polarity” (such as the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War). When there is a single world power, this is referred to a “uni-polarity” (such as the United States enjoyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990.

We use the same language to discuss the cooperation (or lack thereof) between nations. “Multi-lateralism” is when multiple countries work together on an issue, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, which more than 100 nations agreed to. “Bi-lateralism” is when two countries work together on a specific issue. “Uni-lateralism” is when a nation takes an action alone, usually inspite of the general international consensus.

**The United States Position in the World**

In his farewell address, George Washington warned that the United States should avoid entangling alliances, being a friend to all and enemy to none. Subsequent leaders quickly ignored his advice, signing treaties, and making commitments overseas. The Monroe Doctrine (a declaration of US policy by President Monroe in the early 1800s) stated that foreign powers should stop meddling in the Americas, which were now under the protection and guidance of the United States. This policy declaration is a declaration of leadership and hegemony over the Americas, but it was many years before the US had the capacity to do anything about

Our geographic isolation encouraged trade, and some interference in the affairs of our neighbors in the Caribbea, but until the World Wars in the first half of the 1900s, most of our global engagement was limited. This was due to both the limited capacity of the United States to influence the actions of other nations, and due to a desire to do so. The U.S. joined traditional European allies (The UK and France) to win World War One, but retreated quickly back to our side of the Atlantic afterwards.

In the run up to WW2, there was a fierce policy debate about how the country should engage in foreign policy. “Isolationists” argued that the US should remain disengaged from global affairs, and not care about global events (such as the rise of Hitler.). Originally named “interventionists” suggested that the US should engage in world affairs, work with nations who shared common interests and/or values, and take action to prevent things that we disagreed with (such as fighting Hitler). Interventionist President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) ultimately won the argument, supporting “lend/lease” programs that supplied allies such as the UK with much needed arms and supplies to continue the war. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war on both fronts, ultimately putting together a coalition of more than 30 nations that emerged victorious.

 These nations joined together to form the United Nations, a “multi-lateral” institution to solve global problems. Working together, the United Nations (led by mostly by democratic victors of World War 2), created many of the global norms that govern international engagement today. These concepts, such as free trade, resolving disputes through laws and international organizations, and standing up for human rights across national borders, are often referred to as the “liberal world order.”

In the after-math of the war, however, the United States and the Soviet Union began to compete for allies and supremacy across the globe in the Cold War. This conflict was ideological (Capitalism versus Communism), but also political and economic. The Cold War was a period of “Bi-polarity,” where two global powers existed and most nations were allied to one or the other of these powers. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the United States has been considered the global hegemon, unmatched by any other nation in its ability to project power and influence global affairs.

There are strong arguments for the US as a hegemon. We spend more on our armed forces than the next 10 countries put together, 9 of whom are supposed to be our allies, and have military bases around the world. The US has the largest economy in the world, with a highly educated workforce, advanced technology, and abundant natural resources to support future economic growth. We also have a strong network of global allies who share interests and/or values with us and have a history of collaboration. We have also shown a strong desire to guide world affairs, use hard and soft power to influence how other countries interact across the world.

The question many scholars debate: Is the US still the global leader?

The two largest factors impacting this conversation are the rise of challengers such as Russia, and especially China, and the Presidency of Donald Trump.

* **Challengers:**
	+ Russia under Vladimir Putin has sought to re-assert Russian dominance across the world, especially in Eastern Europe. He has invaded Georgia (the country, not the state), and the Ukraine over the last decade, using ‘hard power’ to discourage neighboring countries from disagreeing with him, and has recently used Russian military power to support the Presidency of Bashid Al Assad in Syria (against the U.S. allied coalition that sees him as a human rights abuser). Russian interference in the 2016 US elections is part of a challenge to US hegemony. If our ability to govern ourselves is disrupted, other actors will fill in the vacuum. While Putin is a strong and aggressive leader, Russia’s military and economic might severely lag behind his ambitions.
	+ China has long been the center of commerce, culture, and political power in East Asia, far pre-dating Western “discovery.” They see themselves as re-emerging from a century of European colonial interference, returning to their rightful place as a key player in world affairs. The Chinese economy is growing more rapidly than that of the United States, and their population is far larger. The Chinese have a long term strategic plan to leverage their economic strength over the East Asia, and to dominate emerging technological markets. Their military is increasingly modern, and the nation has made huge investments overseas to buy good will in developing nations. China is an autocratic (non-democratic) country run by a single political party, which could prove unstable if existing economic gains don’t continue, or its citizens begin to demand more rights. It also has demographic challenges as their country gets older , a left-over of the 1 Child Policy.
* Trump
	+ President Trump has, in some ways, abandoned or endangered some of the key elements that made the US a global power. He has attacked, ignored, and harassed many of our traditional allies, especially in Europe and Eastern Europe. He is significantly disengaging from global agreements to fight issues from child soldiers to climate change, his trade wars have disrupted the global (and US) economy, his unpredictable nature and declarations have made allies feel like they can’t count of the United States if there was a problem with a rival. Arms Sales are actually a unique area where Trump is increasing our economic, military, and diplomatic engagement with other nations.

# Strategy Guide: US Leadership Disadvantage

This argument is called a disadvantage. It argues that the actions of the affirmative team (reducing arms sales) will be bad. Disadvantages have three parts, regardless of what they are arguing about:

Uniqueness: How things are going now

Link: What is the cause/effect of the plan’s actions

Impact: Why are these effects important (in this case, negatively).

For Example:

1. Uniqueness: Trevor is healthy now
	1. This means that without the plan, Trevor will remain healthy, but something is changing.
2. Link: Eating old soup makes Trevor sick
	1. Trevor took an action, and got sick.
3. Impact: Food Poisoning is terrible and makes people sick
	1. This is why we care about what happened.

It is important to express the impacts, or why we should care, in terms of the affirmative case.

Do so using several factors:

* Magnitude: How big is the impact?
* Timeframe: When will the problem occur/the benefits kick ig
* Probability: How likely is the problem to happen/are the good things to happen

Making direct comparisons to the affirmative’s impacts is always a good idea.

The thesis statement of this argument is:

The United States sells arms to foreign nations because it supports our global leadership. Sales increase our Hard Power, empowering and scaring away challenges, and increase our Soft Power, by giving us diplomatic leverage. Global leadership is important to confronting the upcoming challenges and preventing competition.

# Background: Economy Disadvantage

When the colonists sought to rebel against the British, one of the biggest barriers was the lack of manufacturing capacity for weapons. The colonial soldiers were often short on rifles, bullets, and cannons, to say nothing of ships. After its independence, the U.S. became a manufacturing powerhouse, exporting an array of goods (agricultural in the south, manufacturing in the north).

During the civil war, the North won the war partially because it already had factories that could be shifted to producing weapons and arms. This industrial capacity became an important reason why the US was a difference maker in World War One and World War Two. Able to create more tanks, planes, ships, and weapons than their rivals, the US military was unmatched.

This industrial capacity has a huge impact of the US economy, helping pull the US out of the Great Depression and into a booming economic period. The U.S. military is increasingly high tech, with our military strength based more on advanced weaponry than large numbers of people. Each soldier costs approximately 1 million dollars to equip, given all of the technology and tools available to them.

Large US companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and others are the largest defense manufacturing companies in the world, making more money, employing more people, and selling more arms than their global competitors. They employ people all over the country, produce substantial profits, and keep entire communities afloat. Furthermore, inventions from the “defense industrial base” sometimes have civilian applications, such as the internet. President Trump has announced that US government officials are tasked with encouraging foreign arms sales, as part of a “Buy American” policy. He believes that increasing arms sales will reduce the trade imbalance between the U.S. and other nations.

This year, affirmative teams will propose reducing sales. This will reduce the amount of weapons produced and sold, and potentially eliminate jobs, profits, and other cause negative repercussions.

# Strategy Page: Economy Disadvantage

Basic idea behind this argument – the US economy is doing okay now, but there’s a bunch of warning signs around recent growth. These include increased volatility in the stock market, and low wage growth. We could easily slip into a recession if these trends continue. Arm sales can fix that. Weapons require a ton of skilled labor to produce, and are generally high paying jobs. Furthermore, arms sales enable us to ying jobs. economies of scale – the US doesn’t necessarily buy enough of everything to make some of the smaller arms that are manufactured in the United States worth it long term. Continuing on with arms sales means that companies can make a lot of money on repeat business from other sources. This stabilizes and pumps up a source of high tech employment that’ll solve those warning signs that are starting to pop up in the economy.

Aff answers are easily available to this argument – while logically sound, there are reasons to believe that the job growth would actually occur overseas as a result of arms sales, as some countries require that the jobs be located in the country where the weapons are being sold. Furthermore, political circumstances change, and can be a serious inhibitor to arms sales (as we saw when the Senate refused to allow the Saudi weapons deal and the Trump administration had to veto the senate disapproval, an option that could eventually be eliminated if the Senate continues to disagree.) There’s also very limited data around the idea of economic growth as a result of arms sales, and the data that exists is kind of shaky on these logical propositions. I would highly recommend that the Gholz evidence be cited for this, as it argues both sides and doesn’t come to a definitive conclusion either way.

# Leadership Disadvantage 1NC

**1NC Shell - 1/2**

**Unique link: The United States is still king of the international arms sales market, but increased competition makes our position vulnerable and the plan reduces sales**

**Grady 2018.** John Grady (retired Director of Communications for the Association of the U.S. Army), Panel: Expansion of U.S. Arms Sales Tool to Expand American Influence, USNI News, Aug. 8, 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence>.

The administration’s goal in streamlining the process for American defense contractors to grow their sales internationally and bringing in unmanned aerial systems is a race for global influence that goes well beyond the marketplace, government and industry association panelists agreed on Wednesday. “Who’s going to make the rules for the next 50 years” for international behavior, Dak Hardwick, assistant vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association, said. Hardwick and others specially cited the growing Chinese interest in overseas military sales and Russia’s success of selling air missile defense systems to Turkey and possibly India. Neither has the strict rules governing the sales or how these systems would be used after purchase the U.S. does. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event in Washington, Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, added the April presidential memo revising the arms transfer policy and covering unmanned serial systems sales, “is only the first step [to] support and grow our defense industrial base.” She added that every sale, still will be reviewed for compliance with United States law concerning human rights and how each sale could affect arms proliferation. The government expects to meet industry requests to set milestones and timelines so they can plan and budget for potential sales domestically and to allies and partners, Laura Cressey, deputy director for regional security and arms transfers at the State Department said. She added new financing options for foreign partners would be available as an incentive to buy American. “We have a bit of a balancing act here,” she said. For example, the balancing act includes mitigating the risk to the American warfighter five years down the road by selling this specific system with its unique technology to “Y” country. Case-by-case also means that approval is not guaranteed based upon past performance by a contractor or behavior by a nation, she and several panelists said. In some parts of the State Department, it also means trying to “do more with less” to meet accelerated timelines as staffing has been left vacant or cut, she added. To Jeff Abramson, a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, this raised “a great deal of concern” because “priorities are not being weighted” in reaching those decisions. He added arms sales should not be considered “a trade commodity; these are weapons,” not to be rushed the system. Arms sales “are fundamentally a political act,” Melissa Dalton, director of CSIS’ cooperative defense project, added, and the change in policy needs to fit in with the President Donald Trump’s national security strategy. In the memo, she said it uses that standard as a guide but does not spell out how for the various federal agencies involved in arms transfers. “What has changed” most in the international marketplace “is the United States is not alone” in offering quality military equipment, Keith Webster, president of the defense and aerospace export council at the United States Chamber of Commerce, said. He said the United States is not only competing with the Russians and the Chinese, but also with its allies such as the French, Koreans and Israelis. Thirty years ago, “we had a very strong corner on the market,” and only serious competition from the Kremlin.

**1NC Shell - 2/2**

**Arms sales are key to U.S. global influence and hegemony abroad**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S. wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S. domination of the global arms trade is based on the world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain. Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage American influence abroad.

**Sustaining U.S. hegemony is the only way to solve great power conflicts**

**Kagan 2017**. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

For the United States to accept a return to spheres of influence would not calm the international waters. It would merely return the world to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres. These unsettled, disordered conditions produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent as a powerful unified Germany took shape, and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity and death on an epic scale. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of World War II that this kind of competi\tion has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. It will be more than a shame if Americans were to destroy what they created — and not because it was no longer possible to sustain but simply because they chose to stop trying.

# Leadership Disadvantage 2NC/1NR Extension Evidence:

**Uniqueness - Arms Sales**

**U.S. dominates arms sales markets now, but the U.S. cannot grow its market share and other countries can take ours**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The arms market is a surprisingly tiny portion of world trade. Annual estimates range from $86 to 105 billion dollars. Compare this to the global markets for cars ($1.35 trillion), pharmaceuticals ($613 billion), and even “human or animal blood” ($252 billion) and the international arms industry begins to look paltry. By any estimate, the United States already dominates this industry. The State Department’s own estimates for 2015 credit the United States with a whopping 80 percent of the financial value of all global arms deliveries from 2013 to 2017. The most authoritative source of data, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, gives the United States a more conservative, but still commanding, lead of 34 percent of arms deliveries (measured according to an index of military, rather than financial, value) for the same time period. Russia comes in at second place with 22 percent, with the next four leading states scrapping for 5 to 7 percent each. Easing regulations on sales to existing American customers is unlikely to have a huge effect on the size of these transactions, and even with relaxed rules, finding new state customers will be hard. Much of the remaining market is essentially closed to the United States. With the crucial exception of India, there is little opportunity to encroach upon the market share of the number two weapons exporter — Russia — since the United States restricts or bans sales of weapons to important Russian customers like China, Venezuela, Syria, and Vietnam.

**Uniqueness - Hegemony Strong and Sustainable**

**U.S. Hegemony is strong and sustainable - it’s our choice whether we give up global leadership**

**Harris 2019**. Peter Harris (assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University), When Will the Unipolar World End?, National Interest, May 27, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/when-will-unipolar-world-end-59202>

Crucially, however, the unipolar world will only end when the United States materially loses its near-hegemonic status in Europe or East Asia. It will not be enough for China or Russia to outmatch the United States on paper. Geopolitical conditions on the ground will have to be overturned. Pressure from foreign competitors is only one way this might come about. The other way is that the United States might simply choose to retrench for its own reasons. In fact, this is how Charles Krauthammer predicted that the unipolar world might end: with isolationist forces inside the United States pushing for an end to deep overseas engagement out of a misguided belief that international security no longer depended upon American preponderance abroad. Either way, the bottom line is that the American Century—the unipolar moment—critically depends on the United States maintaining deep political and military engagement in core regions of Eurasia, especially in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It was the Soviet retreat from these regions in 1991 that left the United States preponderant in global affairs in the first place. It will be America’s retreat from them—whether forced or voluntary—that signals unipolarity is over. The unipolar moment is not over yet, even if its demise is well within sight. The critical question for today’s foreign policy analysts is not “What sort of international system will emerge once unipolarity is over?” but rather, “What will it take for unipolarity to be over?” This is because the eventual collapse of the unipolar system will not so much foreshadow a reorganization of world politics as it will serve as confirmation that such restructuring has already taken place.

**Heg is strong - hard power and strong foreign politics**

**Rose 2019**, Gideon Rose (editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations), The Fourth Founding, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-12-11/fourth-founding>

The United States’ hard power has indeed declined in relative terms from its postwar peak. But this fact does not have the significance realists assume, because the country’s absolute hard power is greater than ever and is multiplied by its soft power. For generations, the United States has done what realist theory said was impossible, playing international politics as a team sport, not an individual one. On balance, it has considered its role in the order to be the protector of a community, not the exploiter of hapless marks; it has participated in alliances, not run a protection racket. Thanks to that, when it comes time for crucial tasks of system maintenance, it can add its friends’ power to its own.

**Link - Generic**

**Strong arms sales market key to global leverage over buyers**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. In the past five years, it has delivered weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam). For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals.

**Link - Saudi Arabia**

**Cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia backfires - decreases U.S. global influence and causes Saudi Arabian re-entrenchment**

**Bisaccio 2018**. Derek Bisaccio (Military Markets Analyst), Examining U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, Defense Aerospace, Oct. 23 2018, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/196962/us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia%3A-policy-options.html>

It would be expensive, take significant amounts of time, and require a restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s security outlook, all to import systems whose quality and usefulness Saudi Arabia is already skeptical of. These are strong points, but it is worth pointing out that a significant or total shutdown of U.S. arms cooperation with Saudi Arabia would come with its own set of risks. The most immediate consequence would be jeopardizing American ties with Riyadh, a country that remains influential in the world especially because of its ability to act as a swing oil producer. Opponents of Saudi Arabia in general see no issue with downgrading U.S.-Saudi relations, and perhaps in time the U.S. might view its security interests as diverging from requiring Washington to work with governments like Saudi Arabia’s. But if the Trump administration’s goal in the present is to isolate Iran and concretely address its nuclear and missile programs as well as foreign policy in the region, coordination of efforts with Saudi Arabia will prove essential. Critics of the Crown Prince regularly paint him as reckless, which, if an accurate depiction, should prompt consideration of whether reducing America’s ability to influence Saudi policy choices is the wisest course of action for Washington to take. Depending on how severely the U.S. was to act, cutting defense cooperation could produce the opposite effect than intended with respect to Saudi policies: Saudi Arabia could well double-down, or in any case refuse to budge, rather than concede to Washington. Should the U.S. cut only a few deals, or refuse to sell a few systems, the pressure will be so miniscule as to hardly register in Riyadh.

**Link - Drones**

**Strong security incentives exist for other countries to use U.S. drone technology**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The potential for unilateral restraint in drones is over. To date, the United States has been extremely discrete in exporting unmanned systems (particularly armed ones). But somewhat comparable products are now readily available from multiple sources in the global market. Over the past five years Israel has filled the gap, delivering 43 percent of all drone exports, with China a rising competitor at 32 percent (source SIPRI). If the United States begins exporting unmanned aerial vehicles more freely, American drones are likely to both dominate the market and be subject to more rigorous regulation. That said, the economic boom is likely to be modest; the entire annual military unmanned aerial vehicle market is projected to be under $10 billion as late as 2026. The security benefits for the United States of drone exports remain considerable however. Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized” conflict. Strong security incentives exist for the United States to ensure that allies operate its unmanned systems.

**Internal Link - Arms Sales Key to Heg 1/2**

**Empirics prove - arms sales bolster American influence abroad and constrain enemies**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

As the world’s leading producer, consumer, and exporter of high-end weaponry, the United States has long used arms sales to influence smaller states, manage regional arms races, encourage allies’ inter-operability, and contain rivals’ capabilities, as well as to support its own defense industrial base and broader economy. It equips foreign militaries not only to defend themselves, but to use hardware in common with the United States, making joint operations easier. The governing document for U.S. arms transfers, Presidential Decision Directive 27 from 2014, lists ten “national security and foreign policy goals” that such transfers serve. These range from “Ensuring U.S. military forces, and those of allies and partners, continue to enjoy technological superiority over potential adversaries” to “Ensuring that arms transfers do not contribute to human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law.”

**Strong arms sales policies key to foreign policy and to bolster allies**

**McInnis and Lucas 2015**, Kathleen J. McInnis (National Security Analyst) and Nathan J. Lucas (Section Research Manager), What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 18, 2015, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>

Over the course of its history, the United States has, with relative frequency, supported its allies and partners as they wage their own internal conflicts. These are contingencies wherein the United States has some sort of larger, geopolitical stake in the outcome of an ongoing conflict, but cannot—or politically will not—become a direct party to the conflict. During the Cold War, this indirect support was often an extension of great power competition. In the absence of the Soviet Union, however, the United States continued supporting local actors to advance other national objectives, such as stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States. In these instances, military support and aid are channeled to one belligerent over another, in the hopes that doing so will enable the U.S.-favored party to ultimately win and create an advantageous post-war situation for the United States. This assistance can be as simple as providing weapons and money, or as complex as providing combat advisors.

**Internal Link - Arms Sales Key to Heg 2/2**

**The United States uses large volumes of arms sales to maintain its hegemony and influence smaller countries**

**Willardson 2013**, Spencer L Willardson (U of Iowa doctoral candidate for Political Science), UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARMS: THE FOREIGN POLICY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS TRANSFERS, May 2013, <https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4789&context=etd>

The idea that arms transfers can be used as an indicator of foreign policy is not new. Early projects in arms transfers started with the explicit assumption that arms transfers were themselves an expression of policy. One of the first reports from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted that military equipment sales require export licenses and are often “considered at the highest levels of administration” and it is “…therefore reasonable to assume that each arms transaction reflects a decision on the part of the government of the supplying country, and the overall pattern of arms supplies reflects a government policy towards the arms trade” (1975, 21). This same volume distinguished three broad patterns by suppliers of arms to third world countries. These categories were hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive (SIPRI 1975, 21–26). Hegemonic suppliers (the U.S. and U.S.SR) use arms transfers both to “…dominate other, dependent countries” and as a “…means to influence a smaller country in minor matters” (SIPRI 1975, 24). Industrial suppliers are mainly concerned with using exports to maintain domestic defense production in the exporting country. Restrictive supply is a pattern of supply to states where the supplier does not become involved in local or international conflict (1975, 24). These broad patterns were empirically tested using complex “fuzzy set” analysis by Sanjian (1991) who found that these overall broad patterns held.

**Impact - Heg Solves War**

**US leadership is necessary to block revisionist powers, prevent terrorism, and prevent a global war**

**Kagan 2017**. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable.

**Impact - China - Scenario Shell 1/2**

**China is using arms sales as a foreign policy tool - if the US decreases sales, China will step in and increase its global influence at the expense of U.S. influence**

**Tian 2018**. Nan Tian (Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme), China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?, RealClearDefense, September 17, 2018, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influence__113806.html>

Add in Myanmar, and it’s a picture where China usually sells weapons to countries that the West (the US and Western Europe) does not. Such sales are partly due to less stringent human rights conditions linked to arms sales and more affordable weapons, but also recognising the gaps left by the US and thus securing greater geopolitical influence as part of its foreign policy. Comparing the types of weapons sold to African and Asia countries reinforces the argument further. Large ticket items exported to Bangladesh and Pakistan include frigates, corvettes, submarines, and air defence systems. In addition to the transfer of the weapon, such transactions (sales and military aid) include training, maintenance, and exchange of information on the capability of the weapons. All of which enhances country relationships and boosts future collaborations. In contrast, weapons exports to Africa are mostly of lower value in the form of armoured personnel carriers (APCs), light training aircraft, battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are akin to one-time transactions, with limited commitments to training or maintenance. While the ability to buy expensive high-tech weapons is lower in African countries compared to neighbours close to China, China has looked to challenge US influence in Asia with more intimate (military and economic) relations with the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The same is not evident in Africa.

**China’s rise won’t stay peaceful - they’ll resort to military action, causing war**

**Kagan 2017**. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

The two great powers have differed, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful, cautious, and patient of the two, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and regional intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature, with strategic objectives. And while Beijing has been wary of using military force until now, it would be a mistake to assume it will continue show such restraint in the future — possibly the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives. As the trend lines draw closer, this is where the first crisis is likely to take place.

**Impact - China - China Uses Arms Sales to Challenge U.S.**

**China wants to use arms sales to increase its global influence at the expense of U.S. heg**

**Darling 2019**. Dan Darling International Military Markets, China’s Arms Exports: Up, Up and Away, Defense Security Monitor, May 9, 2019, <https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2019/05/09/chinas-arms-exports-up-up-and-away/>

By offering an affordable price point, flexible payment options, and assurance of delivery to the end user, China has steadily cultivated a customer base across the developing world. The lack of political restrictions on the sale and delivery of Chinese hardware to interested parties and the broader trade packages presented to recipient countries by the Chinese government serve to further entice potential buyers. On top of this, Chinese products are often cheaper for the buyer on the export market than Western and even Russian hardware. Thus the access to a weapons market for countries that may not be able to purchase Western hardware makes Chinese-sourced materiel highly palatable to a buyer. Furthermore, knowing that Beijing will not hold political qualifiers over them (human rights concerns, etc.) means they in turn have a trustworthy provider in that a deal is unlikely to be canceled midstream. From China’s vantage point, its arms exports help to promote its growing self-sufficiency in defense technology, wield increasing global influence, and support Beijing’s broader foreign policy aims be they economic, political or military. For now, Chinese arms sales pose a modest challenge to U.S. interests and Washington’s stature as the leading global defense supplier. Indeed, China’s arms export success has eaten into Russia’s market share and presented a greater challenge to Moscow than to the U.S. But going forward, with Chinese defense technologies developing and maturing and China’s influence in areas such as Africa increasing, the U.S. will inevitably feel the brunt of greater competition from its preeminent strategic rival.

**Arms sales are a key component’s foreign policy plan to stop China’s rise and maintain heg**

**Huang 2018**, Kristen Huang, China’s arms sales rise as it vies with US for influence on the world stage, South China Morning Post, Mar. 12, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2136877/chinas-arms-sales-rise-it-vies-us-influence-world-stage>

The administration of US President Donald Trump has dubbed China as a “rival”, and the latest SIPRI report shows how the US has used arms transfers as a foreign policy tool to offset Beijing’s growing influence. For example, US arms deliveries to India grew by 557 per cent between 2008 and 2017, the year China and India became embroiled in a protracted border dispute over the Doklam region in the Himalayas. “This development is part of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries under which the USA has begun to supply India with advanced military equipment,” the report said. The US has also started to increase its security cooperation with Vietnam, which is embroiled in a dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. In 2017 it delivered one patrol ship, the USS Morgenthau, to Vietnam – the first major US arms transfer to that country. Tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea also saw Japan moving closer to the US, the report said. It said Tokyo turned to the US for several types of advanced weapons between 2013 and 2017, including the first batches of a total of 42 combat aircraft. Japan also ordered advanced air and missile defence systems from the US in the same period..

**Impact - China - Zero-Sum Link**

**The global arms market is zero-sum - If the U.S. doesn’t sell weapons, other countries with fewer end-use restrictions like China and Russia will corner the market**

**Grady 2018**, John Grady (retired Director of Communications for the Association of the U.S. Army), Panel: Expansion of U.S. Arms Sales Tool to Expand American Influence, USNI News, Aug. 8, 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence>.

 “Who’s going to make the rules for the next 50 years” for international behavior, Dak Hardwick, assistant vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association, said. Hardwick and others specially cited the growing Chinese interest in overseas military sales and Russia’s success of selling air missile defense systems to Turkey and possibly India. Neither has the strict rules governing the sales or how these systems would be used after purchase the U.S. does. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event in Washington, Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, added the April presidential memo revising the arms transfer policy and covering unmanned serial systems sales, “is only the first step [to] support and grow our defense industrial base.” She added that every sale, still will be reviewed for compliance with United States law concerning human rights and how each sale could affect arms proliferation.

**Impact China - Heg Impact**

**China’s rise kills heg**

**Mastro 2019**. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Until now, China has succeeded in growing without provoking. Yet there is a limit to how powerful a country can get without directly challenging the incumbent power, and China is now reaching that point. Under Xi, China has begun confronting American power head-on. Given the country’s internal challenges, China’s rise could still stall. But history has shown that in the vast majority of cases in which a country was able to sustain its rise, the rising power ended up overtaking the dominant power, whether peacefully or through war. That does not mean that the United States cannot buck the historical trend. To remain dominant, Washington will have to change course. It will have to deepen, rather than lessen, its involvement in the liberal international order. It will have to double down on, rather than abandon, its commitment to American values. And perhaps most important, it will have to ensure that its leadership benefits others rather than pursue a strategy based on “America first.”

**China’s rise and U.S. heg are zero sum**

**Leung and White 2018**. Zoe Leung (Senior Program Associate of EWI's Asia-Pacific program) Jace White (Program Assistant with the Asia-Pacific Program at the EastWest Institute), and China's Rise Doesn't Equate to America's Fall, National Interest, June 21, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-rise-doesnt-equate-americas-fall-26368>

Power politics between the two great powers is inevitably a zero-sum game; a rise in Chinese power is treated as running counter to U.S. interests, and vice versa, regardless of intentions. While Washington remains skeptical of Beijing’s ambitions in its “Peaceful Development” and Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is equally suspicious of the U.S.-led alliance system and regards it as a tool left over from the Cold War, designed to isolate and contain China. Tallying recent developments in the long list of contentious bilateral issues reveals a pattern of widening strategic mistrust that must be managed.

**Impact - China - AT: China Doesn’t Want Heg**

**China wants to directly challenge U.S. hegemony**

**Mastro 2019**. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Thanks to this novel strategy, China has been able to grow into one of the most powerful countries in the world, second, perhaps, only to the United States. And if it had chosen to persist with this strategy, the country would have continued to stay off the United States’ radar screen. But rising powers can delay provocation for only so long, and the bad news for the United States—and for peace and security in Asia—is that China has now entered the beginning stages of a direct challenge to the U.S.-led order. Under Xi, China is unabashedly undermining the U.S. alliance system in Asia. It has encouraged the Philippines to distance itself from the United States, it has supported South Korea’s efforts to take a softer line toward North Korea, and it has backed Japan’s stance against American protectionism. It is building offensive military systems capable of controlling the sea and airspace within the so-called first island chain and of projecting power past the second. It is blatantly militarizing the South China Sea, no longer relying on fishing vessels or domestic law enforcement agencies to exercise its conception of sovereignty. It has even started engaging in military activities outside Asia, including establishing its first overseas base, in Djibouti. All these moves suggest one thing: China is no longer content to play second fiddle to the United States and seeks to directly challenge its position in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Impact - China - AT: China Won’t Expand Arms Sales 1/2**

**Africa proves that China will move into new markets, increasing its global influence**

**Tian 2018**. Nan Tian (Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme), China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?, RealClearDefense, September 17, 2018, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influence__113806.html>

Couple this with China’s growing arms industry and arms exports, the question of vital importance is whether weapon sales have become a new foreign policy tool for China in Africa. Development of the Chinese arms industry has enabled it to become a major arms exporter (number five in the world) in recent years. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, the 38% increase in total arms exports was second only to Israel. In this time Chinese export to Africa rose by 55%, and its share of total African arms imports increased from 8.4 to 17%. Although Russia remains the largest supplier of major weapons to Africa (39% of the region’s imports), some see the rise of Chinese arms exports to the region as having a threefold rationale: Beijing’s push to become a major arms producer. Compete against Russia to capture this growing arms market. A foreign policy tool to gain regional influence for future economic and political interests. Although the total volume of major arms flow from China to Africa is less than half of Russia’s, it sells to far more African countries than Russia. Between 2013–17, Russia sold major arms to 14 Africa countries, compared to the 23 of China. This “blanket” style of selling does not typically fit with the notion of linking targeted arms sales with foreign policy objectives. The diversity in the types of weapons and of arms recipients (e.g., from Algeria to South Africa and Kenya to Cote d'Ivoire) suggests a more demand and supply relationship. As China continues to develop its arms industry, **any international buyer will help expand its network**, offer important developmental feedback, and improve weapon quality and company profitability. The fall in export of Russian made weapons to Africa corresponded with the rise in Chinese exports, potentially due to the availability of more cost-effective options. This is especially the case in Algeria, where import of major Chinese arms increased by 46-fold between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, while the transfer of Russian weapons fell by 35%. Yet in-depth analysis into Chinese arms exports to Africa shows Algeria as an outlier that is biasing the recent trends. Of all major weapons exported from China to Africa between 2013 and 2017, 46% went to Algeria, prime among them are three heavy corvettes delivered in 2015 and 2016. Remove Algeria and major arms exports to Africa decreased by 12% between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. Other major African buyers of Chinese weapons are Morocco and Nigeria. It seems that suggestions linking China’s BRI project, its military base in Djibouti, and increased military engagement in the related countries are not founded on arms transfers evidence.

**U.S. drone restrictions prove China wants to move into markets the U.S. leaves**

**ChinaPower 2018**. China Power is a working group of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, How dominant is China in the global arms trade?, CSIS, June 29, 2018, <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/>

China is actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if enacted will update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime. Beijing has been quick to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging technology. This has enabled it to fill the void left by other suppliers. The US, which has long been at the forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development, has purposely restricted the export of its UAVs. Regulations that until recently characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also limited overseas access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China, which has made its UAVs available to countries such as Nigeria and Egypt.

**Impact - Russia - Scenario Shell 1/2**

**U.S. arms exports currently crushing the Russian market - Russia can’t modernize its military without arms sales**

**Caverley 2018**. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction.

**Impact - Russia - Scenario Shell 2/2**

**Russian modernization and aggression leads to miscalculation and nuclear war**

**Oliker 2018**. Olga Oliker (senior associate of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)), Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-10-15/moscows-nuclear-enigma>

Talk to anybody in Washington (except, perhaps, the U.S. president), and you will hear an ominous mantra: the Russians are back. Moscow, resurgent, is sowing discord among Western states and trying to reestablish its sphere of influence in former Soviet countries and beyond. One development, in particular, has caused much hyperventilating in Western ministries and think tanks: the Russian Federation not only has more nuclear weapons than any other country in the world but also is investing in an arsenal of modern, low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used for limited nuclear warfare. These investments have many analysts worried that Russia would be the first to pull the nuclear trigger in a future war, and that it would do so early on, hoping to quickly bomb its adversary into submission and end the conflict—a strategy dubbed “escalate to de-escalate.” If military confrontation of any kind might push Moscow to go nuclear, preparing for war with Russia means preparing for a potential nuclear war. The United States, the thinking goes, can only defend itself and its allies by modernizing its own nuclear arsenal. Above all, Washington should develop more low-yield nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield or risk being outgunned in a future war. But those who fret about the Russian arsenal misread the Kremlin’s intentions and put forward the wrong solutions. The real danger is not a new and more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy; it is the Kremlin’s failure to communicate its goals effectively to leaders in Washington and elsewhere. Russia’s actual strategy has not diverged much from plain old-fashioned deterrence: Russia believes that any major war with the United States could result in a massive U.S. nuclear attack, and so it maintains a nuclear arsenal of its own in order to discourage such an attack. But its policy of deliberate ambiguity is feeding into apprehension in Washington, driving a dangerous cycle of escalation that is bound to worsen suspicions and heighten the risk that clashes will escalate.

**Russian foreign arms sales fund the domestic arms industry and military production**

**Willardson 2013**, Spencer L Willardson (U of Iowa doctoral candidate for Political Science), UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARMS: THE FOREIGN POLICY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS TRANSFERS, May 2013, <https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4789&context=etd>

The fact that Russia remains the second largest arms exporter in the world is an accomplishment in its own right. Putin’s reorganization of the arms export business under the umbrella of Rosoboroneksport has helped Russia to regain the market share it lost to the United States in the 1990s (see Chapter 3). Putin’s model of state interests utilizes assets from core sectors in the economy to enrich the state. ROE fulfills a vital mission in Russia’s state system because it provides an outlet for Russian arms and brings in cash to the Kremlin’s coffers. It also provides a focus for the domestic arms industry, which employs large numbers of people – a holdover from the Soviet mobilization economy (Gaddy 1996). Arms exports also help to prop up the “security economy” that involves both the production of weapons and the military itself. There is some evidence that the focus on arms exports may become a problem for the state. Defense firms are reaching capacity limits, quality issues plague Russian products, and Russia’s two main customers are diversifying their arms import portfolio (Cooper 2010, 153–4). Cooper (2010, 168) in his assessment of the future of the Russian defense industry wonders whether “…in an era of globalization and economic liberalism, vast state, or quasi-state, corporate structures can be an engine of successful modernization, innovation and economic viability.” As recently as 2012, Russia’s president has been involved in negotiating, or at least advocating for large arms deals. We saw this pattern in the case of arms sales to Turkey and Jordan in the case studies in this chapter. As long as Russia’s preference regarding foreign policy is to export to protect critical sectors and fill the state coffers, the decision-making behavior of ROE will not change. That is, it will continue to make whatever deals it can with whomever it can.

# Economy Disadvantage 1NC

**Economy DA: 1NC (1/4)**

**Uniqueness: The firearm and ammunition contributes greatly to the U.S. GDP and is growing**

**NSSF 19** (The National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF) is the trade association for the firearms industry, FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION INDUSTRY ECONOMIC IMPACT, 2019,<https://d3aya7xwz8momx.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-Economic-Impact.pdf> )

This report details the significant economic impact the firearms and ammunition industry has on the nation’s and each state’s economy. **The economic growth America’s firearms and ammunition industry has experienced in recent years has been nothing short of remarkable.** Over the past decade, the industry’s growth has been driven by an unprecedented number of Americans choosing to exercise their fundamental right to keep and bear arms and purchase a firearm and ammunition. NSSF, representing America’s firearms and ammunition manufacturers, takes great pride in supporting wildlife conservation efforts. **Noted in the economic impact report is the significant taxes paid by our industry to federal and state governments and the Pittman-Robertson excise tax the industry pays on the products it sells – this tax is the major source of wildlife conservation funding in America**. **Regardless of economic conditions across the country, our industry has grown and created about 146,000 new, well-paying jobs over the past decade. Our industry is proud to be one of the bright spots in this economy.** Take a look for yourself and see the impact we have nationally and on your home state. United States companies that manufacture, distribute, and sell sporting firearms, ammunition, and supplies are an important part of the country’s economy. **Manufacturers of firearms, ammunition, and supplies, along with the companies that sell and distribute these products, provide well paying jobs in America and pay significant amounts in tax to the state and Federal governments.** 1 John Dunham & Associates, New York, December 2018. Direct impacts include those jobs in firearms and ammunition manufacturers, as well as companies that manufacture products such as ammunition holders and magazines, cases, decoys, game calls, holsters, hunting equipment, scopes, clay pigeons and targets. Direct impacts also include those resulting from the wholesale distribution and retailing of these products. 2 The Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available online at: www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm. Data for November-18 . 3 This is in addition to over $653.76 million in federal excise taxes. Source: John Dunham and Associates, Inc. New York, New York 2017 Economic Impact of the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Industry in the United States Direct Supplier Induced Total Jobs (FTE) 149,146 62,827 100,018 311,991 Wages $6,227,108,200 $4,342,966,200 $5,161,711,300 $15,731,785,700 Economic Impact $21,361,163,600 $14,320,977,800 $16,405,365,000 $52,087,506,400 **The Firearms & Ammunition Industry is an Important Part of America’s Economy Companies in the United States that manufacture, distribute, and sell firearms, ammunition, and hunting equipment employ as many as 149,146 people in the country and generate an additional 162,845 jobs in supplier and ancillary industries.** These include jobs in supplying goods and services to manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, and those that depend on sales to workers in the firearms and ammunition industry.1 **These are good jobs paying an average of $50,400 in wages and benefits.** And today, every job is important. The United States currently has an unemployment rate of 3.77 percent. This means that there are already 6,132,000 people trying to find jobs in the nation and collecting unemployment benefits.2 The Economic Benefit of the Industry Spreads Throughout the Country Not only does the manufacture and sale of firearms and hunting supplies create good jobs in the United States, but the industry also contributes to the economy as a whole. **In fact, in 2018 the firearms and ammunition industry was responsible for as much as $52.09 billion in total economic activity in the country. The broader economic impact flows throughout the economy, generating business for firms seemingly unrelated to firearms.** Real people, with real jobs, working in industries as varied as banking, retail, accounting, metal working, even in printing, all depend on the firearms and ammunition industry for their livelihood. The Country Also Benefits From the Taxes Paid By **The Industry Not only does the industry create jobs, it also generates sizeable tax revenues. In the United States, the industry and its employees pay over $6.82 billion in taxes including property, income, and sales based levies**.3

**Economy DA: 1NC (2/4)**

**Link: Arms regulation is expensive and ineffective**

**Beckett 2017** (Lois, a senior reporter covering gun policy, criminal justice and the far right in the United States, Gun laws that cost millions had little effect because they weren't enforced, 10/13/17, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/13/gun-laws-that-cost-two-state-lawmakers-their-seats-had-little-effect-study-finds>)

**In Colorado and Washington state, advocates spent millions of dollars, and two Colorado Democrats lost their seats, in the effort to pass laws requiring criminal background checks on every single gun sale. More than three years later, researchers have concluded that the new laws had little measurable effect,** probably because citizens simply decided not to comply and there was a lack of enforcement by authorities.**The results of the new study, conducted by some of America’s most well-respected gun violence researchers, is a setback for a growing gun control movement that has centered its national strategy on precisely the kind of state laws passed in Colorado and Washington.** A third, smaller state, Delaware, passed a background check law around the same time and did see increases in the number of background checks conducted, the study found. But a similar background-check law in Nevada passed in 2016 has also run into political hurdles and has never been enforced

**Economy DA: 1NC (3/4)**

**Internal Link: Wasteful government spending destroys economic gain from Arms Sales**

**Mitchell 2005** (Daniel is a former McKenna Senior Fellow in Political Economy, The Economic Consequences of Government Spending, 10/25/2005, <https://www.heritage.org/testimony/the-economic-consequences-government-spending> )

Other forms of government spending have a less desirable impact on economic activity. **If a program does not facilitate or encourage economic activity, or has only a small positive effect, then the aggregate impact on the economy will be negative because there are limited benefits - if any - to outweigh the costs. And if the program actually undermines work, saving, and investment or encourages misallocation of resources, then the overall adverse impact on economic growth will be particularly pronounced.** A good example from recent events is federal flood insurance. Not only does the program require resources to be taxed or borrowed from the productive sector of the economy - with all the associated economic costs, but it also encourages over-building in flood zones, which leads to the destruction of wealth during natural disasters. There are two macroeconomic reasons why government spending can undermine economic performance. The first reason, mentioned above, is "resource displacement." **Every time government spends money, it is using labor and/or capital and those resources no longer are available for private sector uses.** The second macroeconomic issue associated with government spending is the "financing cost.**" When government taxes, it not only takes money from the productive sector, but it also raises revenue by means of a tax system that generally reduces incentives to work, save, and invest. And if it finances spending with debt, it siphons money out of private credit markets.** The microeconomic costs of government spending involve the impact of various forms of budget outlays. The two most important of these effects are the "subsidy for sub-optimal behavior" and the "penalty for pro-growth behavior." In the first instance, some government programs are directly linked to choices that reduce economic performance. Prior to welfare reform, for instance, income transfer programs frequently rewarded people for choosing not to work or for having children out of wedlock. In the second instance, specific government programs discourage behaviors that are good for the economy. A large number of government programs, for example, reduce incentives to save by subsidizing health care, retirement, education, and housing. Other programs reduce incentives to work. Other forms of microeconomic damage are associated with outlays - such as budgets for regulatory agencies - that result in the imposition of costs on private sector activity. A recent example is the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. The actual budget costs for the Securities and Exchange Commission is only a fraction of the economic costs associated with the regulatory burden generated by that single piece of legislation. Another form of microeconomic damage involves the misallocation of resources. Education is widely considered a public good, yet there is considerable evidence that the means of delivering that public good is very inefficient because government school monopolies provide a very low amount of educational achievement per dollar spent. The economic impact of government spending can be presented in graphical form. The so-called Rahn Curve in Figure 1 (attached) shows that economic output or growth is very low when government is non-existent. In this anarchical world, workers, savers, investors, and entrepreneurs do not have an environment conducive to productive behavior. As certain public goods are provided, however, economic growth and/or output rises. There is a growth-maximizing level of government spending. But once outlays exceed that point, economic performance begins to slip. And as government becomes bigger and bigger, the economy suffers larger losses of output and/or growth.This theoretical construct is the spending equivalent of the Laffer Curve. In both cases, the extreme points on the curve show adverse consequences. The more challenging question, of course, is figuring out whether government is too big or too small. In other words, where is America on the Rahn Curve?This is a difficult question, but **empirical data and academic research indicate that excessive government has a negative impact on economic performance.**

**Economy DA: 1NC (4/4)**

**Impact: Trump will resort to diversionary conflict if the economy declines- 2x as likely**

**Foster 16** (Dennis,Professor of international studies Virginia Military Institute, "Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?", The Washington Post, 12/19/16, "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm\_term=.0b52cdd0dabd" Accessed 7/14/17 GDI AC)

**One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.¶ [Trump may put 5 former top military brass in his administration. That’s unprecedented.]¶** For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. **Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.¶ Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses.** Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem**, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force).¶** [Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?]¶ Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so.¶ What about Donald Trump?¶ Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, **rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action.¶** I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.¶ ¶ These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals.¶ As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”¶ A possible implication for military action¶ I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.¶ subscribe¶ The story must be told.¶ Your subscription supports journalism that matters.¶ Try 1 month for 99¢¶ **[Trump’s secretary of state pick could give Putin some very unfortunate ideas]¶ But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force.** For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.¶ Of course, predictions from such a model come with a lot of uncertainty. By necessity, any measures of a president’s traits are imperfect. And we do not know whether there will be an economic downturn. Moreover, campaigning is not governing, and the responsibilities of the Oval Office might moderate Donald Trump. The psychologist Philip Tetlock has found that presidents often become more conceptually complex once they enter office**.¶** Nevertheless, **this analysis suggests some cause for concern about the international ramifications of an economic downturn with a President Trump in the White House.**

# Economy Disadvantage 2NC/1NR Extension Evidence:

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Uniqueness**

1. **They say, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

 **(Write the Aff’s Uniqueness Argument)**

**But extend our NSSF 19 evidence that states**

**(Write your author/date)**

**The firearm industry adds over $50 billion to the U.S. economy yearly.**

**(Write a short summary of your card)**

**It’s better than their \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence because**

 **(Write their author/date)**

*(Circle one or more of the following reasons and read it aloud)*

(it’s newer) (our author is more qualified)

(their evidence is out of context/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (it has more specific facts) (it takes their argument into account) (Their author is biased) (their evidence supports our argument)

(Or ... WRITE IN YOUR OWN! \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_)

**“You should prefer our evidence because...”**

*(Explain the reasons you selected above for why your evidence is better)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**“And this means that ...”**

*(Explain why it’s important that your evidence is better - what argument does it mean is true and what does it mean for the overall debate?)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Uniqueness**

1. **Gun industry contributes $51.3B to US economy, research shows**

**Lisa 18** (Andrew, published hundreds of times in dozens of publications across the country, and I’m currently a frequent contributor to High Times, the Huffington Post, Time, the Seattle Times, MSN.com, Fortune and the Philadelphia Inquirer, Gun industry contributes $51.3B to US economy, research shows, 4/24/18, <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/gun-industry-contributes-dollar513b-to-us-economy-research-shows/ar-AAvuCzz> )DD

**No matter which side of the political spectrum you’re on, there’s no denying that guns are big business in America. In 2016 alone, the gun industry was responsible for roughly $51.3 billion in both direct and indirect economic activity across the country.** This figure comes from the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), an organization that represents gun owners, retailers, manufacturers and distributors. In its 2017 report, the NSSF details the gun industry’s economic impact across America. The report identified how the firearms industry contributes to wages, jobs, taxes and total economic output on a national and state-by-state level.You can use this data to see precisely where your state ranks and understand how much economic activity in your state can be traced to one of the most robust and fastest-growing industries in the country — the gun industry. Take the Quiz: Can You Guess the Biggest Industry in Your State? **The firearms industry is responsible for more than 300,000 jobs and more than $15 billion in wages, when you count direct, supplier and induced jobs and wages, according to the NSSF report**. **For 20 states, the total economic impact of the gun industry measures into the billions**. Not surprisingly, small Northeastern states like Rhode Island and Vermont rank near the bottom. Meanwhile, large states like California and Texas rank near the top — but there are also plenty of surprises. New York, which is typically not considered a “gun state,” ranked in the top 10. Sparsely populated Minnesota made the top three, outranking even populous Florida. When it comes to jobs provided by or associated with the gun industry, heavily populated states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida and Texas anchor the top of the list. But when you look at gun industry jobs per capita, several states are a combination of small, sparsely populated or largely rural dominate. Examples are Idaho, New Hampshire, Montana, South Dakota and Wyoming. The same holds true for per capita excise tax, where Alaska, Wyoming, Montana and Maine take the top spots.

1. **The US Economy is strong now there are problems on the horizon now because of Trump’s Trade Wars, Lowered Consumer Spending, and low income growth.**

**Mutikani 2019 (**Lucia, 6/27 “U.S. economic growth surges in first-quarter, but momentum fizzling”,Reuters,<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy/u-s-economic-growth-surges-in-first-quarter-but-momentum-fizzling-idUSKCN1TS1YG> )

**U.S. economic growth accelerated** in the first quarter, the government confirmed on Thursday, **but the** export and inventory **boost to activity masked weakness** in domestic demand, some of which appears to have prevailed in the current period. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell last week acknowledged the temporary lift to economic growth from trade and inventories, which he described as “components that are not generally reliable indicators of ongoing momentum.” **The U.S. central bank** last Wednesday **signaled interest rate cuts** as early as July, **citing rising risks to the economy,** especially **from an escalation in the trade conflict between the United States and China,** and low inflation. “First-quarter GDP paints a misleading picture of the U.S. economy’s vigor at the start of the year, and second-quarter GDP will come as a timely reminder that the economy is now well past its inflection point,” said Lydia Boussour, a senior U.S. economist at Oxford Economics in New York.

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Uniqueness**

1. **US ARMS exports pump up the economy in all economic conditions – jobs, wages, and gdp all go up – STABILIZES the current economic situation AND SOLVES SLOW GROWTH**

**Gholz 2019** [Eugene, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (2010–2012), “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2019]

**At the macroeconomic level, arms transfers can be a new source of demand for American industry.** The additional effort to produce goods and services for export can stimulate and expand the supply side of the US economy relative to a hypothetical world in which that export de-mand did not exist. **If the US economy has slack inputs, notably unused labor—unemployed workers or potential workers who choose not to look for jobs—the export demand can provide a stimulus that uses those slack inputs, expands the employed population, and increases total US economic output.** If, instead, the United States were already at full em-ployment before the export demand, then the exports would require producers to outbid existing users of inputs in the US economy—meaning the exporters would offer higher wages—and the new export-oriented production would increase at the expense of other US economic activity. Presumably, that other economic activity would be lower value-added work, because the effort to bid away inputs from the other activity would succeed by offering greater compensation in the export-oriented sector. The net effect of the exports would increase US gross domestic product (GDP) and create “higher-paying jobs” for American workers. Foreign consumers would pay the higher costs of the export-oriented produc-tion, although with arms sales the US government sometimes subsidizes the transaction with military aid, reducing or even eliminating the net economic benefit to the US economy.11

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Link**

1. **They say, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

 **(Write the Aff’s Link Argument)**

**But extend our** \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  **evidence that states**

 **(Write your author/date)**

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

 **(Write a short summary of your card)**

**It’s better than their \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence because**

 **(Write their author/date)**

*(Circle one or more of the following reasons and read it aloud)*

(it’s newer) (our author is more qualified)

(their evidence is out of context/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (it has more specific facts) (it takes their argument into account) (Their author is biased) (their evidence supports our argument)

(Or ... WRITE IN YOUR OWN! \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_)

**“You should prefer our evidence because...”**

*(Explain the reasons you selected above for why your evidence is better)*

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**“And this means that ...”**

*(Explain why it’s important that your evidence is better - what argument does it mean is true and what does it mean for the overall debate?)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Link**

1. **Conventional arms transfers STABILIZE EMPLOYMENT IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY**

**Gholz 2019** [Eugene, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (2010–2012), “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2019]

**CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense manufacturing.** **Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete. DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original manufacture of the defense system.** That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases, demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the work-ers lose the ability to maintain quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the government does not realize how much the cost of production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the part profitably, so production drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These situations create potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage (DMSMS) problems.20  **Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares production by keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills, and ameliorating the risk of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain.** These effects have been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, among others. Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime con-tractors.

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Link**

1. **Trump’s Arm Sales create good manufacturing jobs and have a ripple effect throughout the economy**

**Navarro 2019 (**Peter, Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, New York Times, Why America Needs a Stronger Defense Industry, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/opinion/trump-defense-industry.html> )

The story for the history books, however, is about how the factory perfectly encapsulates [President Trump’s maxim](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy/) **“economic security is national security.”** The Lima factory, operated by General Dynamics, builds the M-1 Abrams, the Army’s main battle tank. This heavily armored war horse played a key role in both the liberation of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf war in the early 1990s and the Iraq war beginning in 2003. It remains a stalwart of Army operations today. In 2012, the Obama administration sought to close the Lima plant as part of the mandated budget sequestration process. Fortunately, the Republican-led Congress rejected that move and appropriated enough funds to keep the factory in business — but the number of employees fell sharply, to just 75. Enter President Trump, with a far different view of the role of a strong military in both defending our homeland and revitalizing our manufacturing base. As part of his significantly increased defense budgets for 2019 and 2020, the president has requested an additional $11 billion to buy combat vehicles like the Abrams, as well as the Stryker combat vehicle, also manufactured in Lima. Even better, spending that $11 billion could actually mean saving money in the long run. By expanding production in Lima, by accelerating the modernization of the Abrams and other armored vehicles and by increasing other economies of scale, the Defense Department will achieve significant cost reductions: Unit costs for the Abrams are expected to drop by more than 10 percent. In terms of economic security, **the Trump defense budget is helping to create good manufacturing jobs at good wages, including in communities** like Lima **that have fallen behind economically.** The revitalized Lima plant will directly employ a little more than 1,000 employees. **And plants** like the one in Lima **are drivers for thousands of more jobs in the supply chain across the country.** Consider, for example, the ripple effects of the Lima plant. In Ohio alone, 198 of its suppliers are spread out across the state’s 16 congressional districts. **These mostly small and medium-size businesses churn out components** ranging from bearings, castings and industrial packaging to electronic assemblies, pressure gauges and steel. The impact is not limited to Ohio. Honeywell manufactures the Abrams engine in Alabama, Allison manufactures its transmissions in Indiana, the tank’s main gun is made at the Watervliet Arsenal in New York, special armor comes from the Idaho National Laboratory, and the gun tube preforms come from Ellwood in Pennsylvania. In terms of national security, state of the art tanks like the latest versions of the Abrams are critical tools in increasing the effectiveness of American ground forces, enabling the decisive defeat of the threats outlined in our National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. A less obvious, but no less important, benefit comes from sharing these upgraded combat vehicle capacities with our allies and strategic partners through conventional arms sales. In the Middle East, Kuwait’s tank fleet consists of 218 Abrams tanks, and its military is planning to double that number. Saudi Arabia has 374 recently upgraded Abrams tanks, while Egypt has the largest fleet, at 1,130. Australia commands a fleet of 59 Abrams tanks and may order 100 more. Taiwan may soon buy 108 Abrams tanks as well. **Those arms sales not only help create good jobs at good wages in America** — a principle not well understood by the Obama administration — they also enhance America’s capacity to bolster and stabilize our regional alliances, even as they may reduce the need to deploy more American soldiers overseas. Here, then, is what the grand strategic view from Lima, Ohio, will look like from the presidential podium: While President Dwight Eisenhower in many ways viewed the “military-industrial complex” as a source of waste and inefficiency, **the Trump administration sees our defense industrial base as the unshakable foundation of both economic and national security.**

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Link**

1. **Implementing Gun Regulation is extremely costly**

**Doleac 2018** (Jennifer, an associate professor of economics at Texas A&M University and the director of the Justice Tech Lab. Her research focuses on the economics of crime and discrimination, and particularly on the impacts of technology and surveillance on public safety, Gun Regulation Is Costly—and Not the Only Option, 11/9/18, <https://www.theregreview.org/2018/11/09/gun-regulation-costly-not-only-option/> ) DD

**Every mass shooting in the United States generates fresh calls to restrict access to guns, under the theory that fewer guns mean fewer shootings. But if the goal is to reduce gun fatalities, gun regulations are not the only option. In fact, the fight over gun control is distracting policymakers from opportunities to save more lives by other means.** Calls for stronger gun regulations are based on the belief that gun ownership leads to more deaths, through a combination of escalating violent conflicts—for example, what was just a bar fight is now a shooting—accidental shootings, and suicides. (A striking 62 percent of gun deaths in the United States are due to suicide.) Proponents of meaningful gun control say that these deaths outweigh any deterrent effect that gun possession may have. There is solid evidence supporting this claim. For instance, the school shooting at Sandy Hook resulted in a spike in gun purchases, perhaps because people feared being the victim of a violent crime themselves. That spike in purchases led to spikes in homicides and accidental deaths. The death toll due to the subsequent spike in gun purchases was larger than the initial toll of the Sandy Hook shooting itself. It would seem, then, that government regulations could engineer a drop in gun ownership, which would lead to a drop in homicides and accidental deaths. But this is easier said than done. Government regulations are not always successful at changing behavior. It may be that those who want guns—particularly those who want guns for nefarious purposes—will find a way to obtain them, even if doing so means skirting the law. **In other words, it is unclear how much gun possession falls in response to stricter gun regulations. It is even less clear whether any changes in gun possession result in a change in public safety**. There is a long, contentious academic literature on this topic. Many smart people have spent decades debating methods and data sources to consider the effects of a wide variety of regulations. Some regulations do seem promising: For instance, mandatory waiting periods for handgun purchases reduce suicide rates by 5 percent, and surveys suggest that child access prevention laws improve school safety by holding gun owners accountable if a minor is found in possession of their guns. A recent study found that right-to-carry laws increase homicides by 4 to 6 percent, suggesting that repealing such laws might reverse this effect. But, in general, the effect of gun regulations on public safety is less clear than many advocates on either side think, in part because gun law changes are typically heavily tethered to public opinion. These are not laws that slip through the legislature unnoticed. **These laws therefore do not offer good natural experiments to estimate their effects. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of gun laws from the effects of a community’s feelings about guns, from a community’s motivation to reduce gun violence, or from an increase in gun purchases that often comes before the laws take effect**. But let us assume for the sake of discussion that gun regulations would meaningfully reduce mortality. Pursuing regulations has opportunity costs: **The significant time and money required to pass gun regulations—not to mention the time and money needed to enforce such laws through policing and incarceration**—could be spent advocating for and implementing other programs. Are there other life-saving programs more deserving of these resources?

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Internal Link**

1. **They say, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

 **(Write the Aff’s Internal Link Argument)**

**But extend our** \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  **evidence that states**

 **(Write your author/date)**

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 **(Write a short summary of your card)**

**It’s better than their \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence because**

 **(Write their author/date)**

*(Circle one or more of the following reasons and read it aloud)*

(it’s newer) (our author is more qualified)

(their evidence is out of context/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (it has more specific facts) (it takes their argument into account) (Their author is biased) (their evidence supports our argument)

(Or ... WRITE IN YOUR OWN! \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_)

**“You should prefer our evidence because...”**

*(Explain the reasons you selected above for why your evidence is better)*

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**“And this means that ...”**

*(Explain why it’s important that your evidence is better - what argument does it mean is true and what does it mean for the overall debate?)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Internal Link**

1. **Conventional Arms Transfer Policy is strengthening the U.S. economy and alliances**

**Navarro 2019 (**Peter, 4/29/19, “President Trump’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy is strengthening America and its allies,” <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/navarro-arms-transfer-policy> )

**The president's new, more aggressive CAT policy has put into sharp focus the critical synergies between a globally competitive defense industrial base, a strong domestic economy, and a more effective geo-strategic competition with rivals such as** [**China**](https://www.foxnews.com/category/world/world-regions/asia) **and Russia. The new CAT policy improves the competitiveness of United States arms sales internationally in three ways.** The process advances proactively rather than reactively by **prioritizing strategic competition, focusing on key partnerships and capabilities, and updating regulatory frameworks** such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. More active engagement with the Congress, industry, international partners, and other stakeholders has created a more collaborative environment for efficient operation of the United States defense trade. On the shoulders of President Trump’s new CAT policy, **the financial value of Direct Commercial Sales** authorizations, in which the purchasing country consults directly with industry and which are licensed by the Department of State, **rose 6.6 percent to $136.6 billion** in FY 2018. **The value of Foreign Military Sales** (FMS) cases implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) **rose 33 percent to $55.66 billion** over the same period as the DSCA closed over 1,700 FMS cases — a 42 percent increase from the previous year. Let us all remember this essential truth: **When we promote and strengthen our manufacturing and defense industrial base, we empower our allies, grow our workforce, and keep Americans safe.** These improvements are the result of a fundamental change in organizational culture spearheaded by Ambassador John Bolton at the National Security Council, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Pat Shanahan, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, and multiple other key leaders. To better facilitate government unity in advocating for United States arms transfers, State and Defense Department representatives talk daily with their counterparts on Capitol Hill to fulfill their obligations to apprise Congress. Representatives from the National Security Council and the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy meet at the White House every other week with the State Department Political-Military Affairs team to identify bottlenecks and expedite the process while the new Interagency Working Group on Offsets works to ensure foreign procurement requirements do not create unfair burdens on United States companies. **On the economic security front, transfers of systems** ranging from M1 Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets to Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems **support tens of thousands of United States manufacturing jobs and supply chains across America.** Workers of all backgrounds benefit, as these high-paying jobs span the spectrum from scientists, engineers, and software designers to welders, machinists, and electricians. **Arms transfers can also exploit economies of scale, reducing the cost of tanks, planes, or ships — thus providing taxpayers the return on investment in our defense posture they expect and deserve. Every sale of United States defense items to our military partners also bolsters our national security by strengthening our alliances and partnerships, increasing our partners’ capabilities, and ensuring that the United States remains the strategic and long term partner of choice.**

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Internal Link**

1. **Arms Sale Restrictions cause fill in and forever close markets to the U.S., causing a cascade of economic harm**

**Schwartz 2018 (**Ben, US Chamber of Commerce, Strengthening the economy at home and us military partnerships abroad,<https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/393565-strengthening-the-economy-at-home-and-us-military> )

Today, however, global market conditions are considerably different. **America’s defense and aerospace industry is faced with significant competition, and its dominance in a variety of critical defense technologies is under threat. As a result, restrictions on U.S. arms exports can now accelerate non-U.S. manufacturing,** indirectly promoting advanced defense capabilities to be transferred abroad. In certain ways, counter-proliferation policies now encourage proliferation. As a Pentagon official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I witnessed multiple cases of the U.S. government denying foreign partners’ requests for American defense products, only to have those countries acquire the same or similar capabilities from another source. In a number of instances, the U.S. government would reverse its denial in time, but by then it was too late. The sale and opportunity to partner with the foreign government had been lost, and instead, a market had been opened to stimulate foreign defense manufacturing. **Increasingly, when American industry is forced to abandon these markets, the gap is filled by Russian and Chinese companies, and their presence inhibits future American defense industrial partnerships** because of counter-intelligence concerns. **One export denial creates a cascade of future denials.** Alarmingly, policies aimed at preventing the spread of WMD delivery systems are now encouraging foreign countries to turn to Chinese capabilities that do not come with the monitoring requirements that mitigate the risk of WMD use or loss of control. As the U.S. Congress evaluates American interests associated with arms exports moving forward, it ought to also consider measures that will help avert promoting rival defense manufacturers through export restrictions. There are times when it is in America’s interest to deny defense exports to a country — even when that country will respond by purchasing the same or a similar capability from another foreign supplier. Diplomatic, strategic, and ethical considerations are reasonable grounds to justify export denials. But there ought to be a transparent, reviewable record to ensure that the economic and strategic implications of export denials are taken into account. A historical record would also be a valuable decision-making resource, enabling policymakers to use past cases and trend analysis to inform future decisions. Every export denial of major defense equipment should be accompanied by a written assessment of the economic consequences. The assessment should gauge the likelihood of an end user receiving the same or similar capability from an alternative source, as well as the estimated effect on American jobs. Because **exports decrease the per-unit cost of acquisitions by the U.S. military through economies of scale,** these impact statements ought to assess costs to the U.S. military department that manages the defense item under review. Maintaining a healthy U.S. defense industrial base and sustaining American leadership in emerging technologies will require serious and sustained consideration of these factors and more. The U.S. government is capable of producing these assessments, and the end product will be better if American industry has an opportunity to share its own data. Companies have a vested interest in understanding competitors and market trends to a degree that government officials do not. In export review decisions, American industry should have an opportunity to make a case before regulators through mechanisms that ensure industry input will be a factor, even if not the decisive factor, in export review decisions.

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Internal Link**

1. **Implementing gun regulation can cost the US billions**

**Swift 13** (Jim, is deputy online editor of The Weekly Standard. He previously worked for members of the House and Senate as a tax staffer, At Least $4.5 Billion in New Spending for Gun Control, 1/16/2013, <https://www.weeklystandard.com/jim-swift/at-least-45-billion-in-new-spending-for-gun-control> )

President Obama and Vice President Biden revealed their proposed reforms intended to reduce firearms related violence.**The proposal contains a mix of executive actions, regulations, and calls for Congress to act legislatively. The total package will cost at least $4.5 billion in new spending.** Among the new spending the president proposed:$4 billion for the president’s proposal “to help keep 15,000 cops on the streets in cities and towns across the country.” (That is roughly $266,000 per police officer.) $20 million to “give states stronger incentives to make [relevant] data available [for background checks] … “$50 million for this purpose in FY2014” “$14 million to help train 14,000 more police officers and other public and private personnel to respond to active shooter situations.” “$10 million for the Centers for Disease Control to conduct further research, including investigating the relationship between video games, media images, and violence.” $20 million to expand the National Violent Death Reporting System. $150 million to “put up to 1,000 new school resource officers and school counselors on the job. “$30 million of one-time grants to states to help their school districts develop and implement emergency management plans.” $50 million to help 8,000 schools “create safer and more nurturing school climates.” $15 million to “provide “Mental Health First Aid” training for teachers.”$40 million for school districts to “work with law enforcement, mental health agencies, and other local organizations to assure students with mental health issues or other behavioral issues are referred to the services they need.” $25 million for state-based strategies that support “young people ages 16 to 25 with mental health or substance abuse issues.” $25 million to “offer students mental health services for trauma or anxiety, conflict resolution programs, and other school-based violence prevention strategies.” $50 million to “train social workers, counselors, psychologists, and other mental health professionals.”The president’s proposals to ban high capacity magazines and “military-style assault weapons” will be costly to implement, if they are passed. Those costs are either unknown or haven’t been released**. The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which included the assault weapons and high capacity magazine ban (that expired in 2004), authorized the expenditure of $30.2 billion dollars, or about $45 billion in today’s dollars.**

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Impact**

1. **They say, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

 **(Write the Aff’s Impact Argument)**

**But extend our** \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  **evidence that states**

 **(Write your author/date)**

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 **(Write a short summary of your card)**

**It’s better than their \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence because**

 **(Write their author/date)**

*(Circle one or more of the following reasons and read it aloud)*

(it’s newer) (our author is more qualified)

(their evidence is out of context/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (it has more specific facts) (it takes their argument into account) (Their author is biased) (their evidence supports our argument)

(Or ... WRITE IN YOUR OWN! \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_)

**“You should prefer our evidence because...”**

*(Explain the reasons you selected above for why your evidence is better)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**“And this means that ...”**

*(Explain why it’s important that your evidence is better - what argument does it mean is true and what does it mean for the overall debate?)*

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Impact**

#### **Economic decline causes war-negative GDP relation**

**Kim 2010** (UN author, Conceição ,Chief-Economist Head of the Strategic Advisory Unit UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa, 10 Namsuk, Pedro “THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT” International Journal of Peace Studies, ?/?/10, GMU.edu Volume 15, Number 1, accessed 7/11/17 GDI AC)

While there are a number of factors that could cause conflict, **empirical studies¶ find that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict**.¶ Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a). Growth¶ rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing countries. If **the¶ growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point from the mean, the¶ risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent** (Collier et al., 2009).¶ Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the five years¶ prior to conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent¶ compared to 2 percent in the countries that remained peaceful.¶ Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be¶ clearly related. **The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a new conflict.¶** Collier et al. (2009) finds that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with¶ characteristics set at the study‟s sample mean was 4.6 percent. If the level of per capita¶ income were to be halved from this level, the risk would be increased to 5.3 percent.¶ Conflict¶ Loss of life¶ Destruction of assets¶ Forced migration¶ Low investment in¶ health and education¶ Low Human¶ Development¶ Low institutional¶ capacity¶ Low productivity¶ Low potential growth¶ Slow growth¶ Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição 33¶ **Growth rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing¶ countries.** If the growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point¶ from the mean, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent¶ (Collier et al., 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict¶ countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on¶ average 0.5 percent compared to 2 percent in countries that remained peaceful.¶ Figure 2: GDP per capita and the probability of observing a new conflict¶ Source: Humphreys (2003, p.2), as reported d in UNDP (2008a).¶ **Empirical analysis of growth and conflict has inherent data limitations, but some¶ recent studies using more careful methodology shows a strong causal link running from¶ poor economic performance to conflict.**

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**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Impact**

#### **Decline leads to war -corporate resource takeovers**

**Cooke 2010** (Shamus,social service worker, trade unionist, 10 “How Economic Recessions Cause Wars and Revolutions” Global Research, 5/10/10, http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-economic-recessions-cause-wars-and-revolutions/19080, Accessed 7/10/17, GDI AC)

A quick glance around the globe reveals a ruined international economy, wars and more wars in the works, and revolutionary movements aplenty — all connected phenomena. No, the apocalypse is not coming; **but the international economic system currently used to arrange the social order is crumbling, taking everyone down with it.**¶ The global capitalist system is in far worse shape than most people realize: it may only take the tiny economy of Greece to go bankrupt to break this camel’s back — and finally the word “recession” will be antiquated and “depression” will be in vogue. ¶ How did this happen?¶ **A great economic downturn would have happened years ago were it not for the monstrous debt that many governments created — consumer, corporate, and state — to prop up the economic system,** since debt was needed to fuel the consumption that corporations depended on for the purchase of their products. When this global debt bubble burst, the current crisis was ignited. ¶ The debts started going unpaid and the banks stopped lending, creating the “credit crunch.” Giant corporations thus began failing, and the governments that are heavily

 “influenced” by these corporations went on a bailout frenzy: billions and trillions of taxpayer money poured into these companies, keeping them alive to plunder another day. ¶ **After the bailouts, stupid politicians everywhere declared the capitalist system “saved,” and the crisis over. But bigger crises were already visible on the horizon.** ¶ The debt that nations used to bailout private corporations was too massive. **If these countries’ currencies are to retain any value, the debt must be trimmed** (the Euro for example, is widely believed to be “finished”). The battle over how this trimming takes place can be properly referred to as “class war” — a revolution in Greece is brewing over such an issue, with Portugal, Spain, and Italy not far behind. ¶ All over Europe and the U.S. **the corporate elite is demanding that the giant government debts — due to bailouts and wars — be reduced by lowering wages, gutting social services, slashing public education, Social Security, Medicare, etc. Labor unions and progressive groups are demanding that the rich and corporations, instead, pay for the crisis that they created through progressive taxation, eliminating tax havens, and if need be, nationalization. This tug of war over society’s resources is class war.** The global crisis has developed to such a degree that no middle ground can be safely bargained. ¶ This revolution-**creating dynamic also spawns wars**. Corporations demand that wages and benefits be reduced during a recession so that “profitability is restored.” This is the only way out of a global recession, since nothing is produced under capitalism if it doesn’t create a profit; and recessions destroy profit. But there are other ways to restore profits.¶ While **corporate-controlled governments** work to restore domestic profitability by attacking the living standards of workers, **they likewise look abroad to fix their problems. A sure-fire way to increase profits is to export more products overseas,** something Obama has mentioned in dozens of speeches. One way to **ensure that a foreign country will accept/market your exported goods is by threatening them, or attacking them. An occupied country, like Iraq for example, was forced to allow a flood of U.S. corporations inside to pillage as they saw fit — an automatic export boom. ¶ When the world market shrinks during a recession** — since consumers can afford to buy fewer goods — the urge **to dominate markets via war increases dramatically**. These same shrinking markets compel international corporations, based in different nations, **to insanely compete for markets, raw materials, and cheap labor.** War is a very logical outcome in such circumstances. President Obama reminds us: ¶ “The world’s fastest-growing markets are outside our borders. We need to compete for those customers because other nations are competing for them.” Having a giant military establishment to back them up enables U.S. corporations to be better “competitors” than other nations.¶ **War also serves as a valuable distraction to an angry public which is demanding jobs, higher wages, health care, well funded public education, and taxes on the wealthy.** Better to channel this anger into hatred toward a “foreign enemy.”

**2NC/1NR Economy DA Extensions: Impact**

#### **Economic decline equals war-4 reasons (short)**

**Stewart 15** (Francis, Graham, Oxford Department of International Development, Brown, University of Western Australia Development Economics, “Economic and Political Causes of Conflict:An Overview and Some Policy Implications”, CRISE, 2/?/15, http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper81.pdf, Accessed 7/7/17, GDI AC)

**Although some observers attribute contemporary conflicts to fundamental differences arising¶ from ethnicity or religion,6 such differences are evidently an insufficient**

**explanation; many¶ multiethnic or multireligious societies live peacefully—for example, Ghana and Tanzania—while¶ others are at peace for decades before experiencing conflict. In fact, the vast majority of¶ multiethnic societies are at peace.7 As Abner Cohen succinctly stated four decades ago: ¶ CRISE Working Paper No. 81¶ 6¶ Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs¶ of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their¶ own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the¶ other hand, fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight¶ over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power,¶ whether economic, political, or both.8¶ Four economic explanations have dominated recent analysis: the first points to group motives¶ and group inequalities as a source of conflict; the second focuses on individual gains from¶ conflict; the third is derived from a failed “social contract”; and the fourth theorizes that¶ environmental pressures are a major source of conflict (“green war”).**

# On Case: Saudi Arabia Answers

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Turn: Reducing military aid causes allied prolif and aggression**

**Bromund 2018 (**Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/obamas-ugly-legacy-the-mideast> )

The **war in Syria was like a stone thrown into a lake.** The initial splash has subsided, but **the waves are spreading** throughout the region. Where the waves meet the shores of the lake, they splash again into new wars. **The wars of the Persian Gulf, the Kurds, and Israel are beginning.** The modern Middle East has rarely been peaceful. But today, its wars have a new shape. A few years ago, they were in the heartland of Syria. Now, they are on the periphery — Yemen, Qatar, Turkey, and soon, Israel. These are the wars after the Syrian war — and they flowed naturally from it, and from U.S. policy. **The Obama administration** believed that the United States was too involved in the Middle East. That idea was not completely wrong: fundamentally, Asia and Europe are more important to the United States than the Persian Gulf. But it **was wrong to believe that less U.S. involvement would bring more peace. The role of U.S. power —** everywhere — **is to reassure our friends and deter our enemies. We often focus too much on the deterrence role, but the reassuring role is often just as important. If we were not there to reassure, our friends would find it necessary to act in ways contrary to our interests.** In Europe, the purpose of NATO was as much to reassure Western Europe as it was to deter the USSR. In Asia, our alliances with Japan and South Korea keep their nervousness about China and North Korea within tolerable limits. In the Persian Gulf, we backed up Saudi Arabia against Iran. The reason **we do this is not because we are nice guys. It’s because we don’t want Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia to become nuclear powers to protect themselves.** And we don’t want that because we believe that, on the whole, **we’re safer if the spread of nuclear weapons is limited. When the United States withdraws, we expect our allies to start taking out insurance policies on their own, and our adversaries to become more aggressive. That is what we have seen in the Middle East**. As the Obama administration withdrew, Saudi Arabia grew nervous, and Iran advanced. The result of that advance was the war in Syria. Of course, even before Iran was involved, the Arab Spring brought revolt to Syria. But it was Iran that made the struggle what it became — a war meant to spread Iranian power. **Today, the Saudis are engaged in wars on several fronts.** At its rear, it struggles to pacify Yemen. On its flank, it blockades Qatar. A blockage, classically, is an act of war. These are the acts of a new leadership seeking to control its neighbors out of fear for its region.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Allied prolif turns the case- it causes *militarization* of new states with a legacy of colonial violence causing arms races and nuclear conflict-the affirmative must refute the specifics of each scenario to win.**

**Khalilzad 1995 (**Zalmay, Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the cold war Tim WASHINGTON QtMciKkiv • SPRIX« 1995)

Realistically and over the longer term, however, **a** neo-**isolationist approach might** well **increase the danger of major conflict,** require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. **By withdrawing** from Europe and Asia, **the United States** **would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the world's community** of democratic powers **and** so **establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder** and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century. **In the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace.** At that time, the United States was but one of several major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany—especially since unification—would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that **U.S. withdrawal could** not, in the long run, **result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy.** The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, **Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities.** China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically—to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. **This could result in arms races**, **including the possible acquisition** by Japan **of nuclear weapons.** Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With **the shifting balance of power** among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea **could come significant risks of preventive or preemptive war**. Similarly, European **competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars** in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war—an unlikely prospect—Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Turn: Restricting military aid gets circumvented and causes a shift to PMCs.**

**Gul 2006 (**Saad 5-17-06, Law Clerk to The Hon. John C. Martin, Chief Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals, THE SECRETARY WILL DENY ALL KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR ACTIONS: THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, <https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9635-lcb102gulpdf> )

**The use of innovative financial procedures to utilize PMC services in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy is particularly ominous, because Congress has often relied on its power of the purse to define** **the** permissible parameters of **the nation’s policy**, e.g. in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda.116 Indeed, Congressional use of the appropriations power is **one of the last meaningful constraints on virtually unbridled Presidential authority** as Commander in Chief in the arena of military affairs—**the utilization of financial smoke and mirrors to evade Congress effectively eviscerates this power**. 117 The use of contractors to escape legal constraints is hardly a recent innovation. During the Vietnam era, a Pentagon official described one contractor, Vinnell, as “our own little army in Vietnam,” explaining that “we used them to do things we either didn’t have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems.” 118 Worse still, **the ostensibly private status of PMCs means that they can be used to skirt Congressional mandates;** the **Pentagon used them in the Balkans to stage an end run around the Congressionally imposed cap on U.S. troop deployments** in the region.119 Similarly, **the United States has been able to evade statutory prohibitions on offering military assistance to certain nations by routing such aid through PMCs**.120 Congressional oversight becomes an even more distant prospect when PMC contracts are routed through a variety of channels, including the Commerce, Interior, and State Departments.121 For instance, many of CACI’s contractors at Abu Ghraib were funded through a Department of the Interior Contract for Information Technology Services.122 With such bureaucratic sleights of hand, meaningful oversight is impossible. Even if technically legal, such actions serve to significantly dilute Congressional oversight of U.S. military activity around the globe.12

1. **Greater reliance on PMCs causes shadow wars.**

**Singer, 2007 (**Peter, Director @ 21st century defense initiative “‘Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Six Questions for P.W. Singer”, 9/30, <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311> )

One of your first conclusions is that **by using military contractors, policymakers “dodge key decisions that carry political costs,** thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect the public interest.” Moving away from the operations in Iraq which are more immediately topical, security contractors have been pushed as surrogates for uniformed military as peacekeepers in Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and a variety of other circumstances. A Marine general recently told me that he was concerned that the **heavy reliance on contractors might allow policymakers to ease into a foreign conflict in a way that avoided Congressional scrutiny** and oversight. Do you agree that this is a realistic concern? Yes, and I wouldn’t use the word “might,” as if it were a future scenario. **Contractors have already been used in** all sorts of operations, in both **an overt (Iraq, Balkans) and covert (Colombia, Sudan), manner to get around certain political consequences or congressional restrictions.** When the U.S. military shifted to an all-volunteer, professional force in the wake of the Vietnam War, military leaders set up a series of organization “tripwires” to preserve the tie between the nation’s foreign policy decisions and local communities. Led by then-Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (1972-74), they wanted to ensure that the military would not go to war without the sufficient backing and involvement of the nation. Much like a call center moved to India, this “Abrams Doctrine” has been outsourced. Instead, contractors offer the means for choices to be dodged at the onset of deployment, and for scrutiny and public concern to be lessened after deployment. Your home-front does not get as involved when its contractors are being called up and deployed, nor do the people there ask key questions when contractors are lost. Over 1,000 have been killed in Iraq and 13,000 wounded, but they are not counted on official Department of Defense reports. In turn, if you want to go to a non-Iraq example, where is the concern over the three American contractors still held captive by the FARC in Colombia today? Imagine if we had three soldiers as POWs instead. In addition, your **media** also **becomes less likely to cover the story when contractors are involved. One quarter of one percent of all news stories out of Iraq mention contractors.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **PMCs remove any counterweight on violence and prevents long term solution.**

**Gladstone 2010 (**Elias, PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE SECURITIZATION OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, Dissertation in M.Litt from University of St Andrews, Proquest)]

Leander (2005, 819) argues that in the US after Vietnam and with the detente policies in Europe, we saw the rise of non-military understandings of security, as “security was too important to be left to the generals”. In the contemporary global order, **the “privatization” of security helps to remobilise the re-militarization** of its understanding. This contributes to the increased legitimacy of technical, military, managerial security discourses. **It depoliticises security,** moving it out of the public realm **and thereby disempowers** not so much the state or public, but rather 'civil' component of state and **civil society advocates of non-military security approaches.** This has implications for where discourses about security are produced and by whom. **Security debates are moving out of the public realm into a restricted sphere** where executive, military, secret services and PSCs can decide how issues should be defined and handled. Correspondingly, **it diminishes the presence of** governmental (legislative assemblies, diplomats and foreign affairs/state departments) and civil society (media, NGOs, think tanks) **voices that would be expected to contest the consequent militarization of security issues** (Leander, 2005: 820). The increasing weight of the technical and managerial in discussions about security in the public sphere is the most tangible consequence of this trend. This shift reinforces the re-militarization of security as firms ground their claim to expertise in their capacity to offer technologically effective and economically interesting solutions to existing problems. However, when a problem is not a security problem or would be better responded too by way of diplomacy or economic aid or re-regulation of markets, the services of PSCs not needed. **The growing weight of security experts and discourses in the production of legitimate knowledge risks overshadowing the kinds of “long term” solutions everyone sees the importance of. The dominance of private security discourses crowds out the prior question of whether or not a problem is really security problem,** and if so, whether or not a military or law enforcement response is most appropriate (Leander, 2005: 824). As Ong- Webb (2007: 90) argues, piracy is non-traditional security threat that cannot be solved through military solutions, it requires better policing on land. Piracy should be rooted out by attacking pirates’ sources of strength on land, disrupting their organizational structures and isolating them from their sources of support. In particular, this means destroying their bases and hideouts, cutting off sources of capital, technology and recruitment; and crippling the middlemen and markets that allow them to dispose of their loot. **A long-term solution would require governments to employ socioeconomic measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance** in order deal with piracy effectively. Young (2007: 1) argues similarly that the remedies to piracy involve building the national capacities of regional states, emphasising long-term structural development, increasing operational policing capabilities, better information gathering, and international cooperation.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **The Saudis-Iran proxy war prevents Iran from nuclear proliferation and terrorism**

**Gordon 2019 (**Evelyn 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> )

An expert report submitted to the U.N. Security Council this month concluded that **Iran is illegally funding Yemen’s Houthi rebels** by giving them oil, which they can sell for cash. From last year’s version of the same report, we learned that **Iran is arming the Houthis with missiles and drones,** in violation of a U.N. arms embargo. Thus whatever the Houthis were when the war started, **they are now effectively an Iranian subsidiary**, dependent on Tehran for both cash and arms. That is just one of many reasons to be appalled by the Senate’s renewed effort to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led fight against the Houthis. Not only is this strategically idiotic, but it contradicts the Senate’s own stated goal of protecting human rights. And the legislation reintroduced this week sends a terrible message, even if a presidential veto will presumably keep it from becoming law. On the strategic side, let’s start with the fact that **an organization whose official slogan is “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam” isn’t one Americans should want ruling anything,** much less a country whose location enables it to dominate a strategic waterway vital to the global oil industry. And **without the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis would long since have taken over Yemen. In other countries, like Syria and Lebanon, Iranian** military and financial **aid has repeatedly enabled its proxies to overwhelm the opposition**; that this hasn’t yet happened in Yemen is only because there, unlike in Syria and Lebanon, the Saudi coalition has provided its local allies with substantial assistance, including airstrikes. Second, empowering allies is always better than empowering enemies. Granted, **Saudi Arabia a highly imperfect ally, but it is at least nominally in America’s camp.** Iran, in contrast, has been America’s avowed enemy since 1979, and its proxies have been responsible for hundreds, if not thousands, of American deaths in Lebanon and Iraq. Thus for the Senate **to weaken Riyadh and strengthen Tehran**, which targeting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen does, **would be foolish at any time.** But **it’s especially foolish at a time when America** ostensibly **seeks to exert maximum pressure on Iran to curb its** multifarious bad behavior— its **nuclear program**, about which it has repeatedly lied; its ballistic-missile program, which defies a U.N. Security Council resolution; its **regional aggression,** which has already enabled it to dominate Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; **and its terrorism,** including recent attacks in the heart of Europe. Maximum pressure requires both financial and military components, as the case of the Soviet Union shows. It was America’s massive military buildup under Ronald Reagan, combined with its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which made Moscow’s military adventurism too expensive for its ailing economy to support. Iran, like the Soviet Union, has a weak economy, which has been further undermined by America’s reinstatement of stringent sanctions. Yet the economic pressure will be multiplied if Iran has to keep pouring resources into its numerous proxy wars rather than being able to win them cheaply. Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria obviously further this effort, since Iran must keep replacing what Israel destroys. But **the Saudi coalition in Yemen is similarly forcing Iran is keep expending resources on a war it thought would be easily won.** Thus if Washington is serious about countering Tehran and doesn’t want to risk American troops in the process, **supporting regional allies who are bleeding Iran is the only alternative.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Iranian aggression causes global conflict over oil resources**

**Kopits 2017 (**Steven, “Oil could top $200 if Saudi-Iran war breaks out”. *CNBC News.* November 10, 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/10/saudi-iran-war-would-create-domino-effect-of-global-disaster-commentary.html> )

**Events appear to be spinning out of control in the Middle East, and the threat a Saudi-Iranian war is looking increasingly credible.** Make no mistake, **an out and out conflict between the two nations would be an unmitigated disaster for the region and the world.** Last week, Houthi rebels in Yemen launched a missile targeting a Saudi airport near Riyadh. The missile was intercepted, but a Saudi-led military coalition battling the Yemeni rebels called the attack a "blatant military aggression by the Iranian regime which may amount to an act of war." The Saudis reserved the "right to respond", according to the official Saudi Press Agency. The **major** OPEC **oil producers,** all abutting the Persian Gulf, **export almost 20 percent of the world's oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz,** which connects the Persian Gulf to global markets. The strait, a mere 34 miles wide at its narrowest, sits pinched between Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Were a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to erupt, **this chokepoint could easily be closed.** Indeed, **shipping could stop even before a single ship is damaged. If insurers perceive an imminent risk of attack on a tanker in the region, they would either suspend insurance** or charge exorbitant rates for coverage. Under the circumstances, **vessel owners could opt to wait out the hostilities rather than risk their tankers.** Of course, the strait could also be closed as a direct result of military hostilities, for example, by Iran. **The impact of such a closure on the global economy would be severe and immediate.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **And China would either intervene or collapse without access to oil, escalating the conflict**

**Kopits 2017** Steven, “Oil could top $200 if Saudi-Iran war breaks out”. *CNBC News.* November 10, 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/10/saudi-iran-war-would-create-domino-effect-of-global-disaster-commentary.html> )

**A loss of 20 percent of the world's oil supply would push oil prices into the $200 / barrel range.** The shale sector would see its glory days. Those countries without material oil production would suffer the most, notably Europe and East Asia, in particular Japan and South Korea. **China's situation would be dire.** In the last few years, Chinese import dependence has become acute. **Oil imports cover more than three-quarters of total Chinese consumption,** and half of China's imports originate in the Persian Gulf. **The closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not only put China into recession, but** given the high degree of financialization of the economy, **could create a wider societal and political crisis.** The reaction of the Chinese government is difficult to anticipate, but **China would certainly bring maximal pressure** on the U.S. and Persian Gulf countries **to end the conflict, by whatever means.** The ultimate takeaway for China would be the necessity to build, at all speed, a global military and diplomatic presence capable of projecting force to influence events in the Middle East and, if necessary, to displace the U.S. in the region.

1. **The Houthis are worse than Saudi Arabia: They use child soldiers**

**Gordon 2019 (**Evelyn 1-30-19, Israeli journalist, "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> )

Still, how can America possibly support a coalition that’s committing gross human-rights violations in Yemen? The answer is easy: **Horrible as Riyadh’s behavior is, the Houthis are worse**. Thus **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, American would empower an even greater evil**. **A perfect example is the issue of child soldiers**. The New York Times ran a front-page story last month accusing the Saudis of using Sudanese child soldiers in Yemen. Though it didn’t provide many hard numbers, it implied that there could well be several thousand such soldiers. This is incontrovertibly bad. But what the Times carefully concealed from its readers is that the Saudis’ use of child soldiers pales before that of the Houthis. According to an Associated Press report earlier that month, **the Houthis openly admit to employing a whopping 18,000 child soldiers**. Moreover, while the Saudis are taking boys aged 14 to 17, **the Houthis are using children as young as 10**. And while the Saudis are recruiting their impoverished volunteers by offering pay sufficient to make their families permanently self-supporting (assuming the returning veterans invest it, as most do, in profit-making ventures like cattle or shops), **the Houthis** use other tactics: They **kidnap children outright, coerce them to enlist** in exchange for a relative’s freedom from jail, **or force poor parents to choose between “volunteering” their child and making an unaffordable cash contribution to the war effort. Parents who resist are shot**. In short, bad as the Saudis’ human-rights violations are, the Houthis’ violations are far worse. And **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, the Senate would consign Yemen to the barbarous rule of those very same Houthis**.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Fear of US abandonment drives reckless Saudi behavior- cutting off sales will magnify it.**

**Bromund 2018 (**Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage, <https://www.newsday.com/opinion/commentary/what-not-to-do-about-khashoggi-1.22136012> )

As I have written in this column before, **most U.S. alliances are as much about restraining our allies as they are about deterring our enemies.** When Obama tilted toward Tehran, he gave Saudi Arabia a reason to start writing its own insurance policy against Iran, its regional enemy. Predictably, the Saudis have made a mess of it. They wanted to secure their flanks, but their war in Yemen is endless and profitless, and their blockade of Qatar, though driven by understandable concern over Iranian influence, has achieved little. At home, the regime’s so-called drive against corruption — like the parallel ones in Russia and China — is about centralizing power by eliminating opponents. The killing of Khashoggi, whether it was deliberate or a panicked bungle, is part of that drive — and it has backfired spectacularly. The problem for the United States is that **Saudi behavior is destructive. But leaving the Saudis to go it alone would merely be more of the same policy that got us where we are today.** Since 2011, when most U.S. forces left Iraq**, declining U.S. influence has paralleled rising regional violence — and Iranian power.** That violence isn’t our fault — but given how rotten the regimes in the region are, we shouldn’t have expected them to behave any better. **Kicking Saudi Arabia to the curb** **now is tempting, but it will only quicken the descent by making it clear to the Saudis that they’re on their own against the Iranians.** Breaking this spiral won’t be easy. It may not be possible. Yet we have to try to convince the Saudis that their actions, far from enhancing their security, are undermining it. Ironically, Khashoggi was right about that; the reaction to his death is proof of it. Our response to it should be guided not by self-righteous outrage, but by our interest in talking the Saudis down from their ledge.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **Ending aid won’t end the war; it will exacerbate it, encourage Iranian aggression and weaken key allies.**

**Phillips and Posey, 2018 (**James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @Heritage Madyson, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy. <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous> )

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but **ending U.S. support** for the multinational coalition in Yemen **is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that** would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. **A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen**, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. **Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia** entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people **ignore the war crimes** and heavy-handed treatment meted out **by the Houthis** to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. **Undermining the Saudi-led coalition** in Yemen **risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments** through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Offense Frontline**

1. **US influence is key to reduce violence and promote settlement- withdrawal greenlights aggression by Russia and terrorists**

**Carafano 2018 (**James J, vice president of Heritage's Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow. <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/chaos-will-erupt-the-middle-east-if-us-leaves-yemen>

**If America walks away, it will only bring more war, not peace. America is there for a reason: to keep the region from falling apart.** The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us. **The greatest threats to Middle East stability** and security **are Iran** and transnational Islamist terrorists groups, principally **ISIS and al-Qaida.** And **it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war. If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, Tehran, ISIS, and al-Qaida would feel emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war.** Meanwhile, Washington would lose its ability to influence how Saudi Arabia and the UAE conduct coalition operations. Without our mitigating presence, the carnage of this vicious war would only increase.

1. **Saudi strength key to peace- plan weakening them means zero chance of success.**

**Almarzoqi 2016 (**Mansour , researcher on Saudi politics at Sciences Po de Lyon, France [https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-saudi-efforts-yemen-advance-us-interests-1790](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-saudi-efforts-yemen-advance-us-interests-17901) )

**No fight against Al Qaeda has any chance of success in Yemen without two elements: a strong central government and a functioning state structure.** Without that, any achievement is a mere flash in the pan. These two elements on the one hand, and the predominance of the alliance between the Iran-backed Houthi militia and Saleh forces on the other, are mutually exclusive. Thus, fighting Al Qaeda starts with the Houthi militia becoming a political party and Saleh’s acceptance of an inclusive political process. That is why the Arab coalition labored so hard for a solution based on these elements, as evident in the Gulf Initiative, UNSC Resolution 2216, the Kuwait negotiations, and several failed ceasefire attempts. If Saudi military capabilities are weakened, the chances that another state actor can rally the region behind a viable stabilization plan are next to none. **Riyadh is the only major Arab world power that is stable and prosperous.** And the fact **that the Arab and Islamic World are rallying behind Riyadh’s leadership is not only motivated by Saudi Arabia’s reliability and stability, but also by its diplomatic, economic and military power, as well as its symbolic power as the birthplace of Arab and Islamic civilization.** The Arab nation was born in Souk Okaz, grew up in Dar Annadwah, and emerged from the Suspended Poems. The Islamic nation was born in Mecca, grew up in Medina, and emerged from Saqifat Bani Sa’idah. From the Rashideen era, Umayyad era and Abbasid era, to Arab royal families and until today, political and religious elites of the Arab and Islamic worlds trace back their origins to this land. And it is towards this land that more than one billion believers around the world turn their faces five times a day. **Blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia will put the territorial integrity of the Arab world, its security, and the stability of the region in jeopardy. The current balance maintained by Riyadh and its allies will be in a grave danger, and with it American security and interests.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Solvency Frontline**

1. **No Solvency: Pressure on Sauid Arabia alone ends the war in 1 minute**

**Indyk and Riedel 2019 (**Martin and Bruce, The Brookings Institution, New Geopolitics of Mena, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190107_new_geopolitics_of_mena_final.pdf>)

MARTIN INDYK: And **the United States has viable diplomatic options. U.S. diplomatic leadership can play a positive role in the conflicts** between Israel and Iran in Syria, and **between Saudi Arabia and Yemen**. In Syria, Israel has no choice but to deal with Moscow because we are absent from the game. And, as Kemal pointed out, Turkey, Iran, and Russia are trying to influence the political and diplomatic outcome there, and we’re not playing. Israel will quickly come to realize the limits to its ambitions in Syria because of the absence of the United States. In Yemen, **the Saudis need an active American effort to get them the hell out of there. It’s the only way it’s going to work. And yet we’re not willing to do anything** but supply weaponry. BRUCE RIEDEL: I want to underscore this point. **If you think about smart American politics in this region, helping the Saudis get out of the morass that they’ve created in Yemen is probably the biggest thing we could do in the near term to help stabilize the Kingdom and stabilize the Arabian Peninsula**. And it’s doable. We have the means. **If we call the Saudis up tonight and say “Cease fire tomorrow at 6:00 or no arms deliveries starting at 6:01,” they’ll say, “Yeah, okay, we got it.” They would have no choice.**

1. **The UAE will funnel weapons to fight the Houthis in Yemen**

**Byman 2018 (**Daniel, Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/> )

Yet **even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses** or is compelled to do so, **an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided,** and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. **Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active**, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Solvency Frontline**

1. **The EU will continue to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE**

**Cochrane 2018 (**Paul “EU countries approve arms sales to Saudi, UAE worth 55 times aid to Yemen”; Middle Eastern Eye; November 12, 2018; <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-countries-approve-arms-sales-saudi-uae-worth-55-times-aid-yemen> )

European governments and **the European Union publicly wring their hands about the "human tragedy" and need for "life-saving assistance" in war-torn Yemen. Yet** while the Saudi-led coalition has bombed the region’s poorest country over the past three years, **the EU** and European **countries approved the sale of more than $86.7bn in arms to Saudi Arabia** and the United Arab Emirates, according to figures compiled by Middle East Eye. The value of the licences which the countries issued in 2015 and 2016 - the only years for which data is available - amount to more than 55 times what the EU and European countries have donated to the UN’s chronically underfunded Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. Meanwhile, independent researchers estimate that more than 56,000 Yemenis have been killed with the UN warning “a clear and present danger” of an imminent famine engulfing 14 million Yemenis – or half of the population. **Many governments have promised** during the course of the war **to stop or restrict sales of the weapons that are being used to maim Yemenis**, and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last month brought a new wave of public pressure to halt deals with the Saudi kingdom. **But only Germany and Norway have suspended their sales** – until Khashoggi’s murder is explained - while **the UK, France and Spain have all signalled that they will continue business as usual**. Experts say the continuation of the sales, which politicians often justify by pointing to job creation, security cooperation and trade relations, reveals a fundamental disconnect for Western governments between their actions and Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. The UK and many of its EU allies insist there is no military solution to the conflict, yet they themselves are supplying the weapons that are fuelling and prolonging the hostilities,” says Ben Donaldson, head of campaigns at the United Nations Association-UK, a grassroots policy group. “There has just been one UN Security Council resolution in three years of conflict, which is very surprising given its severity compared to other conflicts, and the UK is taking sides in the conflict, which flies against its position of ‘penholder’ and its responsibility. The UK’s position is to support Saudi Arabia.” Jeff Abramson, a non-resident senior fellow with the Washington, DC-based Arms Control Association told MEE: “**The reality is the provision of arms extends conflicts and leads to humanitarian disasters, so to an extent the arms trade fuels the need for aid assistance. It is a perverse cycle.**” **For decades, billions of dollars in arms sales flowed into the Gulf to be stockpiled and largely forgotten**, while the revenues have piled up into European bank accounts.

**1NC Saudi Arabia Solvency Frontline**

1. **The UK is a massive alt cause—they fuel just as many human rights abuses in Yemen and there are NO checks**

**Sharman 2018 (**Jon, reporter, 7-18-18, UK almost doubles arms sales to countries on governments list of human rights abusers, figures reveal, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-arms-sales-double-human-rights-abusers-china-saudi-arabia-israel-yemen-a8452101.html>)

**The UK nearly doubled the value of arms sales to countries on the government’s list of human rights abusers in the past year**, figures reveal. Licences for arms deals worth some £1.5bn were approved in Whitehall in 2017, up from £820m a year earlier, according to figures compiled by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) pressure group. **Sales were granted to 18 countries on the list, including** China, **Saudi Arabia,** Bahrain, Israel, Egypt and Pakistan, compared to 20 different states in 2016. The value of **sales to Saudi Arabia,** currently embroiled in a bloody conflict in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels where thousands of civilians have been killed and millions left in need of aid, **alone totalled £1.13bn,** the group said. Theresa May’s government is “actively arming and supporting many of the regimes that even it believes are responsible for terrible human rights abuses”, CAAT’s Andrew Smith told The Independent. He added: **“There is little oversight in the system, and no controls over how these arms will be used once they have left the UK. The arms sales being agreed today could be used to fuel atrocities for years to come.** Right now UK-made fighter jets and bombs are playing a central role in the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen, and the government and arms companies have totally failed to monitor or evaluate how this deadly equipment is being used. “We are always being told how rigorous and robust the system supposedly is, but nothing could be further from the truth. These arms sales don’t just provide dictatorships and human rights abusers with the means to kill, they also give them a huge degree of political support.”

1. **The plan guarantees circumvention**

**Miller 2012 (**Nathanael, The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences, Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 45, 2012, <https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Miller-final.pdf> **)**

**This incident also demonstrates the consequences of the United States’ circumventing its own laws to permit the distribution of military aid and equipment to countries that violate their citizens’ human rights**. In many instances, units receiving aid from the United States are responsible for extra-judicial killings, torture, extortion, and rape.16 **The failure of legislation to prevent military aid from flowing to foreign military units responsible for atrocities stems in part from a long-standing pattern in which increasingly broad Executive power pushes back against legislative attempts to limit Presidential authority in foreign policy decision-making**.17 Often, Congress legislates a foreign policy position and the Executive works around the intent, if not always the letter, of the law. **Because of subsequent congressional inaction,** and a series of Supreme Court decisions effectively depriving any potential party of means to sue for enforcement of human rights legislation, **the Executive remains in firm control.18 Without any independent check on its authority, the Executive’s internal controls are insufficient to prevent funding units that have committed human rights abuses.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Middle East Stability Frontline**

1. **No Impact: Middle East war won’t escalate—regional militaries are too weak**

**Rovner and Talmadge 2014 (**Joshua, Southern Methodist University, and Caitlin, George Washington University, “Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, The George Washington University, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/less-more-future-us-military-persian-gulf> )

Happily, however, the situation for the United States today is more like the 1950s than the 1970s. **The major regional powers all suffer from serious shortcomings in conventional military power,** meaning that none of them will be able to seriously threaten the balance for the foreseeable future. **Iran’s military has suffered greatly from decades of war and sanctions. Iraq’s fledgling security services are** almost **exclusively focused on internal problems. And Saudi Arabia,** the richest country in the region, **seems content to rely on a dense network of defenses and proxies rather than pursue any real power projection capabilities.** While there are reasons to worry about internal stability, especially given the ongoing fight against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), **there is very little chance of a major interstate war**. Moreover, **threats to oil shipping in the Gulf are real but not overwhelming.** All of this points to a simple and optimistic conclusion: the United States can protect its core interest in the free flow of oil without having to commit to a large and enduring naval or ground presence to the Gulf.

1. **Middle East war won’t escalate – balanced alliances, Chinese non-intervention, and cooperation prevent great power draw-in**

**Mead 2014 (**Walter Russell, Yale University, “Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?” *Huffington Post*, July 7th, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html> )

But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. **Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East.** **China isn't** (yet) **taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet**; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible. AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today **the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from,** and in some cases even hostile to, **the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.** While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, **we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I.** Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. **Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.**

**1NC Saudi Arabia Framing Frontline**

1. **The threat of nuclear war is more important than preventing human rights abuses**

**Boulding, 1978 (**Ken, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354 )

**Nor can we pretend that peace** around the temper- ate zone **is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff.** The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that **war**, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," **remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things.** Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not accounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, **advancing technology is creating a situation where** in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore **if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong**. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems.

1. **War turns structural violence not vice versa**

**Goldstein, 2001 (**IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412)

**The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause,** although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. **Rather, war has** in part **fueled and sustained these and other injustices**.9  **So, “if you want peace, work for peace.”** Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.**

# On Case Answers: End Small Arms Sales Affirmative

**1NC Small Arms Solvency Frontline**

1. **No Solvency: Illegal trafficking and weak US gun laws are responsible**

**Parsons and Vargas 2018 (**Chelsea and Eugenio Weigend, Feb 2nd, Center for American Progress, Beyond our Borders, How Weak US Gun Laws Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad [https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/ )](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/)

**The large inventory of guns in the United States—from both domestic manufacture and import—and the nation’s comparatively weak gun laws are key contributors to the flow of guns across the U.S. border and into nearby countries.** **Gun traffickers take advantage of both to purchase firearms in the United States at a relatively low cost before trafficking these weapons to nearby countries for resale at a substantial profit, creating a significant risk to these countries’ public safety in the process.**[34](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-34) While is it difficult to assess the precise number of guns in the United States, the best estimates suggest that there are roughly 300 million guns in circulation in this country.[35](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-35)Moreover, in recent years, gun manufacturing in the United States has increased. While the United States manufactured an annual average of 3.5 million firearms from 1996 to 2005, it manufactured an annual average of 6.7 million firearms from 2006 to 2015.[36](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-36)There is also a substantial number of guns imported into the United States; firearm imports have increased from an annual average of 1.3 million firearms from 1996 to 2005 to an annual average of 3.5 million firearms from 2006 to 2015.[37](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-37) During the 10-year period from 2006 to 2015, a total of 67.5 million guns were manufactured in the United States and another 35.4 million guns were imported into the country.[38](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-38) In addition to the substantial size of its gun market, **the United States also has comparatively weaker gun laws than its regional neighbors.** In Canada, for example, citizens have no constitutional right to possess firearms and most semi-automatic weapons are prohibited.[39](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-39) Moreover, Canadian gun owners must obtain a license prior to purchasing a gun, undergo a background check, receive training, and be at least 18 years old.[40](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-40) Furthermore, there is a mandatory 28-day waiting period for first-time owners.[41](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-41) In Mexico, only the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) can manufacture and sell guns, and any individuals who purchase a firearm must register the weapon with the ministry.[42](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-42) In order to purchase a firearm, individuals must provide a letter of employment, a letter demonstrating that they do not have a criminal record, a copy of their military service card, proof of residency, photo identification, a copy of their birth certificate, and their Unique Population Registry Code (CURP).[43](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-43) Finally, certain types of firearms are exclusively limited to military use, such as AR-15 and AK-47-style assault rifles.[44](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/#fn-445659-44) However, the **strong gun laws in Canada and Mexico are undermined by their proximity to the United States and its comparatively weak laws. Traffickers along both the northern and southern U.S. borders have developed a variety of methods to exploit the United States’ weak gun laws in order to illegally traffic guns across the border into Canada and Mexico,** where they can be sold at a considerable profit.

**1NC Small Arms Solvency Frontline**

1. **No Solvency: Many nations manufacture small arms**

**Boutwell and Klare 1998 (**Jeffrey, Director of International Security, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Michael, Arms Control Association, Spring,[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998\_08-09/mkas98 )](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/mkas98)

**The global spread of small arms and light weapons has been facilitated by the emergence in many states,** including a dozen or more developing countries, **of a domestic capacity for the manufacture of such weapons.** Whereas the fabrication of major weapons systems is highly concentrated, with only a dozen or so states capable of producing modern tanks, planes and warships, **some 50 nations now manufacture light weapons and/or ammunition of various types.** The production of modern assault rifles, for example, occurs in many of the industrialized nations as well as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey. **Many of these countries produce arms for export as well as domestic use, greatly adding to the number of sources from which a potential belligerent can obtain weapons of war.**

1. **No Solvency: Availability of weapons doesn’t necessarily mean violence will happen**

**Keating 2011 (**Joshua, Jan 11, Foreign Policy, Armed but not necessarily dangerous, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/11/armed-but-not-necessarily-dangerous/>)

**With nearly 90 guns per 100 people** according to the [2007 Small Arms Survey](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2007.html), **America has by far the most robust gun culture on the planet and one of the world’s highest rates of gun crime to go along with it. Looking at the next nine countries on that list, however, reveals a very mixed bag. How is it that the world’s most gun-crazy countries include some of the most dangerous and the safest? YEMEN: Guns per 100 residents: 54.8** (All figures: [Small Arms Survey 2007](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2007.html)) The culture: Despite [new laws](http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/yemeni-officials-look-to-new-gun-laws) in 2005 and 2007 that required guns to be registered and banned them from being carried openly in public, firearms remain a way of life in Yemen. Even with the law, it’s still [not unusual](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B73FJ20101208) for Yemeni men to tote AK-47s, pistols, and hunting rifles around town. Bursts of celebratory gunfire are de rigueur at weddings and social events. Kalashnikovs can typically be purchased at open-air markets for between $500 and $1,500 depending on quality; harder stuff, such as rocket-propelled grenades, can be obtained easily with the right connections. **An estimated 2,000 Yemenis lose their lives every year in gun-related incidents, a disturbingly high number for a country its size.** The engrained gun culture perpetuates tribal violence that has been a major source of the instability that plagues Yemen. The country ranks 15th on Foreign Policy‘s [Failed States Index](https://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings) and is considered a terrorist safe-haven by the United States. Because of the large number of unregistered weapons in Yemen, Small Arms Survey’s numbers are probably on the low end. [Some estimates](http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/yemeni-officials-look-to-new-gun-laws) put the number of guns in Yemen at around two to three per person. Unfortunately, U.S. military assistance to the country [hasn’t exactly helped matters](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA05Ak03.html).SWITZERLAND: Guns per 100 residents: 45.7 The culture: **Switzerland, which requires many of its citizens to own automatic rifles, but has one of the world’s lowest violent crime rates,** is a [favorite example](http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?ID=72) of U.S. gun-rights advocates.

**1NC Small Arms Human Rights Frontline**

1. **There are too many small arms too easily accessible for the plan to matter**

**Frey 2004** (Barbara, Peace Palace Library, Small Arms and Light Weapons, the tools ued to violate human rights, <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art2140.pdf> )

**The availability,** transfer and misuse **of small arms have dramatic adverse consequences on human rights.** Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children are killed or injured each year by small arms and light weapons. **The estimated number of firearms in circulation in the world is 640 million.**1 **It is likely that the actual global stockpile of small arms is even greater.** While **small arms proliferation is not a new phenomenon, in the era of globalization there is growing concern that more guns are getting into more hands with fewer restraints.** In today’s world, small arms—including **military-style weapons—are available to almost anyone who has the will to obtain them.** These weapons, which are cheap, easy to transport and easy to operate, are used to violate human rights in every corner of the globe. A single weapon, misused, can change the fate of an individual, a family or even an entire community. A flood of small arms can shift the entire balance of power in a community, leading to a lack of personal security that destroys the rule of law.

1. **There are too many guns in the world, sales don’t matter**

**Peters 2009 (**Rebecca, UN Chronicle, Small Arms: No Single Solution, <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/small-arms-no-single-solution> )

A thousand people die each day from gunshot wounds, and three times as many are left with severe injuries. If the death, injury and disability resulting from small arms were categorized as a disease, it would qualify as an epidemic. Yet the media and popular perception tend to suggest that **gun violence is simply an unavoidable consequence of human cruelty** or deprivation, rather than a public health problem which can be prevented or at least reduced. **The circumstances of gun violence vary so enormously, it would be simplistic to suggest a single solution. A comprehensive approach, reflecting the multi-faceted nature of the problem, is needed to bring down the grim toll of global death and injury.** Nonetheless, the high school massacres in the US, the armed gangs in Brazil or the systematic sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo all share a common denominator: the availability of guns (or small arms, as they are known in UN circles). Practical steps toward reducing the availability and misuse of small arms can be classed under four headings: 1. Reducing the existing stockpile2. Reducing the supply of new weapons, 3. Closing the gates between the legal and illegal markets, 4. Reducing the motivation for acquiring guns (demand) **The existing global small arms stockpile is huge -- at least 875 million guns,** according to the Small Arms Survey in Geneva. Less than 25 per cent of these are in the possession of armies, police or other government agencies; the remaining three-quarters are in the hands of civilians. **Guns on earth outnumber cars by about 40 per cent.** How can we reduce this enormous pool of weapons?

**1NC Small Arms Global Violence Frontline**

1. **The arms sales aren’t making the world more violent, and most of the weapons in question aren’t coming from the US**

**Carafano 2012 (**James, Heritage Foundation, Sept. 10th, Arms Sales and False Alarms, [https://www.heritage.org/arms-control/commentary/arms-sales-and-false-alarms )](https://www.heritage.org/arms-control/commentary/arms-sales-and-false-alarms)

**There is a problem with implying that the United States is fueling warfare in the Third World: there isn’t much evidence to support that suggestion.** Indeed, **the world is actually getting less—not more—violent.** The Human Security Project, a research center affiliated with Simon Fraser University (SFU) in Vancouver, Canada, tracks global trends in political violence. Its 2010 report concluded that various **“forces and political developments . . . have driven down the number of international conflicts and war deaths** since the 1950s, and the number of civil wars since the early 1990s.” A one-year bump in U.S. overseas arms sales is hardly likely to change that trend—especially when that bump is more a statistical blip than real. **Further the “developing nations” receiving the most arms from all exporting countries** are Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, the UAE and Venezuela. Saudi Arabia, India and the UAE are hardly powers wreaking havoc throughout the Third World. And while Pakistan and Venezuela may be regarded as more problematic, it’s worth noting that they **are supplied in large part by China and Russia, not the United States.**

1. **The US destroys millions of weapons each year**

**Stohl and Hogendoorn 2010 (**Rachel and EJ, March, Center for American Progress, Stopping the spread of destructive small arms, [https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/small\_arms.p](https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/small_arms.pdf)df

**The cornerstone of U.S. small arms policy is its focus on practical steps to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms worldwide. The United States operates the world’s largest small arms assistance program, which provides technical and financial assistance to help countries around the world destroy surplus and obsolete weapons and safeguard weapons in government arsenals.** The destruction program is run by the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. Since 2001 the United States has spent over $27 million to destroy more than 1.3 million weapons and more than 50,000 tons of ammunition in 36 countries. It has also helped destroy more than 30,000 man-portable air defense systems in 29 countries.139 In FY 2009 $24.4 million was spent on the weapons destruction programs and $75 million has been appropriated for FY 2010. The Physical Security and Stockpile Management program is run by the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or DTRA. The program has secured stockpiles in more than 37 countries, conducted 38 assessments, and held 30 seminars.140 The Weapons Removal and Abatement and DTRA programs work together to maximize resources and often conduct joint evaluations and assessments to best recommend appropriate strategies and options.

**1NC Small Arms Global Violence Frontline**

1. **The US needs to be able to transfer weapons to fight terrorism**

**Stohl and Hogendoorn 2010 (**Rachel and EJ, March, Center for American Progress, Stopping the spread of destructive small arms, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/small_arms.pdf>

**The U.S. position on and attitude toward small arms is also shaped by the political context, which is currently influenced by the economic crisis, the war on terrorism, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan**. To date the Obama administration’s primary focus is on nuclear issues, with the one small-arms-focused policy statement coming in the form of Obama’s support for U.S. ratification of the OAS Convention. The United States also has economic interests in the small arms trade: **A key strategy of both the “global war on terror” and economic recovery has been ensuring that U.S. allies are able to acquire U.S. weapons as quickly as possible.** Even though arms constitute only a small part of total U.S. arms exports, the defense industry has made the claim, and Congress and the administration have accepted it, that arms exports are good for U.S. jobs and the economy.

1. **Trump would lash out in a major war in response to a terrorist attack**

**Politico 2016 (**Politico Magazine, March 31st, 9/11 What Would Trump Do? <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784>)

It’s the totally unthinkable question that Americans find themselves confronting this week: **What would President Donald Trump do in a genuine national crisis?** After a series of overseas terror attacks and some startling statements about nuclear weapons and torture, the world’s attention has turned to Trump’s foreign policy—an area where **he has few advisers, no experience and a tendency to fire off answers and deal with the fallout later.** The reality of a Trump candidacy has begun to set in: If Trump is elected and a major national crisis hits, he’ll be the one with his hands on the button. He’ll be at the head of the table in the Situation Room. His decisions would steer America’s immediate response and could set the course of American policy for years. What’s hard to project with a normal politician is nearly impossible to guess with Trump. He has no foreign policy or public service experience, which means there’s no official record to consult, and his public statements, while extreme, have been vague. **The saber-rattling statements that excite his supporters also suggest he has disregard for linchpins of the global order** like NATO, the Geneva Conventions and the hard-won global nuclear-weapons limits. Politico Magazine asked foreign policy and counterterrorism experts, historians, Trump biographers, even psychologists to take a serious guess at how he’d handle the days after a terrorist attack in the United States—all based on what they know about Trump the candidate and what he’ll be facing if he gets elected. The responses were at times surprising, and at times unsettling. Some focused on Trump’s apparent hesitancy about sending troops into combat, and predicted he’d act more like President Barack Obama than President George W. Bush. Others looked at his immigration rhetoric and foresaw a country newly divided, with patrols stalking Muslim neighborhoods and religious hatreds bubbling to the surface. **One biographer, familiar with Trump’s primal response to any perceived insult, drew a frightening picture of a quickly escalating set of attacks and responses, with major cities caught in the crossfire.** But, then again, another predicted that Trump would simply withdraw to his Twitter account, riding out the threat with a lot of talk and little action.

**1NC Small Arms Global Violence Frontline**

1. **Trump would lash out and repress political and social freedoms in the face of a terrorist attack**

**Stout 2016 (**Martha, Psychologist, Politico Magazine, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784> )

As a psychologist who has spent her career studying human personality and its variations, I can tell you that personalities don’t have an off switch, not even for dire emergencies. If we suffered another brutal terrorist attack, I fear that President **Trump would exhibit the same bombast, rage and impulsivity that he has shown in the campaign trail and imperil his fellow human beings**, perhaps with even more lasting effects than those of the disaster itself. **The personality that underlies Trump’s observable behaviors**—a demeanor of personal superiority, a focus on being admired, immediate heated anger when challenged, an emphasis on unlimited success, and an apparent expectation of automatic compliance—**would be problematic in a U.S. president at any time, and plainly dangerous should our nation experience another terrorist atrocity.** A president with such a personality would experience a large terrorist event as an attack on him personally, an enormous “narcissistic injury”—what psychologists call a perceived threat to self-worth—and **his rage would be white-hot.** The anger we have seen directed at protesters during Trump rallies would be multiplied by an unknowable factor. That whisper in the ear from an aide, telling him that **an event** had occurred, **would instantly evoke a need for reprisal, a desire to attack and to do so right away, using airstrikes, boots on the ground, torture in interrogations and any other “powerful” tactic that occurred to him.** If there is a positive thread in this psychologically predicted scenario, it is that such a huge perceived injury to Trump’s sense of self-worth would compel him to focus utterly on the source of that injury. **He would be single-mindedly intent on destroying the terrorists** and would have no tolerance for those who might wish to refashion the country’s pain and anger into a willingness to attack a different target. In the aftermath of our waking nightmare in 2001, we might have benefited from some portion of that single-mindedness. Still, with a President Trump, the surge of bigotry and the resulting deportation and internment efforts would do their own inestimable damage. Given a re-terrorized nation, Trump’s famous skill at gaining allegiance from people through their heightened fears might very well sway Congress and result in the actual implementation of some of his ideas: **a wholesale military response, a lockdown of Muslim communities, and attempts to deport large groups of people. With an unapologetically self-involved and rage-prone commander-in-chief—which is what we evidently would be getting with a President Trump—nothing would be off the table.**

**1NC Small Arms Impact Framing Frontline**

1. **You should prefer large impacts to small ones--we don’t think about or evaluate these large impacts effectively**

**Bostrom 2013 (**Nick, Oxford, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, Global Policy, Vol 4, Issue 1, <https://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html> )

**Mitigation of existential risk is hampered by a lack of understanding, but also by a deficit of motivation. Existential risk mitigation is a global public good** (i.e., non-excludable and non-rivalrous), and economic theory suggests that such goods tend to be undersupplied by the market, since each producer of existential safety (even if the producer is a large nation) could capture only a small portion of the value (Feldman 1980; Kaul 1999). In fact, the situation is worse than is the case with many other global public goods in that **existential risk reduction is a strongly *transgenerational*** (in fact, pan-generational) **public good:** even a world state may capture only a small fraction of the benefits — those accruing to currently existing people. **The quadrillions of happy people who may come to exist in the future if we avoid existential catastrophe would be willing to pay the present generation astronomical sums in return for a slight increase in our efforts to preserve humanity's future, but the mutually beneficial trade is unfortunately prevented by the obvious transaction difficulties.** Moral motivations, too, may fail to measure up to the magnitude of what is at stake. The scope insensitivity of our moral sentiments is likely to be especially pronounced when very large numbers are involved: **Substantially larger numbers,** such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, **seem to trigger a different mode of thinking—enter into a "separate magisterium." People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really deserve to survive."** (Yudkowsky 2008, p. 114)

**1NC Small Arms Offense Frontline**

1. **The alternative to arms sales is sending troops which is more likely to result in entrapment and is more politically risky.**

**Thrall and Dorminey 2018 (**Trevor, George Mason University, and Caroline, Cato Institute, 3/13, Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 836, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy> )

Arms sales remain attractive to presidents for three main reasons. First, **arms sales are less risky than sending American troops, providing explicit security guarantees to other nations, or initiating direct military intervention,** even long distance.43 **In cases where allies or partners are likely to engage in conflicts with their neighbors, providing weapons rather than stationing troops abroad can lessen the risk of American entrapment in crises or conflicts.** Taiwan is an example of this sort of arms-for-troops substitution. On the other hand, in instances where the United States has an interest in conflicts already underway, **arms sales can be used in attempts to achieve military objectives without putting American soldiers** (or at least putting fewer of them) **in harm’s way.** This tactic has been a central element of the American war on terror, with sales (and outright transfers) of weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to support the fight against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS, as well as to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen.44 In both situations **the reduction of military risk, in particular the risk of American casualties, also helps reduce the political risk.** Presidents who would otherwise abstain from supporting a nation if it entailed sending American troops can sell arms to that country without the political fallout that sending America troops abroad would incur.

1. **The US uses arms sale to gain access to military bases.**

**Thrall and Dorminey 2018** Trevor, George Mason University, and Caroline, Cato Institute, 3/13, Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 836, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>

**The United States has used arms sales to try to encourage states to** vote with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro-Western and pro-U.S. foreign policies, to convince Egypt and Israel to accept peace accords, and to **gain access to military bases in places such as Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and the Philippines.** After the Cold War, the United States also sought to tie arms transfers to human rights and democratization efforts in client states.42

**1NC Small Arms Offense Frontline**

1. **Bases are a key element of supporting US military and diplomatic efforts across the world**

**Atlantic Council 2005 (**Global Futures and Implications for US Basing, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/global-futures-and-implications-for-us-basing> )

**To maintain U. S. security in an increasingly globalized world will require the effective use of all elements of national power. Bases can be important for military reasons, but, if properly utilized, they have significant diplomatic value as well and can support U. S. informational and even economic goals.** Given the unpredictability of future challenges and difficulties the United States will face, maintaining a flexible base network will be extremely valuable to overall U. S. national security strategy. Building Trust and Promoting Common Interests In order to maintain access to existing bases and gain options for new bases, the United States will need to commit substantial resources to promoting common interests and building trust with existing and new partners. We cannot assume that “if we need it, we can get it” in terms of future operating bases. Common interests develop from common understandings and a willingness to act in concert on common problems. Developing the ability to act together requires a wide range of formal and informal efforts that include regular information exchanges and consultation before action is taken that will affect a partner’s interests. Countries will act in their interests but how they see those interests is subject to development over time.

1. **Arms sales can be used as bargaining chips.**

**Thrall and Dorminey 2018**

Trevor, George Mason University, and Caroline, Cato Institute, 3/13, Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 836, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>

Second, **arms sales are an extremely flexible tool of statecraft.** **In contrast to the blunt nature of military intervention, or the long-term commitment and convoluted politics that treaties involve, arms sales can take any form from small to large and can take place on a one-time or ongoing basis;** they can be ramped up or down and started or stopped relatively quickly, depending on the circumstances. **Selling arms to one nation, moreover, does not prohibit the United States from selling arms to any other nation. And thanks to their capacity and prestige, American weapons serve as useful bargaining chips in all sorts of negotiations** between the United States and recipient nations.4

**1NC Small Arms Offense Frontline**

1. **New rules will allow the US to expand its share of small arms sales**

**Mays and Whitten 2019** Lisa and Reid, 1/9, National Defense Magazine, US to Streamline Small Arms, Ammo Export Regulations, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/9/viewpoint-u-s-to-streamline-small-arms-ammo-export-regulations>

The proposed rule acknowledges that **there is a significant worldwide market for firearms** in connection with civil and recreational activities such as hunting, marksmanship, competitive shooting and other non-military activities; and that the proposed changes burden U.S. industry without any proportionate benefits to national security or foreign policy objectives. **American gun and ammunition manufacturers will have an increased capacity to reach a larger customer base without as many restrictions on the export of their products.** U.S. firearm manufacturers and exporters will likely see a reduction in export compliance administrative burden. **Arms sales from the United States will likely grow, and the nation will likely continue to hold and expand its share of the international small arms market.**

1. **Existing Sanctions on Russia have pushed their market to the brink**

**Peck 2019** Michael, National Interest, Guess Who’s Hurt by US Sanctions, Russia’s Gun Makers, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/guess-who%E2%80%99s-hurt-us-sanctions-russia%E2%80%99s-gun-makers-46537>

Now, one Rostec director complains that **the United States is buying such ammunition from China and Bulgaria.** “Americans are cynical businessmen,” said Sergey Abramov. “**They until recently bought our ammunition,** because it is the cheapest. **Now,** taking into account **the active U.S. policy of creating an unfavorable business environment for Russian enterprises, of course, they have closed their market**. In addition, Russian lawmakers have blasted a 2017 U.S. Special Operations Command project that called for American manufacturers [to copy](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/heres-why-us-special-forces-want-russian-machine-guns-20642) Russian small arms and ammunition, which could then be provided to foreign armies and militias accustomed to using Russian and Soviet weapons.**The loss of the U.S. market has plunged the Russian small arms industry into crisis** and led to calls for the industry to reorganize.

**1NC Small Arms Offense Frontline**

1. **Russia can’t modernize its military because they are broke due to US arms sales dominance.**

**Stratfor 2019 (**May 2, Business Insider, Russia is one of the world’s biggest weapons dealers, but its defense industry in headed for trouble, <https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-defense-industry-faces-problems-hurting-military-modernization-2019-5>

**The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military,** **but** [**the country's defense industry is struggling**](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-procurement-plans-reflect-militarys-modernization-struggles-putin) **thanks to decreasing volumes of orders**, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5% less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48% year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that **Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering from a dearth of funds** This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. **Under pressure from a limited government budget,** [**the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending**](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-defense-cuts-mean-russias-military) **in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions.** Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and [Western sanctions](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/sanctions-will-widen-russia-west-rift-2019) over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. **In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development.**

**1NC Small Arms Offense Frontline**

1. **The U.S. is selling small arms to the Ukraine now to help them resist Russian invasion**

**Carpenter 2018** Ted Galen, The American Conservative, Sept. 10th, Washington Quietly increases lethal weapons to Ukraine, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/washington-quietly-increases-lethal-weapons-to-ukraine/>

Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledges that U.S. instructors are [training Ukrainian military units](https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1431947/us-troops-training-ukrainian-soldiers-mattis-says/) at a base in western Ukraine. **Washington also has approved two important arms sales to Kiev’s ground forces in just the past nine months.** The first transaction in December 2017 was **limited to small arms** that at least could be portrayed as purely defensive weapons. That agreement included the export of Model M107A1 Sniper Systems, **ammunition, and associated parts** and accessories, a sale valued at $41.5 million. A transaction in April 2018 was more serious. Not only was it larger [($47 million)](https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-announces-sale-anti-tank-missiles-ukraine-russian/story?id=53450406), it included far more lethal weaponry, particularly [210 Javelin anti-tank missiles](https://www.rferl.org/a/javelin-missile-delivery-ukraine-us-confirmed/29200588.html)—the kind of weapons that Barack Obama’s administration had declined to give Kiev. Needless to say, the Kremlin [was not pleased](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-issues-stern-warning-us-is-fueling-new-bloodshed-in-ukraine/2017/12/23/7e90f78a-40bf-4967-95f0-af840a23ec63_story.html?utm_term=.d3217d74b629) about either sale. Moreover, Congress soon passed legislation in May that authorized $250 million in military assistance, including lethal weaponry, to Ukraine in 2019. Congress had twice voted for military support on a similar scale during the last years of Obama’s administration, but the White House blocked implementation. The Trump administration cleared that obstacle out of the way in December 2017 at the same time that it approved the initial small-weapons sale.

1. **And strengthening the Ukrainian army is necessary to prevent russian aggression across Europe**

**Soltys 2019 (**Dennis, Feb 22nd, The Atlantic Council, Is the Ukrainian Army Worthy of Greater Investment? <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-the-ukrainian-army-worthy-of-greater-investment> )

In a word, yes. With a total of 250,000 personnel, **Ukraine’s army is a strong fighting force, the third largest in Europe** after the Russian and French militaries. Most military experts agree that the Ukrainian army could impose high costs on Russia in a defensive war. Simultaneously, however—and more important—**Ukraine’s military is a “people’s army,” one that has the backing of civil society and is the most trusted institution.** In many ways, it serves as a bridge between government and the public—**and it is helping to keep the peace throughout Europe.**