**Background:**

China is one of the world’s oldest and largest nations. The exact borders of the nation, however, have varied greatly over the last few centuries. At the end of the 19th century (1800s), the last Chinese dynasty (Qing) collapsed, and many fought for control of the wreckage. The two most powerful groups fighting for domination were the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong, and Chiang Kia-Shek, the leader of the nominally democratic Koumintang Party.

Chiang largely succeeded in uniting China’s urban centers under his rule, but fought a series of incredibly bloody battles with warlords from the interior intent on resisting his rule, resulting in more than 3 million casualties. Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong led his supporters on the “Long March” across the nation in retreat from Chiang’s forces.

As Chiang consolidated his rule, World War Two began, and the Japanese invaded.  Japan, with a more modern army, thought they could over-run China in 3 months and knock them out of the war before pivoting towards the United States. While Chiang kept losing battles, the Chinese Republic doggedly refused to surrender.

After Pearl Harbor, the Chinese Republic became an ally of the United States against Japan. The U.S. supported the Chinese Republic with arms and advisors, hoping to create a second front against the Japanese. Chinese Communists also pivoted to fight the Japanese invaders, retreating to northwestern China, where the Soviet Union could supply them with weapons and supplies.

After the Allied Forces defeated the Japanese, the civil war in China resumed. The Communists emerged comparatively stronger than the Chinese Republic from the war, and defeated Chiang in a series of battles. On Oct. 1st, 1949, fled with more than 3 million supporters to the island of Taiwan. Chiang proclaimed Taiwan as the temporary capital of the Chinese Republic, while Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on the mainland.

This separation has continued to this day. The Republic of China, known as Taiwan, is a mixture of Chinese Koumintang refugees and the local Taiwanese and is a western-style democracy. The People’s Republic of China on the mainland is a post-communist single party state that claims Taiwan as part of its traditional lands. No formal peace agreement has been signed, as China still regards Taiwan as a rebel province, though no formal hostilities have occurred since the 1950s.

The United States remains a vigorous supporter of Taiwan, originally as a defense against the expansion of Communism, but now as a check on the regional leadership of China. The United States has long supplied the Republic of China (Taiwan) with weapons to deter an invasion by mainland China, and has made extensive “security guarantees,” or promises to come help in times of crisis.

**Strategy Guide:**

As China has modernized, the People’s Republic (mainland China) has become stronger and more powerful than its island bound neighbor/rebel province (Taiwan, the Republic of China). Taiwan is frustrated with the status quo, and wants independence. The province would have been reunited by force many years ago, except the United States has extensive security guarantees (and arms sales) to the Republic of China (Taiwan). The threat of escalating the conflict to include the United States has deterred China from outward hostility.

Inherency: The Trump administration is selling arms to Taiwan, including offensive weapons such as the F-35 fighter plane and key missile defense systems. This is giving Taiwan’s leaders the confidence to push for formal independence.

Plan: The U.S. should stop selling arms to Taiwan

Advantage: Taiwan Independence: Pushing for Taiwanese independence causes conflict with China, which escalates to a major war, pulling in the United States.

Advantage: US-Chinese Relations: Taiwan arm sales kills US Chinese relations. US concessions on Taiwan encourages other diplomatic breakthroughs:

North Korea

Disease

Warming

Solvency: China will see the plan as an attempt to reduce tensions

**Sample 1AC (1/17): Inherency**

**Taiwan’s leaders are pushing towards independence now, feeling secure because of U.S. Arm Sales. This makes conflict with China inevitable.**

**Carpenter 2019**

**Ted, Cato Institute, 5/30/19** “Is America Prodding Taiwan Towards Conflict With China?,” <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-america-prodding-taiwan-towards-conflict-with-china/>

**For decades, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has reflected a desire to perpetuate the island’s de facto independence while not unduly agitating the People’s Republic of China.** Under these conditions, Washington depends on the Chinese government (PRC) to refrain from adopting coercive measures (especially military actions) aimed at forcing the island to reunify with the mainland. In return, Taiwanese authorities are expected not to push for formal, internationally recognized independence. For its part, the United States has tried to balance two difficult objectives—reassuring Taipei of its own protection while at the same time not antagonizing Beijing. Joseph Nye, an assistant secretary of defense during Bill Clinton’s administration, described the approach as one of “strategic ambiguity.” Although Washington has an implied commitment in the 1999 Taiwan Relations Act to defend Taiwan against aggression, Nye and other officials have indicated that the commitment is not unconditional, especially if Taiwanese leaders provoke Beijing by pursuing formal independence. The U.S. approach has worked reasonably well, despite some occasional tense moments. **But there are now multiple signs of trouble in China, Taiwan, and the United States. Xi Jinping’s government is adopting an increasingly aggressive strategy toward Taiwan**, both diplomatically and militarily. And **the victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party** (DPP) **in Taiwan’s 2016 elections dashed Chinese hopes that proliferating economic ties with the mainland might gradually condition the Taiwanese people to accept political reunification.** Angry at the apparent failure of that strategy, Beijing increased Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation by luring away the handful of small nations that still maintain formal relations with Taipei. The PRC’s saber rattling has also increased. Both the number and size of Chinese military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait have soared over the past two years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 report to Congress concludes that Beijing is building up its ground, air, and naval forces to achieve a more robust capability to invade Taiwan. Taiwanese officials and outside experts see signs that Beijing may be preparing for an invasion as early as 2020 or 2021. Taipei also contends that Chinese intelligence infiltration attempts have markedly accelerated. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, **the Taiwanese government has** firmly rebuffed Beijing’s bullying behavior. It has also **sought to assert its own separate international identity,** pursuing territorial claims in the South China Sea and maximizing its influence as a significant player in the global economic system. **The government has sought and received new weapons shipments from the United States.** Nevertheless, Tsai has proceeded more cautiously on the independence issue than did the last DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, who served from 2000 to 2008. This caution has led to a revolt by hardliners within her own party. Following the DPP’s disappointing showing in local elections, they forced her to resign as party chair. She also faces a strong challenge from her one-time prime minister, William Lai, who is competing with her for the DPP’s nomination in the party’s upcoming primary. Washington has reason to worry that Lai would be another Chen Shui-bian—**a loose cannon regarding relations with the mainland.** Lai has sharply criticized Tsai for ineffectual leadership and is taking a markedly more pro-independence stance. He refuses to consider Beijing’s offer of a “special status” for Taiwan—acceptance of official reunification, but with Taiwan enjoying political autonomy akin to that of Hong Kong—noting that Beijing has gradually eroded Hong Kong’s autonomy. **Some DPP activists are** even more **adamant about the need for full, formal independence**, and have voiced **extreme impatience with Tsai** for her unwillingness to take a stronger stand on the issue. The most assertive factions are pushing for a referendum on Taiwan officially becoming an independent country. But while U.S. leaders might worry about reckless Taiwanese behavior, Washington’s own political trends are pointing towards an abandonment of strategic ambiguity and the adoption of a more hardline stance. Anger at Beijing’s bullying of Taiwan is rising within the Trump administration and even more so in Congress. That sentiment has led to a series of efforts to strengthen Washington’s backing for Taipei. A major step occurred in March 2018 when President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages high-level U.S. officials to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts. That legislation, which passed both houses of Congress overwhelmingly, ended Washington’s practice under the Taiwan Relations Act of holding meetings only with relatively low-level Taiwanese officials. It was especially noticeable that the TTA specifically promoted interactions by “cabinet-level national security officials.” Since then, the demonstrations of U.S. support for Taiwan’s security have multiplied. The United States invited two senior Taiwanese military officials to participate in a May 2018 ceremony at U.S. Pacific Command. American warships have transited the Taiwan Strait on several occasions over the past year. **In September 2018, the administration approved another $330 million arms sale to Taiwan, over China’s strenuous objections.** Congress also is stepping up its support. By a unanimous voice vote in early May 2019, the U.S. House passed the Taiwan Assurance Act, which expresses firm support for Taiwan while urging Taipei to increase its own defense spending. The legislation also emphasizes that Washington should continue “regular sales of defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation in international organizations—something Beijing strongly resists. The House passed a companion resolution affirming continuing U.S. support for Taiwan by a vote of 414 to 0. **It might be tempting to dismiss all these increasingly provocative gestures as little more than posturing.** And there is a considerable amount of that, especially with the largely symbolic congressional measures. **But the adoption of hardline rhetoric tends to lock leaders into positions that can prove difficult to abandon** later on. Moreover, some of the developments are quite substantive. The buildup of Chinese military forces is difficult to ignore, as is Beijing’s continuing campaign to poach Taipei’s remaining allies and isolate Taiwan diplomatically. The growing strength of staunchly pro-independence figures in Taiwan also has very real potential to cause trouble. And the congressional push to prod the White House into showing greater U.S. support for Taiwan will make it difficult for America to adopt a more restrained policy. **Taken alone, any one of these developments might not be all that worrisome, but taken together they constitute an ominous trend.** While attention is (understandably) focused on such matters as the turmoil in Venezuela, the growing tensions between the United States and Iran, and the emerging U.S.-China trade war, **the Taiwan issue is simmering**. At a minimum, U.S. leaders need to take a more sober look at what level of risk they are willing to incur to support Taiwan if this confrontation grows worse.

**Sample 1AC (3/17): Advantage One: Taiwan Independence**

**Taiwan’s push for independence is unacceptable for China, causing an immediate crisis that will draw in the U.S. and escalate to nuclear war. Deterrence doesn’t apply to Taiwan**

**Glaser 2011**

Charles, George Washington University, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war>

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, **China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence,** and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. **Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China**--whatever they might formally agree to**--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship,** placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. **A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved.** Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, **the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan** against any sort of attack, **no matter how it originated**. **Given** the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and **the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.** Such dangers have been around for decades, but **ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis.** In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. **China's nuclear modernization might** remove that check on Chinese action, **lead**ing **Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises** than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

**Sample 1AC (4/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Upcoming approval of Taiwan arms sales *ensures* a major breakdown in US-Sino relations**

**Lopez 2019**

Linette, 6/11/19,Business Insider, “Forget the trade war — a bigger conflict between the US and China is playing out right under our noses,” <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-bigger-threat-to-us-china-relations?module=topTout&area=links>

**The world has its eye on the trade war between the US and China, but a more dangerous confrontation between the two nations is playing out in the background: the worsening disagreement over the "One China" policy.** Last week, Reuters reported that **Washington was on its way to approving $2 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan. The move indicates** the Trump administration isn't trying to create an atmosphere conducive to trade negotiations and suggests **that disputes between the US and China are more likely headed toward escalation than resolution. "Taiwan is the thing the Chinese care most about hands down,"** said Susan Thornton, a former assistant US secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. **"Anything where the US is interfering with Taiwan hits a national third rail."** The One China policy — under which the US acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is not an independent nation but rather a part of China, without taking a side — was developed during the Nixon administration to improve US-China relations. **The idea is central to China's identity as a modern world power, and since President Donald Trump took office the US has challenged that notion repeatedly.** Despite protests from Beijing, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, legislation permitting high-level talks between US and Taiwanese officials, last year. In May, the US national security adviser, John Bolton, met with David Lee, one of Taiwan's top security officials. This meeting came just after Taiwan renamed its unofficial embassy in Washington the Taiwan Council for US Affairs. The old name, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, neglected to mention Taiwan or the US. **The Trump administration has also sold arms to Taiwan before, as have previous administrations, but this $2 billion arms sale digs at a delicate wound during a delicate time. It's a big sale,** even in a world where weapons are becoming more and more expensive. **And though it does not include the US's top fighter jets, it is sure to antagonize Beijing** before the G20 meeting at the end of the month in Osaka, Japan, where US and Chinese heads of state are expected to meet. On Thursday, **a Chinese Foreign Ministry representative,** Geng Shuang, **responded** to the news of the arms sale **with a warning,** according to the Chinese state media outlet Xinhua. **"We urge the US side to stop arms sales to Taiwan** and sever their military ties, prudently and properly handle Taiwan-related issues, **to avoid serious damage to China-US relations** as well as to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait," Geng said.

**Sample 1AC (5/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Taiwan outweighs trade and all other issues when it comes to US-Chinese relations. Messing with Taiwan would eliminate diplomatic ties.**

**Bloomberg 2018**

“Trade wars aside, Trump's 'Taiwan card' is China's real worry,” 3-14, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/14/asia-pacific/trade-wars-aside-trumps-taiwan-card-chinas-real-worry/#.XLlur-hKg2w>

Forget steel and intellectual property. **The biggest potential flashpoint between** U.S. President Donald **Trump and** Chinese President **Xi Jinping is** an island of 23 million people sitting off China’s coast **[Taiwan]. Even as global investors shift from worrying about a second Korean conflict to a potential China-U.S. trade war, decades-old disagreements over democratically run Taiwan are simmering. For China, at least, that is a more serious concern. “Compared with economic and trade issues, the Taiwan issue is a top priority for Beijing and is more politically sensitive,”** said Fu-Kuo Liu, an international relations professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei. “The U.S. will measure relations with Taiwan based on its national interest, and Taiwan will be a pawn to Beijing.” The dispute centers on Taiwan’s 70-year slide into diplomatic isolation after ending up on the losing side of the Chinese civil war. While the island is self-ruled and enjoys American military protection, **China considers Taiwan a province and has made acceptance of its “one-China” claim a precondition for diplomatic ties — including with the U.S. On trade, China has sought to maintain what it calls “strategic composure” as Trump escalates his threats,** launching a probe of U.S. grain imports while warning against a trade war. Trump’s planned tariffs on steel and aluminum would apply to a variety of countries, not just China, which accounts for a relatively small portion of American imports. Indeed, Taiwan faces a bigger hit. **But challenging Xi on Taiwan — a central focus of his “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation — would be another matter.** Trump’s firing of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, a former Exxon Mobil Corp. chief executive officer with many years of China experience, adds more uncertainty to the issue. His nominee for the role, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, warned just days ago of the “Chinese threat” to U.S. interests, although he hasn’t said much recently on Taiwan. Some U.S. national security hawks have long advocated greater Taiwan ties as a bulwark against China. Although Trump signaled he might try that strategy — holding an unprecedented December 2016 phone call with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen — he later reaffirmed support for the one-China principle while seeking Xi’s cooperation on North Korea. Now a series of moves in Beijing, Taipei and Washington are threatening to bring the Taiwan question back to the fore. One Chinese official in Beijing said there was concern that Trump could play the “Taiwan card” and that the government was prepared to take a strong stand against any U.S. moves on the issue. **Tensions have been steadily rising since Taiwan’s 2016 election, which replaced a China-friendly government with one run by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.** Tsai has angered China by refusing to endorse the one-China framework while offering to sign a U.S. free trade deal and buy more advanced American arms. In response, China has ratcheted up pressure on Tsai, picking off Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies and launching regular “encirclement patrols” with military jets around its airspace. China’s decision Sunday to remove presidential term limits gives Xi even more incentive to see through his pledge for Taiwan’s “peaceful reunification.”

**Sample 1AC (6/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**And escalation is likely: Trump will want to use Taiwan as leverage in his trade war**

**Bloomberg 2018**

“Trade wars aside, Trump's 'Taiwan card' is China's real worry,” 3-14, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/14/asia-pacific/trade-wars-aside-trumps-taiwan-card-chinas-real-worry/#.XLlur-hKg2w>

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s allies in the U.S. Congress have pressed for greater support, passing legislation last month allowing for diplomatic exchanges with Taiwan “at all levels,” specifically citing “Cabinet-level national security officials.” Signing the bill and holding such visits would signal whether Trump intends to test China on Taiwan. **He could grant Taiwanese requests to buy advanced weapons** such as Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 fighter jets. While **such moves risk provoking a confrontation** with China, **Trump has shown a willingness to use available leverage in showdowns** over North Korea, health care and immigration. **And he will need to apply a lot of pressure, if he expects China to cut anywhere near $100 billion from its $375 billion trade surplus with U.S. “Taiwan is a diplomatic card for Trump to play when he needs to annoy China,”** said Cheng Yu-Chin, director of the EU-China Economics & Politics Institute in Prague. “In the future, Taiwan will suffer even more as it gets caught in the middle between a stronger China and an inward-looking U.S.” National security policy documents published by the Trump administration have described China as a “strategic competitor” and urged greater efforts to support allies in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. provides military support to the island under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. A stronger line on Taiwan might also find supporters among congressional Republicans. Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton — a vocal Trump ally — has criticized China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan and said after the Taiwan Travel Act’s passage last month that “only U.S. leadership can push back against this aggression.” **China has signaled it will have little patience with the U.S. if it attempts to upgrade its relationship with Taiwan**. In December, a senior Chinese diplomat in Washington warned that China would “unify” the island by military force if a U.S. warship made a port call there. Zhou Qi, director of the Institute of American Studies at the state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said **any effort to play the Taiwan card would backfire on the U.S. “To the Chinese government, Taiwan is the primary issue in U.S.-China relations,”** Zhou said. **“And it can’t be used as a bargaining chip in trade talks.”**

**Sample 1AC (7/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**First: North Korea**

**US concessions on Taiwan makes diplomacy on North Korea possible: their evidence doesn’t assume US strategic adjustments on Taiwan.**

**Sung-han 2018**

Kim, UT-Austin, “US-China Rivalry and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” 8-31, <http://www.theasanforum.org/us-china-rivalry-and-the-future-of-the-korean-peninsula/>

**US-China cooperation is** supposed to be **the essential part of the strategy of inducing North Korea toward the path of denuclearization. North Korea would be highly tempted to try to balance one against the other as long as the United States and China continue their strategic competition** and link the North Korean issue to it. In particular, **China has been looking at North Korea through this lens, which means the North Korean nuclear issue is not to be isolated from other regional strategic issues such as Taiwan** and the East and South China seas. **China is likely to keep North Korea as a “strategic buffer” unless the United States makes a “concession” on those regional strategic issues.** China has already been opening the backdoor for North Korea by loosening its sanctions since Kim Jong-un met with Donald Trump in Singapore.9

**The North Korea threat is real, significant, and rising due to inexperience and technological progress.**

**Warrick 2017**

Joby, “As North Korea’s arsenal grows, experts see heightened risk of ‘miscalculation’,” 3-11. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-north-koreas-arsenal-grows-experts-see-heightened-risk-of-miscalculation/2017/03/11/0a0b5cd2-05be-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.50002fdf2bcb>

A decade later, that confidence has all but evaporated. After a week in which Pyongyang successfully lobbed four intermediate-range missiles into the Sea of Japan, **U.S. officials are no longer seeing North Korea’s weapons tests as amateurish, attention-grabbing provocations. Instead, they are viewed as evidence of a rapidly growing threat** — and one that increasingly defies solution. Over the past year, **technological advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have dramatically raised the stakes in the years-long standoff between the United States and the reclusive communist regime**, according to current and former U.S. officials and ­Korea experts. **Pyongyang’s growing arsenal has rattled key U.S. allies and spurred efforts by all sides to develop new first-strike capabilities, increasing the risk that a simple mistake could trigger a devastating regional war**, the analysts said. The military developments are coming at a time of unusual political ferment, **with a new and largely untested administration in Washington and with South Korea’s government coping with an impeachment crisis**. Longtime observers say **the risk of conflict is higher than it has been in years**, **and it is likely to rise** further as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seeks to fulfill his pledge to field long-range missiles capable of striking U.S. cities. “This is no longer about a lonely dictator crying for attention or demanding negotiations,” said Victor Cha, a former adviser on North Korea to the Bush administration and the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “This is now a military testing program to acquire a proven capability.”

**Sample 1AC (8/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**North Korea causes allied proliferation and miscalculation, risking catastrophe**

**Warrick 2017**

Joby, “As North Korea’s arsenal grows, experts see heightened risk of ‘miscalculation’,” 3-11. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-north-koreas-arsenal-grows-experts-see-heightened-risk-of-miscalculation/2017/03/11/0a0b5cd2-05be-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.50002fdf2bcb>

**As more missiles streak across North Korea’s eastern coast, Japanese and South Korean officials are pledging increased investments in** defensive shields and highly accurate, **conventionally armed missiles designed to preemptively destroy North Korean launch sites and command centers** if an attack seems imminent. North Korea has responded with similar threats, describing its recent missile launches as a dry run for a preemptive attack on U.S. bases in Japan, the presumed staging ground for forces preparing to come to South Korea’s aid if war breaks out. In the past, such a strike would be seen as suicidal, as it would certainly result in a devastating counterattack against North ­Korea that would probably destroy the regime itself. But Kim is betting that an arsenal of long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles would serve as an effective deterrent, said Cha, the former Bush administration adviser. Military, defense and security at home and abroad. “That’s why they want to be able to reach the continental United States, so they can effectively hold us hostage,” Cha said. “Do we really want to trade Los Angeles for whatever city in North Korea?” Such an attack on the U.S. mainland is not yet within North Korea’s grasp, and U.S. officials hope they can eventually neutralize the threat with improvements in antimissile systems. But in the meantime, **each new advance increases the chance that a small mishap could rapidly escalate into all-out war,** Cha said. **In a crisis, “everyone is put in a use-it-or-lose-it situation,** in which everyone feels he has to go first,” he said. **“The growing danger now,”** he said, “is **miscalculation**.”

**Sample 1AC (9/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Second: Diseases**

**Large-scale disease outbreaks are inevitable, only US-Chinese cooperation allows for detection and response to a pandemic**

**Schell and Shirk 2019**

Orville, and Susan, Co-chairs of the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy, “Course Correction: Towards an Effective and Sustainable China Policy,” February, <https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/CourseCorrection_FINAL_2.7.19_1.pdf>

Third, **the United States should continue to work collaboratively with China to address global public goods issues. Global public health is one such area ripe for more collaborative action.** It is important to remember that there are many global problems where the two nations have more to gain from working in concert than by working apart. For example, **because pandemic diseases easily cross borders, they are shared challenges that neither nation can effectively address alone. The United States and China are already making some progress collaborating in this domain.** For instance, in Liberia they established a Center for Disease Control and Cooperation and together launched the U.S.-China Collaborative Program on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases. **The United States should work collaboratively with China to launch more such programs in other regions, while at the same time encouraging Beijing to provide more information to the global community about disease outbreaks within its own borders. Due to its large population, there is a significant risk that the next epidemic will originate in China,** and Beijing, with a track record of failing to report outbreaks promptly, must be made fully accountable for sharing such information in a timely manner.

**Sample 1AC (10/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Unchecked spread risks extinction---modern transportation ensures an epidemic.**

**Bar-Yam 2016**

Yaneer Bar-Yam, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, MIT, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI, 7-3-2016, <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition>

The video (Figure 1) shows a simple model of hosts and pathogens we have used to study evolutionary dynamics. In the animation, the green are hosts and red are pathogens. **As pathogens infect hosts, they spread across the system.** If you look closely, you will see that the red changes tint from time to time — that is the natural mutation of pathogens to become more or less aggressive. Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? **The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it.** Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED ] **When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes.** **They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction.** Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED ] As we add more long range transportation, **there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies.** The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. **We call this the phase transition to extinction. With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold.**  Figure 4: The probability of survival makes a sharp transition (red line) from one to zero as we add more long range transportaion (horizontal axis). The right line (black) holds for different model parameters, so we need to study at what point the transition will take place for our world. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. **Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa.** It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. **As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase.** So how close are we to the tipping point?

**Sample 1AC (11/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Third: Global Warming:**

**China-US Cooperation is necessary to fight global warming—the world is waiting for leadership**

**Sengupta 2018**

Somini, New York Times, Dec. 7th, 2018, US China Friction Threatens to Undercut the Fight Against Climate Change, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/climate/us-china-climate-change.html>

**They have the largest carbon footprints. Also the largest economies. Now,** as diplomats meet in Poland for high-stakes climate negotiations, **a pitched standoff between the United States and China threatens to slow global action on climate change precisely at a time when the risks of catastrophe are accelerating.** The [tensions between Washington and Beijing](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/us/politics/trump-xi-g-20.html?module=inline) range from trade to cybersecurity to military rivalry in the Pacific. And while some of those issues have simmered for years, **cooperation in the fight against climate change had once been a bright spot,** so much so that it propelled the creation of the landmark global agreement in Paris in 2015 to curb greenhouse gas emissions. But then the Trump administration announced its intention to pull out of the Paris pact altogether, rejecting the scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet. That represented perhaps the most consequential diplomatic reversal of the Trump era. **“The biggest threats to the planet are the lack of U.S. climate leadership at home and the unwillingness of the U.S. to engage with China,”** said Joanna Lewis, a China specialist at Georgetown University. **“The rest of the world looks to the U.S. and China for leadership, and it has become clear that, as the alliance has waned, global momentum to address climate change has slowed.” Taken together, the emissions produced by the United States and China account for more than 40 percent of the global total.**

**Sample 1AC (12/17): Advantage Two: US-China Relations**

**Climate Change makes global conflict inevitable**

**Wells-Wallace 2017**

**David, July, New York Magazine,  The Uninhabitable Earth,** [**http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html**](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html)

Climatologists are very careful when talking about Syria. They want you to know that while climate change did produce a drought that contributed to civil war, it is not exactly fair to saythat the conflict is the result of warming; next door, for instance, Lebanon suffered the same crop failures. But researchers like Marshall Burke and Solomon Hsiang have managed to quantify some of the non-obvious relationships between temperature and violence: **For every half-degree of warming, they say, societies will see between a 10 and 20 percent increase in the likelihood of armed conflict.** In climate science, nothing is simple, but the arithmetic is harrowing: **A planet five degrees warmer would have at least half again as many wars as we do today.** Overall, **social conflict could more than double** this century. This is one reason that, as nearly every climate scientist I spoke to pointed out, **the U.S. military is obsessed with climate change:** The drowning of all American Navy bases by sea-level rise is trouble enough, but being the world’s policeman is quite a bit harder when the crime rate doubles. Of course, it’s not just Syria where climate has contributed to conflict. Some speculate that **the elevated level of strife across the Middle East over the past generation reflects the pressures of global warming** — a hypothesis all the more cruel considering that warming began accelerating when the industrialized world extracted and then burned the region’s oil. What accounts for the relationship between climate and conflict? Some of **it comes down to agriculture and economics; a lot has to do with forced migration, already at a record high, with at least 65 million displaced people wandering the planet right now.** But **there is also the simple fact of individual irritability. Heat increases municipal crime rates, and swearing on social media,** and the likelihood that a major-league pitcher, coming to the mound after his teammate has been hit by a pitch, will hit an opposing batter in retaliation. And the arrival of air-conditioning in the developed world, in the middle of the past century, did little to solve the problem of the summer crime wave.

**Sample 1AC (13/17): Plan and Solvency**

**Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce Foreign Military and Direct Commercial Sales of Arms from the United States to the People’s Republic of China.**

**Solvency:**

**Arm Sales don’t meaningfully alter the balance of military might between Taiwan and China anymore. Therefore, we should stop selling arms and more broadly engage China. Even if other nations fill-in for us, it won’t impact US-China relations anymore.**

**Goldstein 2011**

Lyle J., Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival, vol. 53 no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 89–116

**With respect to the sensitive arms-sales issue, a new US approach is now warranted.** Stark **geographic reality, combined with the radically altered military balance in China’s favour, suggest that continued arms sales are, to a very large extent, symbolic in nature.** For example, more advanced F-16s could be purchased by Taipei, but in an actual conflict with China, these aircraft would almost surely never leave the ground, as their bases would likely be quickly obliterated by Chinese missile strikes. Thus, **it will make little or no practical difference to the military balance if such arms sales are made or not. Arms sales could safely be reduced** gradually over time in both volume and scope, consistent with the 1982 communiqué between Washington and Beijing. **Diplomacy should also yield local confidence-building measures,** such as the withdrawal of some Chinese strike platforms to locations at greater distance from Taiwan, a proposal that Jiang Zemin himself put on the table back in 2002. **If arms manufacturers from other nations want to step into the vacuum, so be it, but this issue should no longer form an obstruction to wider US–China cooperation.** This legacy of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War must be allowed to fade into history. Indeed, the Taiwan issue was always a historical anomaly, occasioned by China’s extraordinary weakness during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Washington and its allies may legitimately require defensible positions in the Western Pacific, but for historical and geo-strategic reasons Taiwan is not the place to draw such a line. Those who reach immediately for the ‘appeasement cudgel’ ought to seriously consider the sober reflection of Paul Kennedy, who asked recently, ‘whether acts of appeasing a rival might not sometimes be a good thing … We [Americans] are going to have to trim our sails and no longer try to bestride the world like a colossus. As we do so, we shall make a concession here, a concession there.’ Washington may ‘prefer History to freeze, right [here], and forever’, but as Kennedy warns, ‘history … has a habit of wandering off all on its own’.31 In early 2009, Commander of Pacific Command Admiral Tim Keating said that the **‘easing of tensions between [the mainland and Taiwan] was a US priority’**.32 **Now, after considerable progress has been achieved by Taipei and Beijing in improving the cross-Strait relationship, Washington must take the initiative to capitalise on what amounts to an extraordinary window of opportunity for regional and global security**. Puerile arguments about jurisdiction over rocks in the South and East China Seas cannot be permitted to obscure the larger strategic issues. **It will ultimately be better to make compromises while Washington still maintains a highly favourable balance of power.**

**Sample 1AC (14/17): Solvency**

**If the U.S. reduces its arm sales to Taiwan, it will end their movement towards independence, encouraging an accommodation strategy, which reduces the risk of war**

**Chen et al 2017**

Ping-Kuei, National Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner, and William Reed, University of Maryland, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” October, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>

While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for claims about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, we believe **it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed lead Taiwanese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining power** vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: it is also plausible that, in such a scenario, **Taiwan’s leaders would feel they had no other choice but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC.** Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn’t obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that **Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing’s incentives to consider military force.** In short, **how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward;** in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.

**The plan will disempower the independence movement and encourage negotiations**

**Hickey 2011**

Dennis V. Hickey, James F. Morris endowed professor of political science, “U.S. Policy and Cross-Strait Rapprochement: What Beijing May Expect from Washington,” chapter in: China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics: The Shaping of a New Regional Order – edited by Mingjiang Li, google books

From the PRC's viewpoint, **America often stands in the way of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.** Authorities insist that **US weapons create a climate encouraging Taipei's refusal to enter into meaningful negotiations.** But Washington and Taipei dispute such claims. They argue that **US arms sales make the island more confident** and promote a resolution of the Taiwan issue by enabling Taipei to negotiate from a position of strength Indeed, President Ma contends that "the relaxed tensions across the Strait depend very much on the continued supply of arms from the United States to Taiwan. Certainly Taiwan will not feel comfortable to go to a negotiat- ing table without sufficient defense buildup in order to protect the safety Of the island. **PRC position toward the arms sales issue may hold some merit.** After all, **public opinion polls in Taiwan reveal that support for unification or independence is conditional and dependent upon** on numerous variables. For example, if Beijing undertakes meaningful political reform, support for unification may increase. However, **US military support can bolster the Taiwan independence movement.** This assistance might take numerous forms. For example, a pledge to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan will embolden separatists and increase their numbers. **An escalation in US arms sales may likewise boost the drive to seek independence and oppose unification.**

**Sample 1AC (15/17): Solvency**

**Taiwan’s de-politicization will reduce tensions and prevent conflict**

**Gilley 2010**

Bruce, Portland State University, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits>

Most important, **Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.** In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, **there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict.** The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, **sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value.** In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. **The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit. By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills.** **Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole.** Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the asean Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, **Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia.** More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power. **Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.** In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development.

**Sample 1AC (16/17): Solvency**

**The signal of the plan solves --- rebuilds US-China relations, defuses tensions and bolsters diplomatic credibility and leverage**

**Thrall and Dorminey 2018**

Trevor, George Mason University, and Caroline, Cato Institute “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Policy Analysis No. 836, March 13, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>

But the case for doing so is made even stronger by the fact that **greatly reducing arms sales would also produce two significant benefits for the United States** that cannot otherwise be enjoyed. **The first benefit from reducing arms sales would be greater diplomatic flexibility and leverage.** Critics might argue that even if arms sales are an imperfect tool, forgoing arms sales will eliminate a potential source of leverage. We argue that, on the contrary, **the diplomatic gains from forgoing arms sales will outweigh the potential leverage or other benefits from arms sales.** Most importantly, by refraining from arming nations engaged in conflict, **the United States will have the diplomatic flexibility to engage with all parties as an honest broker.** The inherent difficulty of negotiating while arming one side is obvious today with respect to North and South Korea. After decades of U.S. support for South Korea, North Korea clearly does not trust the United States. Similarly, U.S. attempts to help negotiate a peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians have long been complicated by American support for Israel. To stop arming one side of a contentious relationship is not to suggest that the United States does not have a preferred outcome in such cases. Rather, **by staying out of the military domain the United States can more readily encourage dialogue and diplomacy.** Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example, though it is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other countries to provide for its defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United States. **Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help defuse U.S.-China tensions**. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, **China would clearly prefer a situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy in general, as well as greater stability in the Pacific region**. Most important, **breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming entangled in a future conflict between Taiwan and China**. The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the United States with greater moral authority.

**Sample 1AC (17/17): Pre-emptive Arguments:**

**Specifically, economic interdependence does not prevent this war**

**White 2013**

Hugh, Australian National University, 2013 (“Power and Ambition,” *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*, Published by Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199684717, p. 50-53

12 The lesson to draw is that **interdependence increases the incentive for leaders to subordinate political ambitions and ignore nationalist sentiments, but it does not remove the need for them to take these bold and politically risky steps.** **The hard choices still have to be made**. It is easy for leaders to see that economic interests require them to compromise their countries’ aspirations for international status and power, but **it is harder** for them to acknowledge that to their people, and harder still **to put their economic interests ahead of strategic and political ones when a choice has to be made.** In fact, most often people see it as **shameful** to put economic concerns first when issues of power and status are engaged. What president would tell the American people that their country will compromise its position on an issue like Taiwan in order to protect America’s economic interests? What Chinese leader could make the same argument to the Chinese people? **When a choice has to be made, especially when it has to be made in the glare of an international crisis, it is very hard to put economics first**. In some ways **the obvious importance of economic interdependence increases rather than limits the risk that rivalry will escalate, because of the way it can affect one country’s view of the other’s priorities.** There seems to be a pattern here: **each side believes that the imperatives of interdependence will press more heavily on the other.** That inclines both governments to assume that the other will compromise to protect the economic relationship, so they do not have to do so. In Washington they expect China to back down from its challenge to America once Beijing understands the economic risks of rivalry. In Beijing they think America will blink. **That makes both of them less inclined to compromise their own position – which makes escalation more likely**. Ultimately, faith in the power of interdependence boils down to faith in the power of money to trump other emotions and motivations. That is a risky proposition. We cannot assume that Chinese leaders will always choose rationally to maximise China’s objective benefits. They are no less liable than the leaders of any other country to allow what may be, or may seem to us to be, **irrational desires for status and influence** to trump the rational calculations of national interest.

**Sample 1AC (5/15): Pre-Emptive Arguments**

**No appeasement or loss of credibility arguments: China isn’t interested in broader advances, and other US commitments prevent loss of face in Asia**

**Glaser 2011**

Charles, George Washington University. “Will China's Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war>

Given such risks, **the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan.** This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. **Critics** of such a move **argue that it would result in** not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: **Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement;** instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward--**spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong,** however, **because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail.** Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. **When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.** The key question, then, is whether China has limited or unlimited goals. It is true that China has disagreements with several of its neighbors, but **there is actually little reason to believe that it has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region** or beyond. Concessions on Taiwan would thus risk encouraging China to pursue more demanding policies on those issues for which the status quo is currently disputed, including the status of the offshore islands and maritime borders in the East China and South China seas. But **the risks of reduced U.S. credibility for protecting allies when the status quo is crystal clear--as is the case with Japan and South Korea--should be small, especially if any change in policy on Taiwan is accompanied by countervailing measures** (such as a renewed declaration of the United States' other alliance commitments, a reinforcement of U.S. forward deployed troops, and an increase in joint military exercises and technological cooperation with U.S. allies).

**Thoughts on expanding the Aff:**

The most dangerous negative arguments on the topic surround the DA/Solvency take-out of fill-in by other nations (which is irrelevant here because of the relations advantage/focus of the affirmative, and the lack of security guarantees by other nations), and leadership/hegemony DAs about assurance, deterrence, etc. This affirmative is designed to answer these cases.

Thus, changes/expansions to the case would have to avoid messing with this strategic advantage. Researchers could come up with additional US-China relations impacts (there are probably dozens), and rotate them so that the other team never knows what is coming. Alternatively, the affirmative could focus on the “China Rise” question, and how engaging China (and demilitarizing the Taiwan issue could help lure China into multi-lateral institutions, where progress on AI, Warming, and other global questions could be discussed.

Another approach is to consider President Trump. One of his first acts was to break diplomatic protocol and call the Taiwanese President first upon his election, and his campaign refrain is “getting tough on China.” Using the affirmative to constrain Trump will be a powerful way to prevent miscalculation and to prevent the trade war from escalating.

Instead of offering a comprehensive literature review, I encourage you to research for yourself. This is an easy area to research, with every think-tank and university writing extensively on the subject. I will also refer you to open evidence to the myriad of China related cases. Read these with two ideas in mind:

1. The evidence is produced by your peers: Open evidence cases are designed largely by students at debate camps across the country each summer. Some of the research will be good….and a lot of it won’t be. There are incentives created by lab leaders to encourage quantity over quality when producing these files.
2. Competitive gain: If a student finds 10 good cards, and 50 other cards…they’ll probably keep the good ones for themselves, so you are only looking at the B- stuff they were willing to share. Beating the good teams means having the best evidence (that you find yourself) and knowing the literature better than the other team.